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From: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com>
To: Chris Mason <clm@fb.com>, Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>,
	Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Y. Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>,
	Jaegeuk Kim <jaegeuk@kernel.org>, Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>,
	David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Cc: linux-block@vger.kernel.org, Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com>,
	linux-fscrypt@vger.kernel.org, linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>,
	Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Subject: [PATCH v6 07/43] fscrypt: expose fscrypt_nokey_name
Date: Fri,  6 Feb 2026 19:22:39 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260206182336.1397715-8-neelx@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260206182336.1397715-1-neelx@suse.com>

From: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>

btrfs stores its data structures, including filenames in directories, in
its own buffer implementation, struct extent_buffer, composed of
several non-contiguous pages. We could copy filenames into a
temporary buffer and use fscrypt_match_name() against that buffer, such
extensive memcpying would be expensive. Instead, exposing
fscrypt_nokey_name as in this change allows btrfs to recapitulate
fscrypt_match_name() using methods on struct extent_buffer instead of
dealing with a raw byte array.

Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@osandov.com>
Signed-off-by: Sweet Tea Dorminy <sweettea-kernel@dorminy.me>
Signed-off-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel Vacek <neelx@suse.com>
---

v5: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/132b64edf1e6b705995fb1a6dc2f194527f6be75.1706116485.git.josef@toxicpanda.com/
 * No changes since.
---
 fs/crypto/fname.c       | 36 ------------------------------------
 include/linux/fscrypt.h | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/crypto/fname.c b/fs/crypto/fname.c
index a9a4432d12ba..1e5e503686dd 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fname.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/fname.c
@@ -27,42 +27,6 @@
  */
 #define FSCRYPT_FNAME_MIN_MSG_LEN 16
 
-/*
- * struct fscrypt_nokey_name - identifier for directory entry when key is absent
- *
- * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, the
- * filesystem must present a unique "no-key name" for each filename that allows
- * it to find the directory entry again if requested.  Naively, that would just
- * mean using the ciphertext filenames.  However, since the ciphertext filenames
- * can contain illegal characters ('\0' and '/'), they must be encoded in some
- * way.  We use base64url.  But that can cause names to exceed NAME_MAX (255
- * bytes), so we also need to use a strong hash to abbreviate long names.
- *
- * The filesystem may also need another kind of hash, the "dirhash", to quickly
- * find the directory entry.  Since filesystems normally compute the dirhash
- * over the on-disk filename (i.e. the ciphertext), it's not computable from
- * no-key names that abbreviate the ciphertext using the strong hash to fit in
- * NAME_MAX.  It's also not computable if it's a keyed hash taken over the
- * plaintext (but it may still be available in the on-disk directory entry);
- * casefolded directories use this type of dirhash.  At least in these cases,
- * each no-key name must include the name's dirhash too.
- *
- * To meet all these requirements, we base64url-encode the following
- * variable-length structure.  It contains the dirhash, or 0's if the filesystem
- * didn't provide one; up to 149 bytes of the ciphertext name; and for
- * ciphertexts longer than 149 bytes, also the SHA-256 of the remaining bytes.
- *
- * This ensures that each no-key name contains everything needed to find the
- * directory entry again, contains only legal characters, doesn't exceed
- * NAME_MAX, is unambiguous unless there's a SHA-256 collision, and that we only
- * take the performance hit of SHA-256 on very long filenames (which are rare).
- */
-struct fscrypt_nokey_name {
-	u32 dirhash[2];
-	u8 bytes[149];
-	u8 sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE];
-}; /* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64url-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) */
-
 /*
  * Decoded size of max-size no-key name, i.e. a name that was abbreviated using
  * the strong hash and thus includes the 'sha256' field.  This isn't simply
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
index e3bb9e3756e1..5b4fc75c257c 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
@@ -56,6 +56,42 @@ struct fscrypt_name {
 #define fname_name(p)		((p)->disk_name.name)
 #define fname_len(p)		((p)->disk_name.len)
 
+/*
+ * struct fscrypt_nokey_name - identifier for directory entry when key is absent
+ *
+ * When userspace lists an encrypted directory without access to the key, the
+ * filesystem must present a unique "no-key name" for each filename that allows
+ * it to find the directory entry again if requested.  Naively, that would just
+ * mean using the ciphertext filenames.  However, since the ciphertext filenames
+ * can contain illegal characters ('\0' and '/'), they must be encoded in some
+ * way.  We use base64url.  But that can cause names to exceed NAME_MAX (255
+ * bytes), so we also need to use a strong hash to abbreviate long names.
+ *
+ * The filesystem may also need another kind of hash, the "dirhash", to quickly
+ * find the directory entry.  Since filesystems normally compute the dirhash
+ * over the on-disk filename (i.e. the ciphertext), it's not computable from
+ * no-key names that abbreviate the ciphertext using the strong hash to fit in
+ * NAME_MAX.  It's also not computable if it's a keyed hash taken over the
+ * plaintext (but it may still be available in the on-disk directory entry);
+ * casefolded directories use this type of dirhash.  At least in these cases,
+ * each no-key name must include the name's dirhash too.
+ *
+ * To meet all these requirements, we base64url-encode the following
+ * variable-length structure.  It contains the dirhash, or 0's if the filesystem
+ * didn't provide one; up to 149 bytes of the ciphertext name; and for
+ * ciphertexts longer than 149 bytes, also the SHA-256 of the remaining bytes.
+ *
+ * This ensures that each no-key name contains everything needed to find the
+ * directory entry again, contains only legal characters, doesn't exceed
+ * NAME_MAX, is unambiguous unless there's a SHA-256 collision, and that we only
+ * take the performance hit of SHA-256 on very long filenames (which are rare).
+ */
+struct fscrypt_nokey_name {
+	u32 dirhash[2];
+	u8 bytes[149];
+	u8 sha256[32];
+}; /* 189 bytes => 252 bytes base64url-encoded, which is <= NAME_MAX (255) */
+
 /* Maximum value for the third parameter of fscrypt_operations.set_context(). */
 #define FSCRYPT_SET_CONTEXT_MAX_SIZE	40
 
