From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-cve-announce@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Subject: CVE-2025-71075: scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in device removal path
Date: Tue, 13 Jan 2026 16:31:33 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026011326-CVE-2025-71075-c85d@gregkh> (raw)
From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@kernel.org>
Description
===========
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: aic94xx: fix use-after-free in device removal path
The asd_pci_remove() function fails to synchronize with pending tasklets
before freeing the asd_ha structure, leading to a potential
use-after-free vulnerability.
When a device removal is triggered (via hot-unplug or module unload),
race condition can occur.
The fix adds tasklet_kill() before freeing the asd_ha structure,
ensuring all scheduled tasklets complete before cleanup proceeds.
The Linux kernel CVE team has assigned CVE-2025-71075 to this issue.
Affected and fixed versions
===========================
Issue introduced in 2.6.19 with commit 2908d778ab3e244900c310974e1fc1c69066e450 and fixed in 6.1.160 with commit b3e655e52b98a1d3df41c8e42035711e083099f8
Issue introduced in 2.6.19 with commit 2908d778ab3e244900c310974e1fc1c69066e450 and fixed in 6.6.120 with commit e354793a7ab9bb0934ea699a9d57bcd1b48fc27b
Issue introduced in 2.6.19 with commit 2908d778ab3e244900c310974e1fc1c69066e450 and fixed in 6.12.64 with commit a41dc180b6e1229ae49ca290ae14d82101c148c3
Issue introduced in 2.6.19 with commit 2908d778ab3e244900c310974e1fc1c69066e450 and fixed in 6.18.3 with commit 751c19635c2bfaaf2836a533caa3663633066dcf
Issue introduced in 2.6.19 with commit 2908d778ab3e244900c310974e1fc1c69066e450 and fixed in 6.19-rc1 with commit f6ab594672d4cba08540919a4e6be2e202b60007
Please see https://www.kernel.org for a full list of currently supported
kernel versions by the kernel community.
Unaffected versions might change over time as fixes are backported to
older supported kernel versions. The official CVE entry at
https://cve.org/CVERecord/?id=CVE-2025-71075
will be updated if fixes are backported, please check that for the most
up to date information about this issue.
Affected files
==============
The file(s) affected by this issue are:
drivers/scsi/aic94xx/aic94xx_init.c
Mitigation
==========
The Linux kernel CVE team recommends that you update to the latest
stable kernel version for this, and many other bugfixes. Individual
changes are never tested alone, but rather are part of a larger kernel
release. Cherry-picking individual commits is not recommended or
supported by the Linux kernel community at all. If however, updating to
the latest release is impossible, the individual changes to resolve this
issue can be found at these commits:
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b3e655e52b98a1d3df41c8e42035711e083099f8
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e354793a7ab9bb0934ea699a9d57bcd1b48fc27b
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a41dc180b6e1229ae49ca290ae14d82101c148c3
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/751c19635c2bfaaf2836a533caa3663633066dcf
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f6ab594672d4cba08540919a4e6be2e202b60007
reply other threads:[~2026-01-13 15:32 UTC|newest]
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