From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0283F355027; Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:51:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765885912; cv=none; b=EnkP0v9cSjhsdiIPXy7iTtE5Mo4Uq1kbqADPGm7d9aZdx65GSDXszR9z7MU5ueVeFsNwapV38sxtL4FZmyGAnrDxmvan6ZHCimZzrBUu3nc9ghPdzwyo+lanBX2ER2WRmFul74bAZNLRQX8Bz59Cd7RYWqrwpYvyLAfQz6PNmCU= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765885912; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ZpvhSpKhfyITuaHkDjCfBYynYbV4KGt1SrCmJqNugNA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=p9gHKkm/GXccubmuUg8ysxFnfh8m5bEAYwy9CzL4fe++9qhUHIjk55y7jdMtP7W46TTXKCMKOUrncFbitDm04ZsgExMxvLJfvXHO+woh0w1lUU3F+fEwgnm2GYNf9+q4JCBkz4wUxYokWEYMMXXhImnEC0wbeVG0y+rSieOqP+M= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=H0z6i//u; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="H0z6i//u" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7E3F4C4CEF1; Tue, 16 Dec 2025 11:51:51 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1765885911; bh=ZpvhSpKhfyITuaHkDjCfBYynYbV4KGt1SrCmJqNugNA=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=H0z6i//u5eInop6/xSOAzXYptLw7KkTNxmoZAumuUPhcTqQS7hstwCcZj+RsYVVdL KcD/eHMVX4tZN0KEnlnAHWomV980nn8gSp4ls7xote8cuM1fIOuhz5/G3wKFXxT+u2 HHWJNteWm9j3C+asJ/5Yq7NmpJRT++0/Nge0R9Ms= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Roman Kisel , Tianyu Lan , Michael Kelley , Wei Liu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.17 248/507] Drivers: hv: Allocate encrypted buffers when requested Date: Tue, 16 Dec 2025 12:11:29 +0100 Message-ID: <20251216111354.479243388@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251216111345.522190956@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20251216111345.522190956@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.17-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Roman Kisel [ Upstream commit 0a4534bdf29a5b7f5a355c267d28dad9c40ba252 ] Confidential VMBus is built around using buffers not shared with the host. Support allocating encrypted buffers when requested. Signed-off-by: Roman Kisel Reviewed-by: Tianyu Lan Reviewed-by: Michael Kelley Signed-off-by: Wei Liu Stable-dep-of: 510164539f16 ("Drivers: hv: Free msginfo when the buffer fails to decrypt") Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- drivers/hv/channel.c | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------------- drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h | 3 ++- drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c | 5 ++-- 3 files changed, 34 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hv/channel.c b/drivers/hv/channel.c index 7c7c66e0dc3f2..1621b95263a5b 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/channel.c +++ b/drivers/hv/channel.c @@ -444,20 +444,23 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, return ret; } - /* - * Set the "decrypted" flag to true for the set_memory_decrypted() - * success case. In the failure case, the encryption state of the - * memory is unknown. Leave "decrypted" as true to ensure the - * memory will be leaked instead of going back on the free list. - */ - gpadl->decrypted = true; - ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, - PFN_UP(size)); - if (ret) { - dev_warn(&channel->device_obj->device, - "Failed to set host visibility for new GPADL %d.\n", - ret); - return ret; + gpadl->decrypted = !((channel->co_external_memory && type == HV_GPADL_BUFFER) || + (channel->co_ring_buffer && type == HV_GPADL_RING)); + if (gpadl->decrypted) { + /* + * The "decrypted" flag being true assumes that set_memory_decrypted() succeeds. + * But if it fails, the encryption state of the memory is unknown. In that case, + * leave "decrypted" as true to ensure the memory is leaked instead of going back + * on the free list. + */ + ret = set_memory_decrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, + PFN_UP(size)); + if (ret) { + dev_warn(&channel->device_obj->device, + "Failed to set host visibility for new GPADL %d.\n", + ret); + return ret; + } } init_completion(&msginfo->waitevent); @@ -545,8 +548,10 @@ static int __vmbus_establish_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, * left as true so the memory is leaked instead of being * put back on the free list. */ - if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size))) - gpadl->decrypted = false; + if (gpadl->decrypted) { + if (!set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)kbuffer, PFN_UP(size))) + gpadl->decrypted = false; + } } return ret; @@ -677,12 +682,13 @@ static int __vmbus_open(struct vmbus_channel *newchannel, goto error_clean_ring; err = hv_ringbuffer_init(&newchannel->outbound, - page, send_pages, 0); + page, send_pages, 0, newchannel->co_ring_buffer); if (err) goto error_free_gpadl; err = hv_ringbuffer_init(&newchannel->inbound, &page[send_pages], - recv_pages, newchannel->max_pkt_size); + recv_pages, newchannel->max_pkt_size, + newchannel->co_ring_buffer); if (err) goto error_free_gpadl; @@ -863,8 +869,11 @@ int vmbus_teardown_gpadl(struct vmbus_channel *channel, struct vmbus_gpadl *gpad kfree(info); - ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)gpadl->buffer, - PFN_UP(gpadl->size)); + if (gpadl->decrypted) + ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)gpadl->buffer, + PFN_UP(gpadl->size)); + else + ret = 0; if (ret) pr_warn("Fail to set mem host visibility in GPADL teardown %d.\n", ret); diff --git a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h index 4a01797d48513..0d969f77388ef 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h +++ b/drivers/hv/hyperv_vmbus.h @@ -182,7 +182,8 @@ extern int hv_synic_cleanup(unsigned int cpu); void hv_ringbuffer_pre_init(struct vmbus_channel *channel); int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, - struct page *pages, u32 pagecnt, u32 max_pkt_size); + struct page *pages, u32 pagecnt, u32 max_pkt_size, + bool confidential); void hv_ringbuffer_cleanup(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info); diff --git a/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c b/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c index 23ce1fb70de14..3c421a7f78c00 100644 --- a/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c +++ b/drivers/hv/ring_buffer.c @@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ void hv_ringbuffer_pre_init(struct vmbus_channel *channel) /* Initialize the ring buffer. */ int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, - struct page *pages, u32 page_cnt, u32 max_pkt_size) + struct page *pages, u32 page_cnt, u32 max_pkt_size, + bool confidential) { struct page **pages_wraparound; int i; @@ -208,7 +209,7 @@ int hv_ringbuffer_init(struct hv_ring_buffer_info *ring_info, ring_info->ring_buffer = (struct hv_ring_buffer *) vmap(pages_wraparound, page_cnt * 2 - 1, VM_MAP, - pgprot_decrypted(PAGE_KERNEL)); + confidential ? PAGE_KERNEL : pgprot_decrypted(PAGE_KERNEL)); kfree(pages_wraparound); if (!ring_info->ring_buffer) -- 2.51.0