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From: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
To: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
	Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>, <x86@kernel.org>,
	"H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC PATCH 01/56] Documentation/admin-guide: Add documentation
Date: Mon, 13 Oct 2025 09:33:49 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251013143444.3999-2-david.kaplan@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251013143444.3999-1-david.kaplan@amd.com>

Add new documentation for the dynamic mitigation feature.

Signed-off-by: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>
---
 .../hw-vuln/dynamic_mitigations.rst           | 75 +++++++++++++++++++
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst   |  1 +
 2 files changed, 76 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/dynamic_mitigations.rst

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/dynamic_mitigations.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/dynamic_mitigations.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9904e6ec9be5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/dynamic_mitigations.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
+.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+
+Dynamic Mitigations
+-------------------
+
+Dynamic mitigation support enables the re-configuration of CPU vulnerability
+mitigations through sysfs.  The file /sys/devices/system/cpu/mitigations
+contains the current set of mitigation-related options.  The file can be written
+to in order to make the kernel re-select and re-apply mitigations without a
+reboot or kexec.
+
+The data written to the file should be command line options related to
+mitigation controls (e.g., "mitigations=auto spectre_v2=retpoline mds=off").
+When the file is written, all previous selections related to mitigation controls
+are discarded and the new options are evaluated.  Any non-mitigation related
+options are ignored.
+
+Dynamic mitigations are available if the CONFIG_DYNAMIC_MITIGATIONS option is
+selected.
+
+Purpose
+-------
+
+Dynamic mitigations serve two primary purposes:
+
+Move Policy To Userspace
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Mitigation choices are related to the security policy and posture of the system.
+Most mitigations are only necessary on shared, multi-user systems if untrusted
+code may be run on the system, such as through untrusted userspace or untrusted
+virtual machines.  The kernel may not know how the system will be used on boot,
+and therefore must adopt a strong security posture for safety.
+
+With dynamic mitigations, userspace can re-select mitigations once the needs of
+the system can be determined and more policy information is available.
+
+Mitigation Testing
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+Dynamic mitigation support makes it easy to toggle individual mitigations or
+choose between different mitigation options without the expense of a reboot or
+kexec.  This may be useful when evaluating the performance of various
+mitigation options.  It can also be useful for performing bug fixes without a
+reboot, in case a particular mitigation is undesired or buggy.
+
+Caveats
+-------
+
+There are a few limitations to dynamic mitigation support:
+
+Runtime Limitations
+^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
+
+There are a few mitigations that cannot be toggled at runtime due to the way
+they are structured.  Specifically, kernel PTI (page table isolation) cannot be
+toggled because of the complexity of this mitigation.  Additionally, SMT cannot
+be disabled at runtime.  Therefore, if a bug mitigation requires disabling SMT,
+a warning message will be printed.
+
+BPF JIT
+^^^^^^^
+
+There is currently no way to recompile already JIT'd BPF programs.  This can
+present a security problem if moving from a less secure security posture to a
+more secure one.  It is recommended to either unload BPF programs prior to
+re-configuring mitigations, ensure that security settings only become less
+restrictive over time, or disable use of the BPF JIT.
+
+Performance
+-----------
+
+Re-configuring mitigations is done under the biggest of hammers.  All tasks are
+frozen, all cores are stopped, interrupts are masked, etc.  This may affect
+system responsiveness if lots of patching must be done.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
index 55d747511f83..44418bad5895 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/index.rst
@@ -27,3 +27,4 @@ are configurable at compile, boot or run time.
    old_microcode
    indirect-target-selection
    vmscape
+   dynamic_mitigations
-- 
2.34.1


