From: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
To: mm-commits@vger.kernel.org,vincenzo.frascino@arm.com,vbabka@suse.cz,ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com,glider@google.com,dvyukov@google.com,andreyknvl@gmail.com,jannh@google.com,akpm@linux-foundation.org
Subject: [merged mm-stable] kasan-skip-quarantine-if-object-is-still-accessible-under-rcu.patch removed from -mm tree
Date: Sat, 02 Aug 2025 11:53:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250802185357.CF409C4CEEF@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
The quilt patch titled
Subject: kasan: skip quarantine if object is still accessible under RCU
has been removed from the -mm tree. Its filename was
kasan-skip-quarantine-if-object-is-still-accessible-under-rcu.patch
This patch was dropped because it was merged into the mm-stable branch
of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
------------------------------------------------------
From: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Subject: kasan: skip quarantine if object is still accessible under RCU
Date: Wed, 23 Jul 2025 16:59:19 +0200
Currently, enabling KASAN masks bugs where a lockless lookup path gets a
pointer to a SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU object that might concurrently be
recycled and is insufficiently careful about handling recycled objects:
KASAN puts freed objects in SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU slabs onto its quarantine
queues, even when it can't actually detect UAF in these objects, and the
quarantine prevents fast recycling.
When I introduced CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG, my intention was that enabling
CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG should cause KASAN to mark such objects as freed
after an RCU grace period and put them on the quarantine, while disabling
CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG should allow such objects to be reused immediately;
but that hasn't actually been working.
I discovered such a UAF bug involving SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU yesterday; I
could only trigger this bug in a KASAN build by disabling
CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG and applying this patch.
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20250723-kasan-tsbrcu-noquarantine-v1-1-846c8645976c@google.com
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Acked-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Alexander Potapenko <glider@google.com>
Acked-by: Andrey Konovalov <andreyknvl@gmail.com>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <ryabinin.a.a@gmail.com>
Cc: Dmitriy Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: Vincenzo Frascino <vincenzo.frascino@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
---
mm/kasan/common.c | 25 ++++++++++++++++++-------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
--- a/mm/kasan/common.c~kasan-skip-quarantine-if-object-is-still-accessible-under-rcu
+++ a/mm/kasan/common.c
@@ -230,16 +230,12 @@ static bool check_slab_allocation(struct
}
static inline void poison_slab_object(struct kmem_cache *cache, void *object,
- bool init, bool still_accessible)
+ bool init)
{
void *tagged_object = object;
object = kasan_reset_tag(object);
- /* RCU slabs could be legally used after free within the RCU period. */
- if (unlikely(still_accessible))
- return;
-
kasan_poison(object, round_up(cache->object_size, KASAN_GRANULE_SIZE),
KASAN_SLAB_FREE, init);
@@ -261,7 +257,22 @@ bool __kasan_slab_free(struct kmem_cache
if (!kasan_arch_is_ready() || is_kfence_address(object))
return false;
- poison_slab_object(cache, object, init, still_accessible);
+ /*
+ * If this point is reached with an object that must still be
+ * accessible under RCU, we can't poison it; in that case, also skip the
+ * quarantine. This should mostly only happen when CONFIG_SLUB_RCU_DEBUG
+ * has been disabled manually.
+ *
+ * Putting the object on the quarantine wouldn't help catch UAFs (since
+ * we can't poison it here), and it would mask bugs caused by
+ * SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU users not being careful enough about object
+ * reuse; so overall, putting the object into the quarantine here would
+ * be counterproductive.
+ */
+ if (still_accessible)
+ return false;
+
+ poison_slab_object(cache, object, init);
/*
* If the object is put into quarantine, do not let slab put the object
@@ -519,7 +530,7 @@ bool __kasan_mempool_poison_object(void
if (check_slab_allocation(slab->slab_cache, ptr, ip))
return false;
- poison_slab_object(slab->slab_cache, ptr, false, false);
+ poison_slab_object(slab->slab_cache, ptr, false);
return true;
}
_
Patches currently in -mm which might be from jannh@google.com are
kasan-test-fix-protection-against-compiler-elision.patch
kasan-add-test-for-slab_typesafe_by_rcu-quarantine-skipping.patch
kasan-add-test-for-slab_typesafe_by_rcu-quarantine-skipping-v2.patch
reply other threads:[~2025-08-02 18:53 UTC|newest]
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