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From: Philipp Stanner <phasta@kernel.org>
To: "Miguel Ojeda" <ojeda@kernel.org>,
	"Boqun Feng" <boqun.feng@gmail.com>,
	"Gary Guo" <gary@garyguo.net>,
	"Björn Roy Baron" <bjorn3_gh@protonmail.com>,
	"Benno Lossin" <lossin@kernel.org>,
	"Andreas Hindborg" <a.hindborg@kernel.org>,
	"Alice Ryhl" <aliceryhl@google.com>,
	"Trevor Gross" <tmgross@umich.edu>,
	"Danilo Krummrich" <dakr@kernel.org>,
	"Tamir Duberstein" <tamird@gmail.com>,
	"Christian Schrefl" <chrisi.schrefl@gmail.com>
Cc: rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	Philipp Stanner <phasta@kernel.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2] rust: list: Add unsafe for container_of
Date: Mon,  9 Feb 2026 10:34:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260209093432.17190-2-phasta@kernel.org> (raw)

impl_list_item_mod.rs calls container_of() without unsafe blocks at a
couple of places. Since container_of() is an unsafe macro / function,
the blocks are strictly necessary.

The problem was so far not visible because the "unsafe-op-in-unsafe-fn"
check is a linter rather than a compiler check. Rust suppresses lint
checks triggered inside of a macro from another crate. Thus, the error
becomes only visible once someone from without the core crate tries to
use linked lists:

error[E0133]: call to unsafe function `core::ptr::mut_ptr::<impl *mut T>::byte_sub`
is unsafe and requires unsafe block
   --> rust/kernel/lib.rs:252:29
    |
252 |           let container_ptr = field_ptr.byte_sub(offset).cast::<$Container>();
    |                               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ call to unsafe function
    |
   ::: rust/kernel/drm/jq.rs:98:1
    |
98  | / impl_list_item! {
99  | |     impl ListItem<0> for BasicItem { using ListLinks { self.links }; }
100 | | }
    | |_- in this macro invocation
    |
note: an unsafe function restricts its caller, but its body is safe by default
   --> rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs:216:13
    |
216 |               unsafe fn view_value(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
    |               ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
    |
   ::: rust/kernel/drm/jq.rs:98:1
    |
98  | / impl_list_item! {
99  | |     impl ListItem<0> for BasicItem { using ListLinks { self.links }; }
100 | | }
    | |_- in this macro invocation
    = note: requested on the command line with `-D unsafe-op-in-unsafe-fn`
    = note: this error originates in the macro `$crate::container_of` which comes
    from the expansion of the macro `impl_list_item`

Add unsafe blocks to container_of to fix the issue.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: c77f85b347dd ("rust: list: remove OFFSET constants")
Suggested-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Philipp Stanner <phasta@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Gary Guo <gary@garyguo.net>
Reviewed-by: Alice Ryhl <aliceryhl@google.com>
---
Changes in v2:
  - Tidy up commit message and provide exact reason for the error.
  - Add Reviewed-bys.
---
 rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs | 12 ++++++------
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs b/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
index 202bc6f97c13..7052095efde5 100644
--- a/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
+++ b/rust/kernel/list/impl_list_item_mod.rs
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ unsafe fn view_value(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
                 // SAFETY: `me` originates from the most recent call to `prepare_to_insert`, so it
                 // points at the field `$field` in a value of type `Self`. Thus, reversing that
                 // operation is still in-bounds of the allocation.
-                $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*)
+                unsafe { $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*) }
             }
 
             // GUARANTEES:
@@ -242,7 +242,7 @@ unsafe fn post_remove(me: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
                 // SAFETY: `me` originates from the most recent call to `prepare_to_insert`, so it
                 // points at the field `$field` in a value of type `Self`. Thus, reversing that
                 // operation is still in-bounds of the allocation.
-                $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*)
+                unsafe { $crate::container_of!(me, Self, $($field).*) }
             }
         }
     )*};
@@ -270,9 +270,9 @@ unsafe fn prepare_to_insert(me: *const Self) -> *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$nu
                 // SAFETY: The caller promises that `me` points at a valid value of type `Self`.
                 let links_field = unsafe { <Self as $crate::list::ListItem<$num>>::view_links(me) };
 
-                let container = $crate::container_of!(
+                let container = unsafe { $crate::container_of!(
                     links_field, $crate::list::ListLinksSelfPtr<Self, $num>, inner
-                );
+                ) };
 
                 // SAFETY: By the same reasoning above, `links_field` is a valid pointer.
                 let self_ptr = unsafe {
@@ -319,9 +319,9 @@ unsafe fn view_links(me: *const Self) -> *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num> {
             //   `ListArc` containing `Self` until the next call to `post_remove`. The value cannot
             //   be destroyed while a `ListArc` reference exists.
             unsafe fn view_value(links_field: *mut $crate::list::ListLinks<$num>) -> *const Self {
-                let container = $crate::container_of!(
+                let container = unsafe { $crate::container_of!(
                     links_field, $crate::list::ListLinksSelfPtr<Self, $num>, inner
-                );
+                ) };
 
                 // SAFETY: By the same reasoning above, `links_field` is a valid pointer.
                 let self_ptr = unsafe {
-- 
2.49.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-02-09  9:34 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-09  9:34 Philipp Stanner [this message]
2026-02-09 10:45 ` [PATCH v2] rust: list: Add unsafe for container_of Miguel Ojeda
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2025-11-18  7:28 Philipp Stanner
2025-11-18  8:20 ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-11-18  8:30   ` Philipp Stanner
2025-11-18  9:00     ` Miguel Ojeda
2025-11-18  9:33       ` Philipp Stanner
2025-11-18 17:10         ` Miguel Ojeda

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