From: "Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
To: Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Cc: "Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>, "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
"Samasth Norway Ananda" <samasth.norway.ananda@oracle.com>,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com, "Alyssa Ross" <hi@alyssa.is>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>,
"Tahera Fahimi" <fahimitahera@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 0/5] landlock: Pathname-based UNIX connect() control
Date: Fri, 2 Jan 2026 11:50:15 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260102.17e1c2b9faa4@gnoack.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <81f908e3-8a98-46e7-b20c-fe647784ceb4@gmail.com>
On Fri, Jan 02, 2026 at 05:27:40AM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> On 1/2/26 05:16, Günther Noack wrote:
> > On Thu, Jan 01, 2026 at 05:44:51PM -0500, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >> On 1/1/26 17:34, Tingmao Wang wrote:
> >>> On 1/1/26 22:14, Demi Marie Obenour wrote:
> >>>> [...]
> >>>> Does this leave directory traversal as the only missing Landlock
> >>>> filesystem access control? Ideally Landlock could provide the same
> >>>> isolation from the filesystem that mount namespaces do.
> >>>
> >>> I think that level of isolation would require path walk control - see:
> >>> https://github.com/landlock-lsm/linux/issues/9
> >>>
> >>> (Landlock also doesn't currently control some metadata operations - see
> >>> the warning at the end of the "Filesystem flags" section in [1])
> >>>
> >>> [1]: https://docs.kernel.org/6.18/userspace-api/landlock.html#filesystem-flags
> >>
> >> Could this replace all of the existing hooks?
> >
> > If you do not need to distinguish between the different operations
> > which Landlock offers access rights for, but you only want to limit
> > the visibility of directory hierarchies in the file system, then yes,
> > the path walk control described in issue 9 would be sufficient and a
> > more complete control.
> >
> > The path walk control is probably among the more difficult Landlock
> > feature requests. A simple implementation would be easy to implement
> > technically, but it also requires a new LSM hook which will have to
> > get called *during* path lookup, and we'd have to make sure that the
> > performance impact stays in check. Path lookup is after all a very
> > central facility in a OS kernel.
>
> What about instead using the inode-based hooks for directory searching?
> SELinux can already restrict that.
Oh, thanks, good pointer! I was under the impression that this didn't
exist yet -- I assume you are referring to the
security_inode_follow_link() hook, which is already happening during
path resolution?
I take it back then. :) If there is prior art, implementing this might
be more feasible than I thought.
–Günther
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-01-02 10:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-01-01 13:40 [RFC PATCH 0/5] landlock: Pathname-based UNIX connect() control Günther Noack
2026-01-01 13:40 ` [RFC PATCH 1/5] landlock/selftests: add a missing close(srv_fd) call Günther Noack
2026-01-09 10:41 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-09 10:49 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-10 10:37 ` Günther Noack
2026-01-12 16:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-01 13:40 ` [RFC PATCH 2/5] landlock: Control connections to pathname UNIX sockets by path Günther Noack
2026-01-01 13:41 ` [RFC PATCH 3/5] samples/landlock: Add support for LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CONNECT_UNIX Günther Noack
2026-01-01 19:30 ` Justin Suess
2026-01-01 22:07 ` Tingmao Wang
2026-01-01 22:11 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-01 22:19 ` Tingmao Wang
2026-01-01 22:36 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-01 22:38 ` Justin Suess
2026-01-01 22:39 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-02 9:53 ` Günther Noack
2026-01-08 12:12 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-10 15:05 ` Günther Noack
2026-01-01 13:41 ` [RFC PATCH 4/5] landlock/selftests: test LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_CONNECT_UNIX Günther Noack
2026-01-01 13:41 ` [RFC PATCH 5/5] landlock: Document LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_UNIX_CONNECT Günther Noack
2026-01-01 22:14 ` [RFC PATCH 0/5] landlock: Pathname-based UNIX connect() control Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-01 22:34 ` Tingmao Wang
2026-01-01 22:44 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-02 10:16 ` Günther Noack
2026-01-02 10:25 ` Günther Noack
2026-01-08 11:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-02 10:27 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-02 10:50 ` Günther Noack [this message]
2026-01-02 18:37 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-08 11:14 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-09 11:33 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-09 15:25 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-09 21:02 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-01-12 16:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-09 10:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-09 14:41 ` Günther Noack
2026-01-09 15:20 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-01-11 10:15 ` Günther Noack
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