From: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, ast@kernel.org, andrii@kernel.org
Cc: daniel@iogearbox.net, martin.lau@linux.dev, kernel-team@fb.com,
yonghong.song@linux.dev, eddyz87@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: check operations on untrusted ro pointers to mem
Date: Wed, 25 Jun 2025 11:24:14 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250625182414.30659-4-eddyz87@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250625182414.30659-1-eddyz87@gmail.com>
The following cases are tested:
- it is ok to load memory at any offset from rdonly_untrusted_mem;
- rdonly_untrusted_mem offset/bounds are not tracked;
- writes into rdonly_untrusted_mem are forbidden;
- atomic operations on rdonly_untrusted_mem are forbidden;
- rdonly_untrusted_mem can't be passed as a memory argument of a
helper of kfunc;
- it is ok to use PTR_TO_MEM and PTR_TO_BTF_ID in a same load
instruction.
Signed-off-by: Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>
---
.../bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c | 9 ++
.../bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c | 136 ++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 145 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..40d4f687bd9c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "mem_rdonly_untrusted.skel.h"
+
+void test_mem_rdonly_untrusted(void)
+{
+ RUN_TESTS(mem_rdonly_untrusted);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..00604755e698
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/mem_rdonly_untrusted.c
@@ -0,0 +1,136 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_core_read.h>
+#include "bpf_misc.h"
+#include "../test_kmods/bpf_testmod_kfunc.h"
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(0)
+int ldx_is_ok_bad_addr(void *ctx)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ if (!bpf_core_enum_value_exists(enum bpf_features, BPF_FEAT_RDONLY_CAST_TO_VOID))
+ return 42;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ return p[0x7fff];
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(1)
+int ldx_is_ok_good_addr(void *ctx)
+{
+ int v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ return *p;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+int offset_not_tracked(void *ctx)
+{
+ int *p, i, s;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ s = 0;
+ bpf_for(i, 0, 1000 * 1000 * 1000) {
+ p++;
+ s += *p;
+ }
+ return s;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int stx_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ int v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ *p = 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int atomic_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ int v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ __sync_fetch_and_add(p, 1);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("cannot write into rdonly_untrusted_mem")
+int atomic_rmw_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ long v, *p;
+
+ v = 1;
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(&v, 0);
+ return __sync_val_compare_and_swap(p, 0, 42);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__failure
+__msg("invalid access to memory, mem_size=0 off=0 size=4")
+__msg("R1 min value is outside of the allowed memory range")
+int kfunc_param_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ int *p;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ bpf_kfunc_trusted_num_test(p);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("?fentry.s/" SYS_PREFIX "sys_getpgid")
+__failure
+__msg("R1 type=rdonly_untrusted_mem expected=")
+int helper_param_not_ok(void *ctx)
+{
+ char *p;
+
+ p = bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+ /*
+ * Any helper with ARG_CONST_SIZE_OR_ZERO constraint will do,
+ * the most permissive constraint
+ */
+ bpf_copy_from_user(p, 0, (void *)42);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static __noinline u64 *get_some_addr(void)
+{
+ if (bpf_get_prandom_u32())
+ return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, bpf_core_type_id_kernel(struct sock));
+ else
+ return bpf_rdonly_cast(0, 0);
+}
+
+SEC("socket")
+__success
+__retval(0)
+int mixed_mem_type(void *ctx)
+{
+ u64 *p;
+
+ /* Try to avoid compiler hoisting load to if branches by using __noinline func. */
+ p = get_some_addr();
+ return *p;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
--
2.47.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-06-25 18:24 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-06-25 18:24 [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/3] bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast() Eduard Zingerman
2025-06-25 18:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 1/3] bpf: add bpf_features enum Eduard Zingerman
2025-06-25 18:24 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 2/3] bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast() Eduard Zingerman
2025-06-25 18:24 ` Eduard Zingerman [this message]
2025-06-25 19:38 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 3/3] selftests/bpf: check operations on untrusted ro pointers to mem Andrii Nakryiko
2025-06-25 19:46 ` Eduard Zingerman
2025-06-25 22:14 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2025-06-25 19:39 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 0/3] bpf: allow void* cast using bpf_rdonly_cast() Andrii Nakryiko
2025-06-25 22:20 ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
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