From: Matteo Croce <technoboy85@gmail.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>,
Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next] selftests/bpf: don't call fsopen() as privileged user
Date: Tue, 1 Jul 2025 20:31:23 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250701183123.31781-1-technoboy85@gmail.com> (raw)
From: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
In the BPF token example, the fsopen() syscall is called as privileged
user. This is unneeded because fsopen() can be called also as
unprivileged user from the user namespace.
As the `fs_fd` file descriptor which was sent back and fort is still the
same, keep it open instead of cloning and closing it twice via SCM_RIGHTS.
cfr. https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/36134
Signed-off-by: Matteo Croce <teknoraver@meta.com>
---
.../testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c | 41 ++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
index f9392df23f8a..cfc032b910c4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/token.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static int create_bpffs_fd(void)
static int materialize_bpffs_fd(int fs_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts)
{
- int mnt_fd, err;
+ int err;
/* set up token delegation mount options */
err = set_delegate_mask(fs_fd, "delegate_cmds", opts->cmds, opts->cmds_str);
@@ -136,12 +136,7 @@ static int materialize_bpffs_fd(int fs_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts)
if (err < 0)
return -errno;
- /* create O_PATH fd for detached mount */
- mnt_fd = sys_fsmount(fs_fd, 0, 0);
- if (err < 0)
- return -errno;
-
- return mnt_fd;
+ return 0;
}
/* send FD over Unix domain (AF_UNIX) socket */
@@ -287,6 +282,7 @@ static void child(int sock_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts, child_callback_fn callba
{
int mnt_fd = -1, fs_fd = -1, err = 0, bpffs_fd = -1, token_fd = -1;
struct token_lsm *lsm_skel = NULL;
+ char one;
/* load and attach LSM "policy" before we go into unpriv userns */
lsm_skel = token_lsm__open_and_load();
@@ -333,13 +329,19 @@ static void child(int sock_fd, struct bpffs_opts *opts, child_callback_fn callba
err = sendfd(sock_fd, fs_fd);
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "send_fs_fd"))
goto cleanup;
- zclose(fs_fd);
+
+ /* wait that the parent reads the fd, does the fsconfig() calls
+ * and send us a signal that it is done
+ */
+ err = read(sock_fd, &one, sizeof(one));
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(err, 0, "read_one"))
+ goto cleanup;
/* avoid mucking around with mount namespaces and mounting at
- * well-known path, just get detach-mounted BPF FS fd back from parent
+ * well-known path, just create O_PATH fd for detached mount
*/
- err = recvfd(sock_fd, &mnt_fd);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv_mnt_fd"))
+ mnt_fd = sys_fsmount(fs_fd, 0, 0);
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_FD(mnt_fd, "mnt_fd"))
goto cleanup;
/* try to fspick() BPF FS and try to add some delegation options */
@@ -429,24 +431,24 @@ static int wait_for_pid(pid_t pid)
static void parent(int child_pid, struct bpffs_opts *bpffs_opts, int sock_fd)
{
- int fs_fd = -1, mnt_fd = -1, token_fd = -1, err;
+ int fs_fd = -1, token_fd = -1, err;
+ char one = 1;
err = recvfd(sock_fd, &fs_fd);
if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "recv_bpffs_fd"))
goto cleanup;
- mnt_fd = materialize_bpffs_fd(fs_fd, bpffs_opts);
- if (!ASSERT_GE(mnt_fd, 0, "materialize_bpffs_fd")) {
+ err = materialize_bpffs_fd(fs_fd, bpffs_opts);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(err, 0, "materialize_bpffs_fd")) {
err = -EINVAL;
goto cleanup;
}
- zclose(fs_fd);
- /* pass BPF FS context object to parent */
- err = sendfd(sock_fd, mnt_fd);
- if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "send_mnt_fd"))
+ /* notify the child that we did the fsconfig() calls and it can proceed. */
+ err = write(sock_fd, &one, sizeof(one));
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(err, sizeof(one), "send_one"))
goto cleanup;
- zclose(mnt_fd);
+ zclose(fs_fd);
/* receive BPF token FD back from child for some extra tests */
err = recvfd(sock_fd, &token_fd);
@@ -459,7 +461,6 @@ static void parent(int child_pid, struct bpffs_opts *bpffs_opts, int sock_fd)
cleanup:
zclose(sock_fd);
zclose(fs_fd);
- zclose(mnt_fd);
zclose(token_fd);
if (child_pid > 0)
--
2.50.0
next reply other threads:[~2025-07-01 18:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-07-01 18:31 Matteo Croce [this message]
2025-07-01 21:00 ` [PATCH bpf-next] selftests/bpf: don't call fsopen() as privileged user patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2025-07-02 8:32 ` Christian Brauner
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