From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8E3521E502; Tue, 26 Aug 2025 13:32:34 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1756215154; cv=none; b=lSxJgWjm+4C7u4MAsxV6yDMF7abbaOBulrjkAUd5vX8BF+FnL7+1y2RaUAbD2NgJ1RoZRpQ83U6v3gmdPUtbdMDYuoOBeAZFQ7Gammn2+Eg3L+CWfu3Q6nGuG83Ye70Hngr/qwUCExttOazsg5ztSIdDwl5+5KYceVUfa3xMbcE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1756215154; c=relaxed/simple; bh=HWAgf9sJv6RBXTNIpLGasAGNQk/NVGxY2CXkWeBPC4A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=Rbe9hbDxXprxoqr8L7XfIlRrSa10il0WteLD6xkQgy0Af+qJlHFY5vOyqDl0B4ot93MNC9AAB39oBq+c4LdCoDQLh7UhzQYvidID+sV0wN/fREKmin1GsBYv+dIeeiYSLn0qT91d7j85816esY9jtZYTZyXC07CxDDsrZteDhTg= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=f8+hoHt6; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="f8+hoHt6" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 214DDC4CEF1; Tue, 26 Aug 2025 13:32:33 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1756215154; bh=HWAgf9sJv6RBXTNIpLGasAGNQk/NVGxY2CXkWeBPC4A=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=f8+hoHt6uuwv0UE3Q613/IaWlItn+aq+nKShk0DmlJxGqcx+DtV6bAE3yCgJxpcEu UROXPSeoMmN3M8ZqrfUjWyEMlfQxijsZsf+tfr8eLpwFTzf60hSQier+kmcI8kbzyb UjNcLtPZNeesXJKsIdY6NZkh7LWBWQwqEuoRY2cw= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Andrei Vagin , Pavel Tikhomirov , Christian Brauner , Al Viro , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.1 407/482] use uniform permission checks for all mount propagation changes Date: Tue, 26 Aug 2025 13:11:00 +0200 Message-ID: <20250826110940.883833362@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.50.1 In-Reply-To: <20250826110930.769259449@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20250826110930.769259449@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.68 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Al Viro [ Upstream commit cffd0441872e7f6b1fce5e78fb1c99187a291330 ] do_change_type() and do_set_group() are operating on different aspects of the same thing - propagation graph. The latter asks for mounts involved to be mounted in namespace(s) the caller has CAP_SYS_ADMIN for. The former is a mess - originally it didn't even check that mount *is* mounted. That got fixed, but the resulting check turns out to be too strict for userland - in effect, we check that mount is in our namespace, having already checked that we have CAP_SYS_ADMIN there. What we really need (in both cases) is * only touch mounts that are mounted. That's a must-have constraint - data corruption happens if it get violated. * don't allow to mess with a namespace unless you already have enough permissions to do so (i.e. CAP_SYS_ADMIN in its userns). That's an equivalent of what do_set_group() does; let's extract that into a helper (may_change_propagation()) and use it in both do_set_group() and do_change_type(). Fixes: 12f147ddd6de "do_change_type(): refuse to operate on unmounted/not ours mounts" Acked-by: Andrei Vagin Reviewed-by: Pavel Tikhomirov Tested-by: Pavel Tikhomirov Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner Signed-off-by: Al Viro Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/namespace.c | 34 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index f0fa2a1a6b05..2a76269f2a4e 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -2340,6 +2340,19 @@ static int graft_tree(struct mount *mnt, struct mount *p, struct mountpoint *mp) return attach_recursive_mnt(mnt, p, mp, false); } +static int may_change_propagation(const struct mount *m) +{ + struct mnt_namespace *ns = m->mnt_ns; + + // it must be mounted in some namespace + if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(ns)) // is_mounted() + return -EINVAL; + // and the caller must be admin in userns of that namespace + if (!ns_capable(ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + return 0; +} + /* * Sanity check the flags to change_mnt_propagation. */ @@ -2376,10 +2389,10 @@ static int do_change_type(struct path *path, int ms_flags) return -EINVAL; namespace_lock(); - if (!check_mnt(mnt)) { - err = -EINVAL; + err = may_change_propagation(mnt); + if (err) goto out_unlock; - } + if (type == MS_SHARED) { err = invent_group_ids(mnt, recurse); if (err) @@ -2774,18 +2787,11 @@ static int do_set_group(struct path *from_path, struct path *to_path) namespace_lock(); - err = -EINVAL; - /* To and From must be mounted */ - if (!is_mounted(&from->mnt)) - goto out; - if (!is_mounted(&to->mnt)) - goto out; - - err = -EPERM; - /* We should be allowed to modify mount namespaces of both mounts */ - if (!ns_capable(from->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + err = may_change_propagation(from); + if (err) goto out; - if (!ns_capable(to->mnt_ns->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + err = may_change_propagation(to); + if (err) goto out; err = -EINVAL; -- 2.50.1