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X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: KZiVLQCkT/K9GcfrpH+5vQ== X-CSE-MsgGUID: jbePJs03TJm7CLh+B0Xzhg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6800,10657,11671"; a="69947130" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.21,228,1763452800"; d="scan'208";a="69947130" Received: from fmviesa006.fm.intel.com ([10.60.135.146]) by orvoesa108.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 15 Jan 2026 03:41:03 -0800 X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: n5wPtsBhShmawBokvqQUMA== X-CSE-MsgGUID: DBnjYogzS3Ot77s282N+Kg== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.21,228,1763452800"; d="scan'208";a="204812915" Received: from lkp-server01.sh.intel.com (HELO 765f4a05e27f) ([10.239.97.150]) by fmviesa006.fm.intel.com with ESMTP; 15 Jan 2026 03:41:00 -0800 Received: from kbuild by 765f4a05e27f with local (Exim 4.98.2) (envelope-from ) id 1vgLik-00000000Hu0-2uj2; Thu, 15 Jan 2026 11:40:58 +0000 Date: Thu, 15 Jan 2026 19:40:12 +0800 From: kernel test robot To: aubrey.li@linux.intel.com Cc: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev Subject: [anolis-intel-cloud:devel-5.10 33/33] arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1379:20: warning: this statement may fall through Message-ID: <202601151910.FPutxmgQ-lkp@intel.com> User-Agent: s-nail v14.9.25 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: oe-kbuild-all@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: tree: https://gitee.com/anolis/intel-cloud-kernel.git devel-5.10 head: ff3fd7c43fb0c95eb699767b7b4052b0250c87ce commit: ff3fd7c43fb0c95eb699767b7b4052b0250c87ce [33/33] anolis: cpu vulnerabilities: support hardware-based mitigation for Retbleed and SRSO via Hygon IBRS to avoid performance degradation caused by software-based mitigation. config: x86_64-anolis-intel-cloud-devel-5.10 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260115/202601151910.FPutxmgQ-lkp@intel.com/config) compiler: gcc-14 (Debian 14.2.0-19) 14.2.0 reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20260115/202601151910.FPutxmgQ-lkp@intel.com/reproduce) If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags | Reported-by: kernel test robot | Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202601151910.FPutxmgQ-lkp@intel.com/ All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>): arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: In function 'spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit': >> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1379:20: warning: this statement may fall through [-Wimplicit-fallthrough=] 1379 | if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) | ^ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:1381:9: note: here 1381 | case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: | ^~~~ vim +1379 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c 1342 1343 static void __init spectre_v2_determine_rsb_fill_type_at_vmexit(enum spectre_v2_mitigation mode) 1344 { 1345 /* 1346 * Similar to context switches, there are two types of RSB attacks 1347 * after VM exit: 1348 * 1349 * 1) RSB underflow 1350 * 1351 * 2) Poisoned RSB entry 1352 * 1353 * When retpoline is enabled, both are mitigated by filling/clearing 1354 * the RSB. 1355 * 1356 * When IBRS is enabled, while #1 would be mitigated by the IBRS branch 1357 * prediction isolation protections, RSB still needs to be cleared 1358 * because of #2. Note that SMEP provides no protection here, unlike 1359 * user-space-poisoned RSB entries. 1360 * 1361 * eIBRS should protect against RSB poisoning, but if the EIBRS_PBRSB 1362 * bug is present then a LITE version of RSB protection is required, 1363 * just a single call needs to retire before a RET is executed. 1364 */ 1365 switch (mode) { 1366 case SPECTRE_V2_NONE: 1367 return; 1368 1369 case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_LFENCE: 1370 case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS: 1371 if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_EIBRS_PBRSB)) { 1372 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE); 1373 pr_info("Spectre v2 / PBRSB-eIBRS: Retire a single CALL on VMEXIT\n"); 1374 } 1375 return; 1376 1377 case SPECTRE_V2_EIBRS_RETPOLINE: 1378 /* Hygon Enhanced IBRS flushes RAS upon privilege level changes from low to high. */ > 1379 if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) 1380 return; 1381 case SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE: 1382 case SPECTRE_V2_LFENCE: 1383 case SPECTRE_V2_IBRS: 1384 setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT); 1385 pr_info("Spectre v2 / SpectreRSB : Filling RSB on VMEXIT\n"); 1386 return; 1387 } 1388 1389 pr_warn_once("Unknown Spectre v2 mode, disabling RSB mitigation at VM exit"); 1390 dump_stack(); 1391 } 1392 -- 0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki