From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AA53533B967; Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:20:30 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765884030; cv=none; b=d1BS0VFV6xMzxHMb9cBtufRM/IEQDW3RcbcO4faS47HcIfX0ur2IZGcq6Rev7R8p7+SC9Pp+EBoZcvPUu4NfFlZkOABrDKyFdSpmSKTTXm67CPeEZGX8Zvk+yshR/wGhSbXhaDEZTV30Xx4WCDCa6P1o5//t8+OhUshJkldEuYE= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765884030; c=relaxed/simple; bh=YF29EcrdtWsWqRzvzt91UEd0HI7R4pKN8CP54WIZVLU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=oM9OX9IHNvi7tLe2m4tA32YS73CyDgwjlgxRb0d94vVf8Jwb2Y83Uit2FkYpIXAntcB9otozun49lus9mk4EpQ0lyPgIGt+iDhPGffiWpPYipDCgKy+BLFMR6uYFt/XyQTVtnjHY9Zxu2hIv5HLsFqZyHkAYc1gNwXLC66++O6g= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=0z5RoPTI; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="0z5RoPTI" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 32BB3C4CEF1; Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:20:29 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1765884030; bh=YF29EcrdtWsWqRzvzt91UEd0HI7R4pKN8CP54WIZVLU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=0z5RoPTIxA6M1bK6my+FnuZ5uOVrrbmn78qUAgjvjWppd67fTtwWA865QPW9PHxhg e+0jili/1hA98sNfQNkjzsHchTqfx+Qer2aa7grf4HsmUTfIZBNkNCpxVK4lsUTiVd DPelAPU7Nlq0+BItldSmk37umDXVIOePue/7DSi4= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Thorsten Blum , Lukas Wunner , Herbert Xu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.12 064/354] crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 12:10:31 +0100 Message-ID: <20251216111323.245862263@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251216111320.896758933@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20251216111320.896758933@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Thorsten Blum [ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ] Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1 INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc. Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index 43af5fa510c09..7859b0692b42b 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -151,12 +152,17 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1, size_t len_2) { struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; - - kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2, - GFP_KERNEL); + size_t kid_sz; + size_t len; + + if (check_add_overflow(len_1, len_2, &len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + if (check_add_overflow(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id), len, &kid_sz)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + kid = kmalloc(kid_sz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!kid) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - kid->len = len_1 + len_2; + kid->len = len; memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1); memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2); return kid; -- 2.51.0