From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2022-49948: vt: Clear selection before changing the font
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 13:00:13 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2025061809-CVE-2022-49948-e2a9@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vt: Clear selection before changing the font
When changing the console font with ioctl(KDFONTOP) the new font size
can be bigger than the previous font. A previous selection may thus now
be outside of the new screen size and thus trigger out-of-bounds
accesses to graphics memory if the selection is removed in
vc_do_resize().
Prevent such out-of-memory accesses by dropping the selection before the
various con_font_set() console handlers are called.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2022-49948 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Fixed in 4.9.328 with commit c555cf04684fde39b5b0dd9fd80730030ee10c4a
Fixed in 4.14.293 with commit e9ba4611ddf676194385506222cce7b0844e708e
Fixed in 4.19.258 with commit f74b4a41c5d7c9522469917e3072e55d435efd9e
Fixed in 5.4.213 with commit 1cf1930369c9dc428d827b60260c53271bff3285
Fixed in 5.10.142 with commit 989201bb8c00b222235aff04e6200230d29dc7bb
Fixed in 5.15.66 with commit 2535431ae967ad17585513649625fea7db28d4db
Fixed in 5.19.8 with commit c904fe03c4bd1f356a58797d39e2a5d0ca15cefc
Fixed in 6.0 with commit 566f9c9f89337792070b5a6062dff448b3e7977f
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2022-49948
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
drivers/tty/vt/vt.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c555cf04684fde39b5b0dd9fd80730030ee10c4a
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e9ba4611ddf676194385506222cce7b0844e708e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f74b4a41c5d7c9522469917e3072e55d435efd9e
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1cf1930369c9dc428d827b60260c53271bff3285
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/989201bb8c00b222235aff04e6200230d29dc7bb
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2535431ae967ad17585513649625fea7db28d4db
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c904fe03c4bd1f356a58797d39e2a5d0ca15cefc
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/566f9c9f89337792070b5a6062dff448b3e7977f
reply other threads:[~2025-06-18 11:02 UTC|newest]
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