From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C715234B197; Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:40:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765885235; cv=none; b=BSXFZ1BHIg34VN5kQkSULLPlkLAF5qmB3Cg0VPBDhjKlAIq60CFGMn4hFWHt0gwm/WpOpt0YdNjpeFDzqjY3+DoW4K4I9BWxXJGEOzguO5bWQYgUuNU5EEfHJcm4HNTij1Z1jv9MbiAJXVGDZ3Jd6EsYRuArLEEhocRU/hbO7/U= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765885235; c=relaxed/simple; bh=W+y4C1srKr9Cq/KjFjV3P0FGiUiRkXCYhYazVkek7/0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=rjgU6Iqc5vYoZp3e1Ubjy8clO/TU8XHuiJKbsdq/LJ3snMbVYz6bWnJ5jrDzUG/+uPrN0O+p2dojviAQOtusMgfvS0fHohRtXSFUD4uPypemMd9M94JNWNTmZC1Aoy4Y6haO4XXVVbrglBQI7X3FxvfrAgwzedwmRdgG6sMUMvU= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=H8g4vicW; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="H8g4vicW" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 2991FC16AAE; Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:40:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1765885235; bh=W+y4C1srKr9Cq/KjFjV3P0FGiUiRkXCYhYazVkek7/0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=H8g4vicWE7sD7XoRPihlsld3U/aNPO27wflAJgvNC0rSQysgX758EL7HtpgO+Bdkh Q96yXGvfRbkDUF2ofba+hOWHcCT6Qs7YoSlBvnaO18O6RdL9bREVFSQtCrvZMaQVyh SzMUojkymHwg+T+Mj8Q47pY6U1bfxs51U0GHn0pc= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Thorsten Blum , Lukas Wunner , Herbert Xu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.17 079/507] crypto: asymmetric_keys - prevent overflow in asymmetric_key_generate_id Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 12:08:40 +0100 Message-ID: <20251216111348.404321946@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251216111345.522190956@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20251216111345.522190956@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Thorsten Blum [ Upstream commit df0845cf447ae1556c3440b8b155de0926cbaa56 ] Use check_add_overflow() to guard against potential integer overflows when adding the binary blob lengths and the size of an asymmetric_key_id structure and return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW) accordingly. This prevents a possible buffer overflow when copying data from potentially malicious X.509 certificate fields that can be arbitrarily large, such as ASN.1 INTEGER serial numbers, issuer names, etc. Fixes: 7901c1a8effb ("KEYS: Implement binary asymmetric key ID handling") Signed-off-by: Thorsten Blum Reviewed-by: Lukas Wunner Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c | 14 ++++++++++---- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c index ba2d9d1ea235a..348966ea2175c 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -141,12 +142,17 @@ struct asymmetric_key_id *asymmetric_key_generate_id(const void *val_1, size_t len_2) { struct asymmetric_key_id *kid; - - kid = kmalloc(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id) + len_1 + len_2, - GFP_KERNEL); + size_t kid_sz; + size_t len; + + if (check_add_overflow(len_1, len_2, &len)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + if (check_add_overflow(sizeof(struct asymmetric_key_id), len, &kid_sz)) + return ERR_PTR(-EOVERFLOW); + kid = kmalloc(kid_sz, GFP_KERNEL); if (!kid) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - kid->len = len_1 + len_2; + kid->len = len; memcpy(kid->data, val_1, len_1); memcpy(kid->data + len_1, val_2, len_2); return kid; -- 2.51.0