From: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev
Subject: Re: [PATCH RFC 3/3] coredump: support AF_UNIX sockets
Date: Fri, 2 May 2025 01:35:08 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202505020143.Kuje6Wsb-lkp@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250430-work-coredump-socket-v1-3-2faf027dbb47@kernel.org>
Hi Christian,
[This is a private test report for your RFC patch.]
kernel test robot noticed the following build errors:
[auto build test ERROR on 80e14080a00bc429a4ee440d17746a49867df663]
url: https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Christian-Brauner/coredump-massage-format_corname/20250430-191417
base: 80e14080a00bc429a4ee440d17746a49867df663
patch link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250430-work-coredump-socket-v1-3-2faf027dbb47%40kernel.org
patch subject: [PATCH RFC 3/3] coredump: support AF_UNIX sockets
config: nios2-randconfig-002-20250501 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250502/202505020143.Kuje6Wsb-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: nios2-linux-gcc (GCC) 7.5.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20250502/202505020143.Kuje6Wsb-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)
If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202505020143.Kuje6Wsb-lkp@intel.com/
All errors (new ones prefixed by >>):
nios2-linux-ld: fs/coredump.o: in function `do_coredump':
fs/coredump.c:851: undefined reference to `__sys_socket_file'
>> fs/coredump.c:851:(.text+0x14b4): relocation truncated to fit: R_NIOS2_CALL26 against `__sys_socket_file'
>> nios2-linux-ld: fs/coredump.c:870: undefined reference to `__sys_connect_file'
>> fs/coredump.c:870:(.text+0x14d4): relocation truncated to fit: R_NIOS2_CALL26 against `__sys_connect_file'
>> nios2-linux-ld: fs/coredump.c:875: undefined reference to `sock_from_file'
>> fs/coredump.c:875:(.text+0x14e0): relocation truncated to fit: R_NIOS2_CALL26 against `sock_from_file'
>> nios2-linux-ld: fs/coredump.c:875: undefined reference to `__sys_shutdown_sock'
>> fs/coredump.c:875:(.text+0x14ec): relocation truncated to fit: R_NIOS2_CALL26 against `__sys_shutdown_sock'
vim +851 fs/coredump.c
621
622 void do_coredump(const kernel_siginfo_t *siginfo)
623 {
624 struct core_state core_state;
625 struct core_name cn;
626 struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
627 struct linux_binfmt * binfmt;
628 const struct cred *old_cred;
629 struct cred *cred;
630 int retval = 0;
631 size_t *argv = NULL;
632 int argc = 0;
633 /* require nonrelative corefile path and be extra careful */
634 bool need_suid_safe = false;
635 bool core_dumped = false;
636 static atomic_t core_dump_count = ATOMIC_INIT(0);
637 struct coredump_params cprm = {
638 .siginfo = siginfo,
639 .limit = rlimit(RLIMIT_CORE),
640 /*
641 * We must use the same mm->flags while dumping core to avoid
642 * inconsistency of bit flags, since this flag is not protected
643 * by any locks.
644 */
645 .mm_flags = mm->flags,
646 .vma_meta = NULL,
647 .cpu = raw_smp_processor_id(),
648 };
649
650 audit_core_dumps(siginfo->si_signo);
651
652 binfmt = mm->binfmt;
653 if (!binfmt || !binfmt->core_dump)
654 goto fail;
655 if (!__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags))
656 goto fail;
657
658 cred = prepare_creds();
659 if (!cred)
660 goto fail;
661 /*
662 * We cannot trust fsuid as being the "true" uid of the process
663 * nor do we know its entire history. We only know it was tainted
664 * so we dump it as root in mode 2, and only into a controlled
665 * environment (pipe handler or fully qualified path).
666 */
667 if (__get_dumpable(cprm.mm_flags) == SUID_DUMP_ROOT) {
668 /* Setuid core dump mode */
669 cred->fsuid = GLOBAL_ROOT_UID; /* Dump root private */
670 need_suid_safe = true;
671 }
672
673 retval = coredump_wait(siginfo->si_signo, &core_state);
674 if (retval < 0)
675 goto fail_creds;
676
677 old_cred = override_creds(cred);
678
679 retval = format_corename(&cn, &cprm, &argv, &argc);
680 if (retval < 0) {
681 coredump_report_failure("format_corename failed, aborting core");
682 goto fail_unlock;
683 }
684
685 switch (cn.core_type) {
686 case COREDUMP_FILE: {
687 struct mnt_idmap *idmap;
688 struct inode *inode;
689 int open_flags = O_CREAT | O_WRONLY | O_NOFOLLOW |
690 O_LARGEFILE | O_EXCL;
691
692 if (cprm.limit < binfmt->min_coredump)
693 goto fail_unlock;
694
695 if (need_suid_safe && cn.corename[0] != '/') {
696 coredump_report_failure(
697 "this process can only dump core to a fully qualified path, skipping core dump");
698 goto fail_unlock;
699 }
700
701 /*
702 * Unlink the file if it exists unless this is a SUID
703 * binary - in that case, we're running around with root
704 * privs and don't want to unlink another user's coredump.
