From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Dionna Amalie Glaze <dionnaglaze@google.com>,
Kevin Loughlin <kevinloughlin@google.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Subject: [RFT PATCH v2 17/23] x86/sev: Move __sev_[get|put]_ghcb() into separate noinstr object
Date: Sun, 4 May 2025 11:52:47 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250504095230.2932860-42-ardb+git@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250504095230.2932860-25-ardb+git@google.com>
From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Rename sev-nmi.c to sev-noinstr.c, and move the get/put GHCB routines
into it too.
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c | 75 --------------------
arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile | 6 +-
arch/x86/coco/sev/{sev-nmi.c => sev-noinstr.c} | 74 +++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 77 insertions(+), 78 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
index 2c2a5a043f18..6ba50723d546 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/startup/sev-startup.c
@@ -41,84 +41,9 @@
#include <asm/cpuid.h>
#include <asm/cmdline.h>
-
-/*
- * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
- * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
- *
- * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
- */
-noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
- /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
-
- if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
- /*
- * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
- * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
- * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
- * can be printed out.
- */
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
-
- instrumentation_begin();
- panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
- instrumentation_end();
- }
-
- /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
- data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
-
- state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
-
- /* Backup GHCB content */
- *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
- } else {
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- data->ghcb_active = true;
- }
-
- return ghcb;
-}
-
/* Include code shared with pre-decompression boot stage */
#include "sev-shared.c"
-noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
-{
- struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
- struct ghcb *ghcb;
-
- WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
-
- data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
- ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
-
- if (state->ghcb) {
- /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
- *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
- data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
- state->ghcb = NULL;
- } else {
- /*
- * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
- * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
- */
- vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
- data->ghcb_active = false;
- }
-}
-
void __head
early_set_pages_state(unsigned long vaddr, unsigned long paddr,
unsigned long npages, enum psc_op op)
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
index db3255b979bd..b348c9486315 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/Makefile
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
-obj-y += core.o sev-nmi.o vc-handle.o
+obj-y += core.o sev-noinstr.o vc-handle.o
# Clang 14 and older may fail to respect __no_sanitize_undefined when inlining
-UBSAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
+UBSAN_SANITIZE_sev-noinstr.o := n
# GCC may fail to respect __no_sanitize_address when inlining
-KASAN_SANITIZE_sev-nmi.o := n
+KASAN_SANITIZE_sev-noinstr.o := n
diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-noinstr.c
similarity index 61%
rename from arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
rename to arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-noinstr.c
index d8dfaddfb367..b527eafb6312 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-nmi.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/sev-noinstr.c
@@ -106,3 +106,77 @@ void noinstr __sev_es_nmi_complete(void)
__sev_put_ghcb(&state);
}
+
+/*
+ * Nothing shall interrupt this code path while holding the per-CPU
+ * GHCB. The backup GHCB is only for NMIs interrupting this path.
+ *
+ * Callers must disable local interrupts around it.
+ */
+noinstr struct ghcb *__sev_get_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (unlikely(data->ghcb_active)) {
+ /* GHCB is already in use - save its contents */
+
+ if (unlikely(data->backup_ghcb_active)) {
+ /*
+ * Backup-GHCB is also already in use. There is no way
+ * to continue here so just kill the machine. To make
+ * panic() work, mark GHCBs inactive so that messages
+ * can be printed out.
+ */
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+
+ instrumentation_begin();
+ panic("Unable to handle #VC exception! GHCB and Backup GHCB are already in use");
+ instrumentation_end();
+ }
+
+ /* Mark backup_ghcb active before writing to it */
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = true;
+
+ state->ghcb = &data->backup_ghcb;
+
+ /* Backup GHCB content */
+ *state->ghcb = *ghcb;
+ } else {
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ data->ghcb_active = true;
+ }
+
+ return ghcb;
+}
+
+noinstr void __sev_put_ghcb(struct ghcb_state *state)
+{
+ struct sev_es_runtime_data *data;
+ struct ghcb *ghcb;
+
+ WARN_ON(!irqs_disabled());
+
+ data = this_cpu_read(runtime_data);
+ ghcb = &data->ghcb_page;
+
+ if (state->ghcb) {
+ /* Restore GHCB from Backup */
+ *ghcb = *state->ghcb;
+ data->backup_ghcb_active = false;
+ state->ghcb = NULL;
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Invalidate the GHCB so a VMGEXIT instruction issued
+ * from userspace won't appear to be valid.
+ */
+ vc_ghcb_invalidate(ghcb);
+ data->ghcb_active = false;
+ }
+}
--
2.49.0.906.g1f30a19c02-goog
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-05-04 9:53 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 59+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-05-04 9:52 [RFT PATCH v2 00/23] x86: strict separation of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 01/23] x86/boot: Move early_setup_gdt() back into head64.c Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 02/23] x86/boot: Disregard __supported_pte_mask in __startup_64() Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 03/23] x86/boot: Drop global variables keeping track of LA57 state Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 13:50 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-04 14:46 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:58 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-05-04 19:33 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 21:07 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-05 21:24 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-05 22:30 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 21:26 ` Linus Torvalds
2025-05-05 21:51 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 04/23] x86/sev: Make sev_snp_enabled() a static function Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 05/23] x86/sev: Move instruction decoder into separate source file Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 14:48 ` [RFT PATCH v2 05/23] " Tom Lendacky
2025-05-05 14:50 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-07 9:58 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-07 11:49 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-08 11:08 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 06/23] x86/sev: Disentangle #VC handling code from startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 5:31 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 14:58 ` [RFT PATCH v2 06/23] " Tom Lendacky
2025-05-05 16:54 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 07/23] x86/sev: Separate MSR and GHCB based snp_cpuid() via a callback Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 08/23] x86/sev: Fall back to early page state change code only during boot Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 09/23] x86/sev: Move GHCB page based HV communication out of startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 10/23] x86/sev: Use boot SVSM CA for all startup and init code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 11/23] x86/boot: Drop redundant RMPADJUST in SEV SVSM presence check Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 12/23] x86/sev: Unify SEV-SNP hypervisor feature check Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 13/23] x86/linkage: Add SYM_PIC_ALIAS() macro helper to emit symbol aliases Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 14/23] x86/boot: Add a bunch of PIC aliases Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 15/23] x86/boot: Provide __pti_set_user_pgtbl() to startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:20 ` [tip: x86/boot] " tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 16:03 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:19 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 16:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-06 7:18 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-05 16:54 ` tip-bot2 for Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 16/23] x86/sev: Provide PIC aliases for SEV related data objects Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 18/23] x86/sev: Export startup routines for ordinary use Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 19/23] x86/boot: Created a confined code area for startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 20/23] x86/boot: Move startup code out of __head section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 21/23] x86/boot: Disallow absolute symbol references in startup code Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 22/23] x86/boot: Revert "Reject absolute references in .head.text" Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 9:52 ` [RFT PATCH v2 23/23] x86/boot: Get rid of the .head.text section Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-04 14:04 ` [RFT PATCH v2 00/23] x86: strict separation of startup code Ingo Molnar
2025-05-04 14:55 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-05 5:08 ` Ingo Molnar
2025-05-07 9:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-07 12:05 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2025-05-08 10:55 ` Borislav Petkov
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