From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>,
Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>,
Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>,
Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 6.17.y 3/3] KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL
Date: Thu, 20 Nov 2025 14:07:07 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251120190708.2275081-3-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251120190708.2275081-1-sashal@kernel.org>
From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
[ Upstream commit 9d7dfb95da2cb5c1287df2f3468bcb70d8b31087 ]
Add VMX exit handlers for SEAMCALL and TDCALL to inject a #UD if a non-TD
guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL or TDCALL. Neither SEAMCALL nor TDCALL
is gated by any software enablement other than VMXON, and so will generate
a VM-Exit instead of e.g. a native #UD when executed from the guest kernel.
Note! No unprivileged DoS of the L1 kernel is possible as TDCALL and
SEAMCALL #GP at CPL > 0, and the CPL check is performed prior to the VMX
non-root (VM-Exit) check, i.e. userspace can't crash the VM. And for a
nested guest, KVM forwards unknown exits to L1, i.e. an L2 kernel can
crash itself, but not L1.
Note #2! The Intel® Trust Domain CPU Architectural Extensions spec's
pseudocode shows the CPL > 0 check for SEAMCALL coming _after_ the VM-Exit,
but that appears to be a documentation bug (likely because the CPL > 0
check was incorrectly bundled with other lower-priority #GP checks).
Testing on SPR and EMR shows that the CPL > 0 check is performed before
the VMX non-root check, i.e. SEAMCALL #GPs when executed in usermode.
Note #3! The aforementioned Trust Domain spec uses confusing pseudocode
that says that SEAMCALL will #UD if executed "inSEAM", but "inSEAM"
specifically means in SEAM Root Mode, i.e. in the TDX-Module. The long-
form description explicitly states that SEAMCALL generates an exit when
executed in "SEAM VMX non-root operation". But that's a moot point as the
TDX-Module injects #UD if the guest attempts to execute SEAMCALL, as
documented in the "Unconditionally Blocked Instructions" section of the
TDX-Module base specification.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Cc: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Cc: Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Cc: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Binbin Wu <binbin.wu@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251016182148.69085-2-seanjc@google.com
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 1 +
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c | 8 ++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
index 9792e329343e8..1baa86dfe0293 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
#define EXIT_REASON_TPAUSE 68
#define EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK 74
#define EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY 75
+#define EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL 76
#define EXIT_REASON_TDCALL 77
#define EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ_IMM 84
#define EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE_IMM 85
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
index 4e6352ef95201..c66145aca2d8d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/nested.c
@@ -6587,6 +6587,14 @@ static bool nested_vmx_l1_wants_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
case EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY:
/* Notify VM exit is not exposed to L1 */
return false;
+ case EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL:
+ case EXIT_REASON_TDCALL:
+ /*
+ * SEAMCALL and TDCALL unconditionally VM-Exit, but aren't
+ * virtualized by KVM for L1 hypervisors, i.e. L1 should
+ * never want or expect such an exit.
+ */
+ return false;
default:
return true;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 4d1af365f5845..7bd1679634e93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -5953,6 +5953,12 @@ static int handle_vmx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
return 1;
}
+static int handle_tdx_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
+{
+ kvm_queue_exception(vcpu, UD_VECTOR);
+ return 1;
+}
+
#ifndef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
static int handle_encls(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
{
@@ -6078,6 +6084,8 @@ static int (*kvm_vmx_exit_handlers[])(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) = {
[EXIT_REASON_ENCLS] = handle_encls,
[EXIT_REASON_BUS_LOCK] = handle_bus_lock_vmexit,
[EXIT_REASON_NOTIFY] = handle_notify,
+ [EXIT_REASON_SEAMCALL] = handle_tdx_instruction,
+ [EXIT_REASON_TDCALL] = handle_tdx_instruction,
[EXIT_REASON_MSR_READ_IMM] = handle_rdmsr_imm,
[EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE_IMM] = handle_wrmsr_imm,
};
--
2.51.0
prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-20 19:07 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-20 15:51 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] KVM: VMX: Inject #UD if guest tries to execute SEAMCALL or" failed to apply to 6.17-stable tree gregkh
2025-11-20 19:07 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 1/3] KVM: x86: Rename local "ecx" variables to "msr" and "pmc" as appropriate Sasha Levin
2025-11-20 19:07 ` [PATCH 6.17.y 2/3] KVM: x86: Add support for RDMSR/WRMSRNS w/ immediate on Intel Sasha Levin
2025-11-20 19:07 ` Sasha Levin [this message]
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