From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5.10 v2 03/16] x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2025 05:04:30 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250618170549-44f28237a946cc4c@stable.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250617-its-5-10-v2-3-3e925a1512a1@linux.intel.com>
[ Sasha's backport helper bot ]
Hi,
✅ All tests passed successfully. No issues detected.
No action required from the submitter.
The upstream commit SHA1 provided is correct: 159013a7ca18c271ff64192deb62a689b622d860
Status in newer kernel trees:
6.15.y | Present (exact SHA1)
6.12.y | Present (different SHA1: a6f2a436e9d6)
6.6.y | Present (different SHA1: 195579752c23)
6.1.y | Present (different SHA1: 0eda20c29e12)
5.15.y | Present (different SHA1: 34be1a3100b0)
Note: The patch differs from the upstream commit:
---
1: 159013a7ca18c ! 1: 137854d52a7a4 x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug
@@ Metadata
## Commit message ##
x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug
+ commit 159013a7ca18c271ff64192deb62a689b622d860 upstream.
+
ITS bug in some pre-Alderlake Intel CPUs may allow indirect branches in the
first half of a cache line get predicted to a target of a branch located in
the second half of the cache line.
Set X86_BUG_ITS on affected CPUs. Mitigation to follow in later commits.
- Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>
+ Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
## arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h ##
@@
- #define X86_BUG_BHI X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* "bhi" CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
- #define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
- #define X86_BUG_SPECTRE_V2_USER X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* "spectre_v2_user" CPU is affected by Spectre variant 2 attack between user processes */
-+#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG(1*32 + 6) /* "its" CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
+ #define X86_BUG_RFDS X86_BUG(1*32 + 2) /* CPU is vulnerable to Register File Data Sampling */
+ #define X86_BUG_BHI X86_BUG(1*32 + 3) /* CPU is affected by Branch History Injection */
+ #define X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET X86_BUG(1*32 + 4) /* "ibpb_no_ret" IBPB omits return target predictions */
++#define X86_BUG_ITS X86_BUG(1*32 + 5) /* CPU is affected by Indirect Target Selection */
#endif /* _ASM_X86_CPUFEATURES_H */
## arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h ##
@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static const __initconst struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vul
+#define ITS BIT(8)
static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(IVYBRIDGE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static const struct x86_cpu_id cpu_vuln_blacklist[] __initconst = {
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_G, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_BROADWELL, X86_STEP_MAX, SRBDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, 0x5, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_SKYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, 0xb, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, 0xc, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_KABYLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RETBLEED),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_D, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ICELAKE_X, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, 0x0, MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_TIGERLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, GDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_LAKEFIELD, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
-- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
-+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEP_MAX, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_ALDERLAKE, ATOM, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPS(INTEL_ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEP_MAX, RFDS),
- VULNBL_INTEL_TYPE(INTEL_RAPTORLAKE, ATOM, RFDS),
-@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch_cap_msr)
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_G, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(BROADWELL, X86_STEPPING_ANY, SRBDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x5), MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(SKYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xb), MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0xc), MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(KABYLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | SRBDS | ITS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(CANNONLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RETBLEED),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_D, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ICELAKE_X, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | GDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPINGS(0x0, 0x0), MMIO | RETBLEED | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(COMETLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS | ITS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(TIGERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, GDS | ITS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(LAKEFIELD, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | MMIO_SBDS | RETBLEED),
+- VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS),
++ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ROCKETLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, MMIO | RETBLEED | GDS | ITS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(ALDERLAKE_L, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+ VULNBL_INTEL_STEPPINGS(RAPTORLAKE, X86_STEPPING_ANY, RFDS),
+@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 ia32_cap)
return cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_blacklist, RFDS);
}
@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static bool __init vulnerable_to_rfds(u64 x86_arch
+
static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
- u64 x86_arch_cap_msr = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
+ u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr();
@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_AMD_IBPB_RET))
setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_IBPB_NO_RET);
-+ if (vulnerable_to_its(x86_arch_cap_msr))
++ if (vulnerable_to_its(ia32_cap))
+ setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_ITS);
+
if (cpu_matches(cpu_vuln_whitelist, NO_MELTDOWN))
@@ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c: static void __init cpu_set_bug_bits(struct cpuinfo
## arch/x86/kvm/x86.c ##
-@@ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(kvm_emulate_rdpmc);
+@@ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c: static unsigned int num_msr_based_features;
ARCH_CAP_PSCHANGE_MC_NO | ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR | ARCH_CAP_TAA_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_SBDR_SSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_FBSDP_NO | ARCH_CAP_PSDP_NO | \
ARCH_CAP_FB_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_RRSBA | ARCH_CAP_PBRSB_NO | ARCH_CAP_GDS_NO | \
-- ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO)
-+ ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_BHI_NO | ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO)
+- ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR)
++ ARCH_CAP_RFDS_NO | ARCH_CAP_RFDS_CLEAR | ARCH_CAP_ITS_NO)
static u64 kvm_get_arch_capabilities(void)
{
---
Results of testing on various branches:
| Branch | Patch Apply | Build Test |
|---------------------------|-------------|------------|
| stable/linux-5.15.y | Success | Success |
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-19 9:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-18 0:44 [PATCH 5.10 v2 00/16] ITS mitigation for 5.10 Pawan Gupta
2025-06-18 0:44 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 01/16] Documentation: x86/bugs/its: Add ITS documentation Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:03 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:44 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 02/16] x86/bhi: Define SPEC_CTRL_BHI_DIS_S Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:04 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:44 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 03/16] x86/its: Enumerate Indirect Target Selection (ITS) bug Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:04 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
2025-06-18 0:45 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 04/16] x86/alternatives: Introduce int3_emulate_jcc() Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:04 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:45 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 05/16] x86/alternatives: Teach text_poke_bp() to patch Jcc.d32 instructions Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:03 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:45 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 06/16] x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe indirect thunk Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:03 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:45 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 07/16] x86/alternative: Optimize returns patching Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:04 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-23 19:10 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-06-18 0:46 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 08/16] x86/alternatives: Remove faulty optimization Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:03 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:46 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 09/16] x86/its: Add support for ITS-safe return thunk Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:02 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:46 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 10/16] x86/its: Fix undefined reference to cpu_wants_rethunk_at() Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:03 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-23 19:17 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-06-18 0:46 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 11/16] x86/its: Enable Indirect Target Selection mitigation Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:04 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:47 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 12/16] x86/its: Add "vmexit" option to skip mitigation on some CPUs Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:02 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:47 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 13/16] x86/modules: Set VM_FLUSH_RESET_PERMS in module_alloc() Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:02 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:47 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 14/16] x86/its: Use dynamic thunks for indirect branches Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:03 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-23 19:33 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-06-18 0:47 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 15/16] x86/its: Fix build errors when CONFIG_MODULES=n Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:02 ` Sasha Levin
2025-06-18 0:48 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 16/16] x86/its: FineIBT-paranoid vs ITS Pawan Gupta
2025-06-19 9:02 ` Sasha Levin
2025-07-12 13:50 ` [PATCH 5.10 v2 00/16] ITS mitigation for 5.10 Greg Kroah-Hartman
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