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From: Rahul Sandhu <nvraxn@gmail.com>
To: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Rahul Sandhu <nvraxn@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH] libselinux: fix parsing of the enforcing kernel cmdline parameter
Date: Sun, 20 Jul 2025 13:52:29 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250720125229.306644-1-nvraxn@gmail.com> (raw)

Currently, parsing of the cmdline has two issues:
- By using atoi, no error checking is done. What happens if an argument
  that isn't an integer is provided, e.g. enforcing=foo? And as there
  is also no validation that the number provided is actually valid, 1
  or 0, what happens if enforcing=2?

- After the first strstr, no arguments that follow are searched for; if
  I have enforcing=0 enforcing=1, the latter enforcing=1 is not taken
  into account. This is made even worse due to halting searching after
  finding the first "enforcing=" token, meaning that if the cmdline was
  as follows:

  fooenforcing=0 enforcing=0

  the enforcing parameter is entirely ignored.

This patch fixes this by:

  - Using strtol to actually validate that we got passed a number, and
    then validating that that number is either 0 or 1. If instead we
    get passed an invalid value, we skip over the argument entirely.

  - Looping until the last "enforcing=" in the cmdline. Latter (valid)
    arguments take precedence over previous arguments.

Although this patch (intentionally) breaks the case where "enforcing="
is provided with a positive argument that isn't 1, enforcing=2 doesn't
really make much sense, and being strict with the arguments we parse is
a good thing given that SELinux's mode of operation is controlled by
that option.

Signed-off-by: Rahul Sandhu <nvraxn@gmail.com>
---
 libselinux/src/load_policy.c | 21 +++++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/libselinux/src/load_policy.c b/libselinux/src/load_policy.c
index dc1e4b6e..9d411b95 100644
--- a/libselinux/src/load_policy.c
+++ b/libselinux/src/load_policy.c
@@ -244,17 +244,26 @@ int selinux_init_load_policy(int *enforce)
 	rc = mount("proc", "/proc", "proc", 0, 0);
 	cfg = fopen("/proc/cmdline", "re");
 	if (cfg) {
-		char *tmp;
 		buf = malloc(selinux_page_size);
 		if (!buf) {
 			fclose(cfg);
 			return -1;
 		}
-		if (fgets(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg) &&
-		    (tmp = strstr(buf, "enforcing="))) {
-			if (tmp == buf || isspace((unsigned char)*(tmp - 1))) {
-				secmdline =
-				    atoi(tmp + sizeof("enforcing=") - 1);
+		if (fgets(buf, selinux_page_size, cfg)) {
+			char *search = buf;
+			char *tmp;
+			while ((tmp = strstr(search, "enforcing="))) {
+				if (tmp == buf || isspace((unsigned char)*(tmp - 1))) {
+					char *valstr = tmp + sizeof("enforcing=") - 1;
+					char *endptr;
+					errno = 0;
+					long val = strtol(valstr, &endptr, 10);
+					if (endptr != valstr && errno == 0 && (val == 0 || val == 1)) {
+						secmdline = (int)val;
+					}
+				}
+				/* advance past the current substring, latter arguments take precedence */
+				search = tmp + 1;
 			}
 		}
 		fclose(cfg);
-- 
2.50.1


             reply	other threads:[~2025-07-20 12:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-07-20 12:52 Rahul Sandhu [this message]
2025-07-21  9:01 ` [PATCH] libselinux: fix parsing of the enforcing kernel cmdline parameter robinshao007
2025-07-21  9:47   ` Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-21  9:58     ` robinshao007
2025-07-21 12:56 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-21 14:18   ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-22  5:42     ` Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-22 13:05       ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-22 15:36         ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-24  9:13   ` [PATCH v2] " Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-24 12:28     ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-24 12:33       ` Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-24 13:05       ` [PATCH v3] " Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-24 13:27         ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-24 13:30           ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-24 13:51           ` [PATCH v4] " Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-24 19:29             ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-25 22:03               ` Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-25 22:15               ` [PATCH v5] " Rahul Sandhu
2025-07-28 14:04                 ` Stephen Smalley
2025-07-30 13:06                   ` Stephen Smalley

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