From: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
To: Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.de>
Cc: ltp@lists.linux.it
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH] cve: add CVE-2025-38236 test
Date: Tue, 12 Aug 2025 12:51:27 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20250812105127.GB835467@pevik> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250812-cve_2025_38236-v1-1-e3617ada69c6@suse.com>
Hi Andrea,
> +++ b/testcases/cve/cve-2025-38236.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (C) 2025 SUSE LLC Andrea Cervesato <andrea.cervesato@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * Test for CVE-2025-38236 fixed in kernel v6.16-rc4:
> + * af_unix: Don't leave consecutive consumed OOB skbs.
> + *
> + * The bug is triggered by sending multiple out-of-band data to a socket and
> + * reading it back from it. According to the MSG_OOB implementation, this
> + * shouldn't be possible. When system is affected by CVE-2025-38236, instead,
> + * skb queue holds MSG_OOB data, breaking recv() and causing a use-after-free
> + * condition.
> + *
> + * Even if MSG_OOB is mostly used inside Oracle's product, it is enabled by
> + * default in linux kernel via CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB. This is accessible via
> + * Chrome's renderer sandbox, which might cause an attacker to escalate and to
> + * obtain privileges in the system.
Maybe mention it's based on the reproducer from
https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/423023990
(That adds both background info + kind of credit of the author of the patch who
was the author of the initial reproducer).
> + */
> +
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +
> +static const struct timeval sock_timeout = {
> + .tv_sec = 1,
> +};
> +
> +static char dummy;
> +static int sock[2];
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + int ret;
> +
> + dummy = '\0';
> +
> + tst_res(TINFO, "#1 send and receive out-of-band data");
> + SAFE_SEND(0, sock[1], "A", 1, MSG_OOB);
> + SAFE_RECV(0, sock[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_OOB);
> +
> + tst_res(TINFO, "#2 send and receive out-of-band data");
> + SAFE_SEND(0, sock[1], "A", 1, MSG_OOB);
> + SAFE_RECV(0, sock[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_OOB);
> +
> + tst_res(TINFO, "Send out-of-band data");
> + SAFE_SEND(0, sock[1], "A", 1, MSG_OOB);
> +
> + tst_res(TINFO, "Receive data from normal stream");
> +
> + ret = recv(sock[0], &dummy, 1, 0);
+1 the core part from the original verifier.
> + if (ret == -1) {
> + if (errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
> + tst_res(TPASS, "Can't read out-of-band data from normal stream");
> + else
> + tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO, "recv error");
> + } else {
very nit: using 'if' with return is more readable than short 'if' part and long
'else' part:
if (...) {
...
return;
}
const char *msg = "We are able to read out-of-band data from normal stream";
...
> + const char *msg = "We are able to read out-of-band data from normal stream";
> +
> + if (dummy == 'A') {
> + tst_res(TFAIL, "%s", msg);
> + } else {
> + tst_res(TFAIL, "%s, but data doesn't match: '%c' != 'A'",
> + msg, dummy);
> + }
> +
> + SAFE_RECV(0, sock[0], &dummy, 1, MSG_OOB);
FYI: on vulnerable kernel with SELinux I get (nothing to be fixed):
cve-2025-38236.c:48: TINFO: Receive data from normal stream
cve-2025-38236.c:60: TFAIL: We are able to read out-of-band data from normal stream
cve-2025-38236.c:66: TBROK: recv(3, 0x4391d8, 1, 1) failed: EFAULT (14)
> +
> + tst_res(TFAIL, "We are able to access data from skb queue (use-after-free)");
> + }
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + SAFE_SOCKETPAIR(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sock);
> + SAFE_SETSOCKOPT(sock[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO,
> + &sock_timeout, sizeof(struct timeval));
> +}
Why is struct timeval needed? I haven't found that in
https://project-zero.issues.chromium.org/issues/423023990
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=32ca245464e1
and test works as a verifier without it. If really not needed please remove it
before merge.
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + if (sock[0] != -1)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(sock[0]);
> +
> + if (sock[1] != -1)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(sock[1]);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .test_all = run,
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_kconfigs = (const char *[]) {
> + "CONFIG_AF_UNIX_OOB=y",
Although this is true I wonder if we should limit the reproducer to this.
If one day config silently renames / is removed (but OOB kept) the reproducer
will be lost.
LGTM, thanks for a quickly porting the reproducer!
With added entry to runtest/cve you may add:
Reviewed-by: Petr Vorel <pvorel@suse.cz>
Kind regards,
Petr
> + NULL
> + },
> + .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> + {"linux-git", "32ca245464e1"},
> + {"CVE", "2025-38236"},
> + {}
> + }
> +};
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-08-12 10:51 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-08-12 8:45 [LTP] [PATCH] cve: add CVE-2025-38236 test Andrea Cervesato
2025-08-12 9:43 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2025-08-12 10:57 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-08-12 11:09 ` Petr Vorel
2025-08-12 10:12 ` Petr Vorel
2025-08-12 11:09 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-08-12 11:45 ` [LTP] [doc, runtest] [was: Re: [PATCH] cve: add CVE-2025-38236 test] Petr Vorel
2025-08-12 12:09 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-08-18 6:08 ` Petr Vorel
2025-08-12 10:51 ` Petr Vorel [this message]
2025-08-12 10:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH] cve: add CVE-2025-38236 test Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-08-12 11:14 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-08-12 11:17 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-08-12 11:50 ` Petr Vorel
2025-08-12 11:25 ` Petr Vorel
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20250812105127.GB835467@pevik \
--to=pvorel@suse.cz \
--cc=andrea.cervesato@suse.de \
--cc=ltp@lists.linux.it \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.