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From: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
To: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	omosnace@redhat.com, netdev@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 27/42] selinux: introduce task_obj_perm()
Date: Fri, 13 Jun 2025 15:15:25 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250613141525.GG414686@horms.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250610172226.1470741-28-stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

On Tue, Jun 10, 2025 at 01:21:58PM -0400, Stephen Smalley wrote:
> Introduce task_obj_perm() for namespace-aware permission checking
> between two tasks using the objective SID for both tasks and
> without assuming that either task is current.
> 
> Convert the permission checks of this form in the hook functions
> to use this new helper.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>

...

> +int task_obj_has_perm(const struct task_struct *s,
> +		      const struct task_struct *t,
> +		      u16 tclass, u32 requested,
> +		      struct common_audit_data *ad)
> +{
> +	const struct cred *cred;
> +	const struct task_security_struct *tsec;
> +	struct selinux_state *state;
> +	u32 ssid;
> +	u32 tsid;
> +	int rc;
> +
> +	state = current_selinux_state;
> +	rcu_read_lock();
> +	tsec = task_security(s);
> +	if (tsec)
> +		ssid = tsec->sid;
> +	else
> +		ssid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;

Hi Stephen,

Above it is assumed that tsec may be NULL...

> +	rcu_read_unlock();
> +
> +	do {
> +		tsid = task_sid_obj_for_state(t, state);
> +
> +		rc = avc_has_perm(state, ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, ad);
> +		if (rc)
> +			return rc;
> +
> +		cred = tsec->parent_cred;

... but here tsec is dereferenced without explicitly checking if it is not
NULL. I'm wondering if this is safe, e.g. due to the call to avc_has_perm().

Flagged by Smatch.

> +		if (!cred)
> +			break;
> +
> +		rcu_read_lock();
> +		tsec = selinux_cred(cred);
> +		ssid = tsec->sid;
> +		state = tsec->state;
> +		rcu_read_unlock();
> +	} while (cred);
> +
> +	return 0;
> +}

...

  reply	other threads:[~2025-06-13 14:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 49+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-06-10 17:21 [PATCH v4 00/42] SELinux namespace support Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 01/42] selinux: restore passing of selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 02/42] selinux: introduce current_selinux_state Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 03/42] selinux: support multiple selinuxfs instances Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 04/42] selinux: dynamically allocate selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-13 14:14   ` Simon Horman
2025-06-13 18:17     ` Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 05/42] netstate,selinux: create the selinux netlink socket per network namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 06/42] selinux: limit selinux netlink notifications to init namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 07/42] selinux: support per-task/cred selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 08/42] selinux: introduce cred_selinux_state() and use it Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 09/42] selinux: init inode from nearest initialized namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 10/42] selinux: add a selinuxfs interface to unshare selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 11/42] selinux: add limits for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 12/42] selinux: exempt creation of init SELinux namespace from limits Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 13/42] selinux: refactor selinux_state_create() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 14/42] selinux: allow userspace to detect non-init SELinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 15/42] selinuxfs: restrict write operations to the same selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 16/42] selinux: introduce a global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 17/42] selinux: wrap security server interfaces to use the " Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 18/42] selinux: introduce a Kconfig option for SELinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 19/42] selinux: eliminate global SID table if !CONFIG_SECURITY_SELINUX_NS Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 20/42] selinux: maintain a small cache in the global SID table Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 21/42] selinux: update hook functions to use correct selinux namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 22/42] selinux: introduce cred_task_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 23/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_extended_perms() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 24/42] selinux: introduce cred_self_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 25/42] selinux: introduce cred_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 26/42] selinux: introduce cred_ssid_has_perm() and cred_other_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 27/42] selinux: introduce task_obj_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-13 14:15   ` Simon Horman [this message]
2025-06-13 18:18     ` Stephen Smalley
2025-06-16 10:31       ` Simon Horman
2025-06-16 12:47         ` Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:21 ` [PATCH v4 28/42] selinux: update bprm hooks for selinux namespaces Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 29/42] selinux: add kerneldoc to new permission checking functions Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 30/42] selinux: convert selinux_file_send_sigiotask() to namespace-aware helper Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 31/42] selinux: rename cred_has_perm*() to cred_tsid_has_perm*() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 32/42] selinux: update cred_tsid_has_perm_noaudit() to return the combined avd Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 33/42] selinux: convert additional checks to cred_ssid_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 34/42] selinux: introduce selinux_state_has_perm() Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 35/42] selinux: annotate selinuxfs permission checks Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 36/42] selinux: annotate process transition " Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 37/42] selinux: convert xfrm and netlabel " Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 38/42] selinux: switch selinux_lsm_setattr() checks to current namespace Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 39/42] selinux: make open_perms namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 40/42] selinux: split cred_ssid_has_perm() into two cases Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 41/42] selinux: convert nlmsg_sock_has_extended_perms() to namespace-aware Stephen Smalley
2025-06-10 17:22 ` [PATCH v4 42/42] selinux: disallow writes to /sys/fs/selinux/user in non-init namespaces Stephen Smalley

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