From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8A0B52EAB77; Tue, 15 Jul 2025 13:28:59 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1752586139; cv=none; b=hoLlGuRBtEqemwRHHjPOipNhVGpEFi30tWKMwNaEgMhpr4nPHW6AejUAj6fj8pqmW4fIxWuBW7lMj6lY/STQYNyIquCnYwHVMp8C/nBwH3nHKoQMQxquRnPbnrYTTXyKhkLotnDGr2cKSwWfilzSuAkx2hvN1aBxFhZ5Ep4wEIE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1752586139; c=relaxed/simple; bh=tvTynrO3TwpMOhPZfTQtndafADBmCbjUfi3I4PrnkpQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Wad8Uhhjwe2FJH1YM24bLQq5OxaNkBelahcbksfNog7dZ4vhYEnxf45R8dWdeclwCg2YupHlVj2XPp9bjUCi0OW6RpaxxoopfbQse0aQgdnmOLghb9MepK19mBJFIoAtCYpaiMljN42EH3daaAgmWeuuN65hD6R0BMfNXtHktNY= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=D0Zr6JhM; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="D0Zr6JhM" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E92A1C4CEE3; Tue, 15 Jul 2025 13:28:58 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1752586139; bh=tvTynrO3TwpMOhPZfTQtndafADBmCbjUfi3I4PrnkpQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=D0Zr6JhM1cMDqnmvSX1v2EpAJWo/rHO481qcFqpIdV2GPPDWS4ilWmm7BJqu0Unju 1DLcZevmPSpb1LfS2/3JaxPUeZ5pGIvjrGjTdT9vkV7pvdjvrprbhbAQCz5PcjkkB6 qIplsLy+InqP0Qlydvb8kdxcNMSpSsurYoKYWbCM= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Jann Horn , "Peter Zijlstra (Intel)" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15 03/77] perf: Revert to requiring CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes Date: Tue, 15 Jul 2025 15:13:02 +0200 Message-ID: <20250715130751.813981125@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.50.1 In-Reply-To: <20250715130751.668489382@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250715130751.668489382@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.68 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Peter Zijlstra [ Upstream commit ba677dbe77af5ffe6204e0f3f547f3ba059c6302 ] Jann reports that uprobes can be used destructively when used in the middle of an instruction. The kernel only verifies there is a valid instruction at the requested offset, but due to variable instruction length cannot determine if this is an instruction as seen by the intended execution stream. Additionally, Mark Rutland notes that on architectures that mix data in the text segment (like arm64), a similar things can be done if the data word is 'mistaken' for an instruction. As such, require CAP_SYS_ADMIN for uprobes. Fixes: c9e0924e5c2b ("perf/core: open access to probes for CAP_PERFMON privileged process") Reported-by: Jann Horn Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/CAG48ez1n4520sq0XrWYDHKiKxE_+WCfAK+qt9qkY4ZiBGmL-5g@mail.gmail.com Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/events/core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c index c7ae6b426de38..3e98d10293144 100644 --- a/kernel/events/core.c +++ b/kernel/events/core.c @@ -10225,7 +10225,7 @@ static int perf_uprobe_event_init(struct perf_event *event) if (event->attr.type != perf_uprobe.type) return -ENOENT; - if (!perfmon_capable()) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EACCES; /* -- 2.39.5