705 */
706 if (!need_suid_safe) {
707 /*
708 * If it doesn't exist, that's fine. If there's some
709 * other problem, we'll catch it at the filp_open().
710 */
711 do_unlinkat(AT_FDCWD, getname_kernel(cn.corename));
712 }
713
714 /*
715 * There is a race between unlinking and creating the
716 * file, but if that causes an EEXIST here, that's
717 * fine - another process raced with us while creating
718 * the corefile, and the other process won. To userspace,
719 * what matters is that at least one of the two processes
720 * writes its coredump successfully, not which one.
721 */
722 if (need_suid_safe) {
723 /*
724 * Using user namespaces, normal user tasks can change
725 * their current->fs->root to point to arbitrary
726 * directories. Since the intention of the "only dump
727 * with a fully qualified path" rule is to control where
728 * coredumps may be placed using root privileges,
729 * current->fs->root must not be used. Instead, use the
730 * root directory of init_task.
731 */
732 struct path root;
733
734 task_lock(&init_task);
735 get_fs_root(init_task.fs, &root);
736 task_unlock(&init_task);
737 cprm.file = file_open_root(&root, cn.corename,
738 open_flags, 0600);
739 path_put(&root);
740 } else {
741 cprm.file = filp_open(cn.corename, open_flags, 0600);
742 }
743 if (IS_ERR(cprm.file))
744 goto fail_unlock;
745
746 inode = file_inode(cprm.file);
747 if (inode->i_nlink > 1)
748 goto close_fail;
749 if (d_unhashed(cprm.file->f_path.dentry))
750 goto close_fail;
751 /*
752 * AK: actually i see no reason to not allow this for named
753 * pipes etc, but keep the previous behaviour for now.
754 */
755 if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
756 goto close_fail;
757 /*
758 * Don't dump core if the filesystem changed owner or mode
759 * of the file during file creation. This is an issue when
760 * a process dumps core while its cwd is e.g. on a vfat
761 * filesystem.
762 */
763 idmap = file_mnt_idmap(cprm.file);
764 if (!vfsuid_eq_kuid(i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, inode),
765 current_fsuid())) {
766 coredump_report_failure("Core dump to %s aborted: "
767 "cannot preserve file owner", cn.corename);
768 goto close_fail;
769 }
770 if ((inode->i_mode & 0677) != 0600) {
771 coredump_report_failure("Core dump to %s aborted: "
772 "cannot preserve file permissions", cn.corename);
773 goto close_fail;
774 }
775 if (!(cprm.file->f_mode & FMODE_CAN_WRITE))
776 goto close_fail;
777 if (do_truncate(idmap, cprm.file->f_path.dentry,
778 0, 0, cprm.file))
779 goto close_fail;
780 break;
781 }
782 case COREDUMP_PIPE: {
783 int argi;
784 int dump_count;
785 char **helper_argv;
786 struct subprocess_info *sub_info;
787
788 if (cprm.limit == 1) {
789 /* See umh_coredump_setup() which sets RLIMIT_CORE = 1.
790 *
791 * Normally core limits are irrelevant to pipes, since
792 * we're not writing to the file system, but we use
793 * cprm.limit of 1 here as a special value, this is a
794 * consistent way to catch recursive crashes.
795 * We can still crash if the core_pattern binary sets
796 * RLIM_CORE = !1, but it runs as root, and can do
797 * lots of stupid things.
798 *
799 * Note that we use task_tgid_vnr here to grab the pid
800 * of the process group leader. That way we get the
801 * right pid if a thread in a multi-threaded
802 * core_pattern process dies.