  reply	other threads:[~2025-10-13 14:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 178+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2025-10-13 14:33 [RFC PATCH 00/56] Dynamic mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:33 ` David Kaplan [this message]
2025-10-16 21:24   ` [RFC PATCH 01/56] Documentation/admin-guide: Add documentation Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-17 14:04     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-18 13:39   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-20 13:53     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-22 11:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 02/56] x86/Kconfig: Add CONFIG_DYNAMIC_MITIGATIONS David Kaplan
2025-10-16 21:20   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-17 13:57     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 03/56] cpu: Reset global mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-16 21:34   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-17 14:05     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-17 14:19       ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-17 16:03         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-17 16:36           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 04/56] x86/bugs: Reset spectre_v1 mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-14 18:37   ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-14 19:16     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-29 11:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-29 13:48     ` Kaplan, David
2025-11-03 18:24       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 05/56] x86/bugs: Reset spectre_v2 mitigations David Kaplan
2025-11-03 19:31   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-03 20:10     ` Kaplan, David
2025-11-03 20:28       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-05  2:29         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-11-05 11:03           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-05 17:06             ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-11-05 20:04               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-05 20:21                 ` Kaplan, David
2025-11-05 20:52                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-11-14 17:14                 ` [PATCH] x86/bugs: Get rid of the forward declarations Borislav Petkov
2025-11-14 19:19                   ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-11-14 19:31                     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-11-14 20:04                   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 06/56] x86/bugs: Reset retbleed mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 07/56] x86/bugs: Reset spectre_v2_user mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-16 12:54   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-16 14:06     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 14:56       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-16 15:26         ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 16:13           ` Brendan Jackman
2025-11-26 11:23             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-12-01 16:53               ` Kaplan, David
2025-12-03 12:31                 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-12-03 17:02                   ` Kaplan, David
2025-12-03 17:35                     ` Borislav Petkov
2025-12-03 20:14                       ` Kaplan, David
2025-12-04 15:07                         ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 08/56] x86/bugs: Reset SSB mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-17 15:13   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-17 15:56     ` Kaplan, David
2026-01-20 13:07   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 09/56] x86/bugs: Reset L1TF mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 10/56] x86/bugs: Reset MDS mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:33 ` [RFC PATCH 11/56] x86/bugs: Reset MMIO mitigations David Kaplan
2026-01-26 13:05   ` Borislav Petkov
2026-01-26 14:51     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 12/56] x86/bugs: Reset SRBDS mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 13/56] x86/bugs: Reset SRSO mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 14/56] x86/bugs: Reset GDS mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-24  2:40   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-24 14:43     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 15/56] x86/bugs: Reset BHI mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-24  2:49   ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-24 15:02     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 16/56] x86/bugs: Reset ITS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 17/56] x86/bugs: Reset TSA mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 18/56] x86/bugs: Reset VMSCAPE mitigations David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 19/56] x86/bugs: Define bugs_smt_disable() David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 20/56] x86/bugs: Move bugs.c logic out of .init section David Kaplan
2025-10-16 12:31   ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-16 13:46     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 14:33       ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 21/56] x86/callthunks: Move logic out of .init David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 22/56] cpu: Move mitigation " David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 23/56] x86/vmlinux.lds: Move alternative sections David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 24/56] x86/vmlinux.lds: Move altinstr_aux conditionally David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 25/56] x86/vmlinux.lds: Define __init_alt_end David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 26/56] module: Save module ELF info David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 27/56] x86/mm: Conditionally free alternative sections David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 28/56] stop_machine: Add stop_machine_nmi() David Kaplan
2026-01-09 22:16   ` Chang S. Bae
2026-01-09 22:19     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 29/56] x86/apic: Add self-NMI support David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 30/56] x86/nmi: Add support for stop_machine_nmi() David Kaplan
2025-10-14  7:34   ` kernel test robot
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 31/56] x86/alternative: Prepend nops with retpolines David Kaplan
2025-10-16 10:32   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 11:08     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 11:07   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 11:10     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 11:23     ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 13:27       ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 14:07         ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 14:16           ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 14:23             ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-22  8:41         ` David Laight
2025-10-22 10:40           ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 32/56] x86/alternative: Add module param David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 33/56] x86/alternative: Avoid re-patching init code David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 34/56] x86/alternative: Save old bytes for alternatives David Kaplan
2025-10-15 10:38   ` Juergen Gross
2025-10-15 13:45     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-27 11:34       ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-27 14:19         ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-29  9:37           ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-29 16:26             ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-29 22:14               ` David Laight
2025-10-30 14:39                 ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-30 15:42                   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-30 15:49                     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 35/56] x86/alternative: Save old bytes for retpolines David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 36/56] x86/alternative: Do not recompute len on re-patch David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 37/56] x86/alternative: Reset alternatives David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 38/56] x86/callthunks: Reset callthunks David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 39/56] x86/sync_core: Add sync_core_nmi_safe() David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 40/56] x86/alternative: Use sync_core_nmi_safe() David Kaplan
2025-10-16 10:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 14:40     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 14:47       ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 15:34         ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 16:15           ` Dave Hansen
2025-10-16 16:27             ` Borislav Petkov
2025-10-16 18:52           ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 18:56             ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 18:58               ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-16 21:53                 ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-20 14:49         ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-20 15:01           ` Peter Zijlstra
2025-10-23 18:50             ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-23 19:26             ` Andrew Cooper
2025-10-23 21:23             ` David Laight
2025-10-21  2:13           ` H. Peter Anvin
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 41/56] static_call: Add update_all_static_calls() David Kaplan
2025-10-14  7:14   ` kernel test robot
2025-10-14  7:45   ` kernel test robot
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 42/56] module: Make memory writeable for re-patching David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 43/56] module: Update alternatives David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 44/56] x86/module: " David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 45/56] x86/alternative: Use boot_cpu_has in ITS code David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 46/56] x86/alternative: Add ITS re-patching support David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 47/56] x86/module: Add ITS re-patch support for modules David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 48/56] x86/bugs: Move code for updating speculation MSRs David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 49/56] x86/fpu: Qualify warning in os_xsave David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 50/56] x86/alternative: Add re-patch support David Kaplan
2025-10-31 10:22   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-11-04 16:54     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 51/56] cpu: Parse string of mitigation options David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 52/56] x86/bugs: Support parsing " David Kaplan
2025-10-27 11:31   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-27 13:56     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 53/56] drivers/cpu: Re-patch mitigations through sysfs David Kaplan
2025-10-27 12:25   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-27 13:59     ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 54/56] x86/debug: Create debugfs interface to x86_capabilities David Kaplan
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 55/56] x86/debug: Show return thunk in debugfs David Kaplan
2025-10-27 12:29   ` Nikolay Borisov
2025-10-27 14:24     ` David Laight
2025-10-13 14:34 ` [RFC PATCH 56/56] x86/debug: Show static branch config " David Kaplan
2025-10-14 16:29 ` [RFC PATCH 00/56] Dynamic mitigations Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-14 18:06   ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-15  9:14     ` Alexander Graf
2025-10-15 23:06     ` Boris Ostrovsky
2025-10-16 12:21     ` Brendan Jackman
2025-10-15  4:10 ` Aaron Rainbolt
2025-10-15 13:53   ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-15 15:43     ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-15 15:51       ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-15 16:02         ` Josh Poimboeuf
2025-10-15 16:10           ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 10:00             ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2025-10-16 13:42               ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-16 13:55                 ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2025-10-16 13:56                   ` Kaplan, David
2025-10-24  5:00 ` Pawan Gupta
2025-10-24 13:41   ` Kaplan, David

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