-- 
2.51.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-06 18:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 86+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-06 18:22 [PATCH v6 00/43] btrfs: add fscrypt support Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 01/43] fscrypt: add per-extent encryption support Daniel Vacek
2026-02-21 22:11   ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-22  8:17     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-04-22 22:53       ` Eric Biggers
2026-04-23  6:45         ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 02/43] fscrypt: allow inline encryption for extent based encryption Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 03/43] fscrypt: add a __fscrypt_file_open helper Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 04/43] fscrypt: conditionally don't wipe mk secret until the last active user is done Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 05/43] blk-crypto: add a process_bio callback Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 06/43] fscrypt: add a process_bio hook to fscrypt_operations Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` Daniel Vacek [this message]
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 08/43] fscrypt: add documentation about extent encryption Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:43   ` Randy Dunlap
2026-02-17 14:48     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 09/43] btrfs: add infrastructure for safe em freeing Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 10/43] btrfs: start using fscrypt hooks Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:44   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-17 15:26     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 11/43] btrfs: add inode encryption contexts Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:36   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 13:18     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 12/43] btrfs: add new FEATURE_INCOMPAT_ENCRYPT flag Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 13/43] btrfs: adapt readdir for encrypted and nokey names Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:35   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 14:05     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 14/43] btrfs: handle " Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:28   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 14:50     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 15/43] btrfs: implement fscrypt ioctls Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 16/43] btrfs: select encryption dependencies if FS_ENCRYPTION Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:22   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 15:02     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 17/43] btrfs: add get_devices hook for fscrypt Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 18/43] btrfs: set file extent encryption excplicitly Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 19/43] btrfs: add fscrypt_info and encryption_type to extent_map Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 20/43] btrfs: add fscrypt_info and encryption_type to ordered_extent Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:18   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 15:29     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-18 15:50       ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 16:11         ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 21/43] btrfs: plumb through setting the fscrypt_info for ordered extents Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 22/43] btrfs: populate the ordered_extent with the fscrypt context Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 23/43] btrfs: keep track of fscrypt info and orig_start for dio reads Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 24/43] btrfs: add extent encryption context tree item type Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:16   ` Chris Mason
2026-02-18 17:25     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-04-14 14:23       ` Mark Harmstone
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 25/43] btrfs: pass through fscrypt_extent_info to the file extent helpers Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 26/43] btrfs: implement the fscrypt extent encryption hooks Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:22 ` [PATCH v6 27/43] btrfs: setup fscrypt_extent_info for new extents Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 28/43] btrfs: populate ordered_extent with the orig offset Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:12   ` Chris Mason
2026-03-03 13:42     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 29/43] btrfs: set the bio fscrypt context when applicable Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 30/43] btrfs: add a bio argument to btrfs_csum_one_bio Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 31/43] btrfs: limit encrypted writes to 256 segments Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 32/43] btrfs: implement process_bio cb for fscrypt Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:10   ` Chris Mason
2026-03-24  9:36     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 33/43] btrfs: implement read repair for encryption Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:08   ` Chris Mason
2026-03-25 14:17     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 34/43] btrfs: add test_dummy_encryption support Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 35/43] btrfs: make btrfs_ref_to_path handle encrypted filenames Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 15:02   ` Chris Mason
2026-03-25 15:27     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 36/43] btrfs: deal with encrypted symlinks in send Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 37/43] btrfs: decrypt file names for send Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 38/43] btrfs: load the inode context before sending writes Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 39/43] btrfs: set the appropriate free space settings in reconfigure Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 40/43] btrfs: support encryption with log replay Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 41/43] btrfs: disable auto defrag on encrypted files Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 42/43] btrfs: disable encryption on RAID5/6 Daniel Vacek
2026-02-08 13:14   ` Chris Mason
2026-03-26 16:16     ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:23 ` [PATCH v6 43/43] btrfs: disable send if we have encryption enabled Daniel Vacek
2026-02-06 18:42 ` [PATCH v6 00/43] btrfs: add fscrypt support Daniel Vacek
2026-02-21 20:56 ` Eric Biggers
2026-02-27 15:50   ` Daniel Vacek
2026-02-27 22:26     ` Neal Gompa
2026-02-28  7:57       ` Daniel Vacek
2026-04-15  5:30         ` Neal Gompa
2026-04-15 10:21           ` Daniel Vacek
2026-04-16 14:34             ` Neal Gompa
2026-04-17  6:17               ` Daniel Vacek

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