803 */
804 coredump_report_failure("RLIMIT_CORE is set to 1, aborting core");
805 goto fail_unlock;
806 }
807 cprm.limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
808
809 dump_count = atomic_inc_return(&core_dump_count);
810 if (core_pipe_limit && (core_pipe_limit < dump_count)) {
811 coredump_report_failure("over core_pipe_limit, skipping core dump");
812 goto fail_dropcount;
813 }
814
815 helper_argv = kmalloc_array(argc + 1, sizeof(*helper_argv),
816 GFP_KERNEL);
817 if (!helper_argv) {
818 coredump_report_failure("%s failed to allocate memory", __func__);
819 goto fail_dropcount;
820 }
821 for (argi = 0; argi < argc; argi++)
822 helper_argv[argi] = cn.corename + argv[argi];
823 helper_argv[argi] = NULL;
824
825 retval = -ENOMEM;
826 sub_info = call_usermodehelper_setup(helper_argv[0],
827 helper_argv, NULL, GFP_KERNEL,
828 umh_coredump_setup, NULL, &cprm);
829 if (sub_info)
830 retval = call_usermodehelper_exec(sub_info,
831 UMH_WAIT_EXEC);
832
833 kfree(helper_argv);
834 if (retval) {
835 coredump_report_failure("|%s pipe failed", cn.corename);
836 goto close_fail;
837 }
838 break;
839 }
840 case COREDUMP_SOCK: {
841 struct file *file __free(fput) = NULL;
842 struct sockaddr_un unix_addr = {
843 .sun_family = AF_UNIX,
844 };
845 struct sockaddr_storage *addr;
846
847 retval = strscpy(unix_addr.sun_path, cn.corename, sizeof(unix_addr.sun_path));
848 if (retval < 0)
849 goto close_fail;
850
> 851 file = __sys_socket_file(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
852 if (IS_ERR(file))
853 goto close_fail;
854
855 /*
856 * It is possible that the userspace process which is
857 * supposed to handle the coredump and is listening on
858 * the AF_UNIX socket coredumps. This should be fine
859 * though. If this was the only process which was
860 * listen()ing on the AF_UNIX socket for coredumps it
861 * obviously won't be listen()ing anymore by the time it
862 * gets here. So the __sys_connect_file() call will
863 * often fail with ECONNREFUSED and the coredump.
864 *
865 * In general though, userspace should just mark itself
866 * non dumpable and not do any of this nonsense. We
867 * shouldn't work around this.
868 */
869 addr = (struct sockaddr_storage *)(&unix_addr);
> 870 retval = __sys_connect_file(file, addr, sizeof(unix_addr), O_CLOEXEC);
871 if (retval)
872 goto close_fail;
873
874 /* The peer isn't supposed to write and we for sure won't read. */
> 875 retval = __sys_shutdown_sock(sock_from_file(file), SHUT_RD);
876 if (retval)
877 goto close_fail;
878
879 cprm.file = no_free_ptr(file);
880 cprm.limit = RLIM_INFINITY;
881 break;
882 }
883 default:
884 WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
885 retval = -EINVAL;
886 goto close_fail;
887 }
888
889 /* get us an unshared descriptor table; almost always a no-op */
890 /* The cell spufs coredump code reads the file descriptor tables */
891 retval = unshare_files();
892 if (retval)
893 goto close_fail;
894 if (!dump_interrupted()) {
895 /*
896 * umh disabled with CONFIG_STATIC_USERMODEHELPER_PATH="" would
897 * have this set to NULL.
898 */
899 if (!cprm.file) {
900 coredump_report_failure("Core dump to |%s disabled", cn.corename);
901 goto close_fail;
902 }
903 if (!dump_vma_snapshot(&cprm))
904 goto close_fail;
905
906 file_start_write(cprm.file);
907 core_dumped = binfmt->core_dump(&cprm);
908 /*
909 * Ensures that file size is big enough to contain the current
910 * file postion. This prevents gdb from complaining about
911 * a truncated file if the last "write" to the file was
912 * dump_skip.
913 */
914 if (cprm.to_skip) {
915 cprm.to_skip--;
916 dump_emit(&cprm, "", 1);
917 }
918 file_end_write(cprm.file);
919 free_vma_snapshot(&cprm);
920 }
921 if ((cn.core_type == COREDUMP_PIPE) && core_pipe_limit)
922 wait_for_dump_helpers(cprm.file);
923 close_fail:
924 if (cprm.file)
925 filp_close(cprm.file, NULL);
926 fail_dropcount:
927 if (cn.core_type == COREDUMP_PIPE)
928 atomic_dec(&core_dump_count);
929 fail_unlock:
930 kfree(argv);
931 kfree(cn.corename);
932 coredump_finish(core_dumped);
933 revert_creds(old_cred);
934 fail_creds:
935 put_cred(cred);
936 fail:
937 return;
938 }
939
--
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-01 17:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-30 11:05 [PATCH RFC 0/3] coredump: support AF_UNIX sockets Christian Brauner
2025-04-30 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC 1/3] coredump: massage format_corname() Christian Brauner
2025-04-30 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC 2/3] coredump: massage do_coredump() Christian Brauner
2025-04-30 11:05 ` [PATCH RFC 3/3] coredump: support AF_UNIX sockets Christian Brauner
2025-04-30 11:14 ` Christian Brauner
2025-05-01 0:25 ` Kuniyuki Iwashima
2025-05-01 17:35 ` kernel test robot
2025-05-01 17:35 ` kernel test robot [this message]
2025-04-30 11:14 ` [PATCH RFC 0/3] " Christian Brauner
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