[PATCH] x86/sev: Remove bogus virtual address check

[Ard Biesheuvel <ardb+git@google.com>]

From: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>

The AES-GCM crypto library operates strictly on virtual addresses, and
never performs any H/W offload, and so calling virt_addr_valid() is not
needed.

Cc: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c | 9 ---------
 1 file changed, 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
index 9ae3b11754e6..c4e2de3687a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
+++ b/arch/x86/coco/sev/core.c
@@ -2249,15 +2249,6 @@ int snp_send_guest_request(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc, struct snp_guest_req *req
 	u64 seqno;
 	int rc;
 
-	/*
-	 * enc_payload() calls aesgcm_encrypt(), which can potentially offload to HW.
-	 * The offload's DMA SG list of data to encrypt has to be in linear mapping.
-	 */
-	if (!virt_addr_valid(req->req_buf) || !virt_addr_valid(req->resp_buf)) {
-		pr_warn("AES-GSM buffers must be in linear mapping");
-		return -EINVAL;
-	}
-
 	guard(mutex)(&snp_cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
-- 
2.51.0.740.g6adb054d12-goog