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From: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
To: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, pabeni@redhat.com,
	andrew+netdev@lunn.ch, horms@kernel.org, borisp@nvidia.com,
	john.fastabend@gmail.com, shuah@kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, sd@queasysnail.net,
	will@willsroot.io, savy@syst3mfailure.io
Subject: Re: [PATCH net 1/2] tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP
Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2025 06:57:30 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250808065730.602dac6a@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CANn89iLbDQ2Le-7WU2dWvr3bc4J-Jcra-rX935Or4wRXDGVViw@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, 8 Aug 2025 06:51:06 -0700 Eric Dumazet wrote:
> > > Can a 2^32 wrap occur eventually ?  
> >
> > Hm, good point. Is it good enough if we also check it in data_ready?
> > That way we should notice that someone is eating our data before
> > the seq had a chance to wrap?  
> 
> I could not understand what your suggestion was.
> 
> Perhaps store both copued_seq and tp->bytes_received and
> 
> check if (tp->bytes_received - strp->bytes_received) is smaller than 2^31 .
> 
>               if (unlikely(strp->copied_seq != tp->copied_seq ||
>                                (tp->bytes_received -
> strp->bytes_received >= (1ULL < 31)) ||
>                             WARN_ON(tcp_inq(strp->sk) < strp->stm.full_len))) {

Nice, I think that would work.
I was wondering how to solve this yesterday and I realized the extra
condition isn't really needed. We just have to handle the inq < full_len
more carefully and remove the WARN_ON(). I posted a v2.

  reply	other threads:[~2025-08-08 13:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-08-06 18:05 [PATCH net 1/2] tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP Jakub Kicinski
2025-08-06 18:05 ` [PATCH net 2/2] selftests: tls: test TCP stealing data from under the TLS socket Jakub Kicinski
2025-08-06 18:35 ` [PATCH net 1/2] tls: handle data disappearing from under the TLS ULP Eric Dumazet
2025-08-06 20:20   ` Jakub Kicinski
2025-08-08 13:51     ` Eric Dumazet
2025-08-08 13:57       ` Jakub Kicinski [this message]
2025-08-08 14:06         ` Eric Dumazet

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