From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jonathan McDowell <noodles@earth.li>,
Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>,
Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>,
stable@vger.kernel.org,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v9 4/8] KEYS: trusted: Fix a memory leak in tpm2_load_cmd
Date: Fri, 28 Nov 2025 04:53:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20251128025402.4147024-5-jarkko@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20251128025402.4147024-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
'tpm2_load_cmd' allocates a tempoary blob indirectly via 'tpm2_key_decode'
but it is not freed in the failure paths. Address this by wrapping the blob
into with a cleanup helper.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Fixes: f2219745250f ("security: keys: trusted: use ASN.1 TPM2 key format for the blobs")
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
---
v9:
- Fixed up the commit message. It was not up to date and referred to wrong
function.
- Simplified the patch considereably. It was not optimally small.
v8:
- No changes.
v7:
- Fix compiler warning.
v6:
- A new patch in this version.
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 ++++--
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 4467e880ebd5..225b8c9932bf 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -366,6 +366,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
struct trusted_key_options *options,
u32 *blob_handle)
{
+ u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) = NULL;
struct tpm_buf buf;
unsigned int private_len;
unsigned int public_len;
@@ -379,6 +380,9 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
/* old form */
blob = payload->blob;
payload->old_format = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Bind for cleanup: */
+ blob_ref = blob;
}
/* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */
@@ -443,8 +447,6 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
out:
- if (blob != payload->blob)
- kfree(blob);
tpm_buf_destroy(&buf);
return tpm_ret_to_err(rc);
--
2.52.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-11-28 2:54 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-11-28 2:53 [PATCH v9 0/8] Prepare TPM driver for Trenchboot Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:53 ` [PATCH v9 1/8] tpm2-sessions: Remove 'attributes' parameter from tpm_buf_append_auth Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:53 ` [PATCH v9 2/8] tpm2-sessions: Open code tpm_buf_append_hmac_session() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:53 ` [PATCH v9 3/8] KEYS: trusted: Replace a redundant instance of tpm2_hash_map Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 9:44 ` Jonathan McDowell
2025-11-28 15:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:53 ` Jarkko Sakkinen [this message]
2025-11-28 2:53 ` [PATCH v9 5/8] KEYS: trusted: Open code tpm2_buf_append() Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:53 ` [PATCH v9 6/8] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:53 ` [PATCH v9 7/8] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle Jarkko Sakkinen
2025-11-28 2:54 ` [PATCH v9 8/8] tpm-buf: Enable managed and stack allocations Jarkko Sakkinen
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