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From: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, kvmarm@lists.linux.dev,
	 linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: maz@kernel.org, oliver.upton@linux.dev, joey.gouly@arm.com,
	 suzuki.poulose@arm.com, yuzenghui@huawei.com,
	catalin.marinas@arm.com,  will@kernel.org, tabba@google.com,
	stable@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v1 2/3] KVM: arm64: Fix ID register initialization for non-protected pKVM guests
Date: Thu, 12 Feb 2026 09:02:51 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260212090252.158689-3-tabba@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260212090252.158689-1-tabba@google.com>

In protected mode, the hypervisor maintains a separate instance of
the `kvm` structure for each VM. For non-protected VMs, this structure is
initialized from the host's `kvm` state.

Currently, `pkvm_init_features_from_host()` copies the
`KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED` flag from the host without the
underlying `id_regs` data being initialized. This results in the
hypervisor seeing the flag as set while the ID registers remain zeroed.

Consequently, `kvm_has_feat()` checks at EL2 fail (return 0) for
non-protected VMs. This breaks logic that relies on feature detection,
such as `ctxt_has_tcrx()` for TCR2_EL1 support. As a result, certain
system registers (e.g., TCR2_EL1, PIR_EL1, POR_EL1) are not
saved/restored during the world switch, which could lead to state
corruption.

Fix this by explicitly copying the ID registers from the host `kvm` to
the hypervisor `kvm` for non-protected VMs during vCPU initialization,
since we trust the host with its non-protected guests' features. Also
ensure `KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED` is cleared initially in
`pkvm_init_features_from_host` so that `vm_copy_id_regs` can properly
initialize them and set the flag once done.

Fixes: 41d6028e28bd ("KVM: arm64: Convert the SVE guest vcpu flag to a vm flag")
Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba <tabba@google.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c | 37 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
index 12b2acfbcfd1..267854ed29c8 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/pkvm.c
@@ -344,6 +344,8 @@ static void pkvm_init_features_from_host(struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm, const struc
 
 	/* No restrictions for non-protected VMs. */
 	if (!kvm_vm_is_protected(kvm)) {
+		clear_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &host_arch_flags);
+
 		hyp_vm->kvm.arch.flags = host_arch_flags;
 
 		bitmap_copy(kvm->arch.vcpu_features,
@@ -471,6 +473,36 @@ static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sve(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu, struct kvm_vcpu *h
 	return ret;
 }
 
+static int vm_copy_id_regs(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+	struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm = pkvm_hyp_vcpu_to_hyp_vm(hyp_vcpu);
+	const struct kvm *host_kvm = hyp_vm->host_kvm;
+	struct kvm *kvm = &hyp_vm->kvm;
+
+	if (!test_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &host_kvm->arch.flags))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	if (test_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &kvm->arch.flags))
+		return 0;
+
+	memcpy(kvm->arch.id_regs, host_kvm->arch.id_regs, sizeof(kvm->arch.id_regs));
+	set_bit(KVM_ARCH_FLAG_ID_REGS_INITIALIZED, &kvm->arch.flags);
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int pkvm_vcpu_init_sysregs(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
+{
+	int ret = 0;
+
+	if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
+		kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+	else
+		ret = vm_copy_id_regs(hyp_vcpu);
+
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
 			      struct pkvm_hyp_vm *hyp_vm,
 			      struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu)
@@ -490,8 +522,9 @@ static int init_pkvm_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu,
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.cflags = READ_ONCE(host_vcpu->arch.cflags);
 	hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mp_state.mp_state = KVM_MP_STATE_STOPPED;
 
-	if (pkvm_hyp_vcpu_is_protected(hyp_vcpu))
-		kvm_init_pvm_id_regs(&hyp_vcpu->vcpu);
+	ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_sysregs(hyp_vcpu);
+	if (ret)
+		goto done;
 
 	ret = pkvm_vcpu_init_traps(hyp_vcpu);
 	if (ret)
-- 
2.53.0.239.g8d8fc8a987-goog


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-02-12  9:02 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-02-12  9:02 [PATCH v1 0/3] KVM: arm64: Fix guest feature sanitization and pKVM state synchronization Fuad Tabba
2026-02-12  9:02 ` [PATCH v1 1/3] KVM: arm64: Hide S1POE from guests when not supported by the host Fuad Tabba
2026-02-12  9:29   ` Marc Zyngier
2026-02-12  9:41     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-02-12 15:35       ` Marc Zyngier
2026-02-12 18:53         ` Fuad Tabba
2026-02-13 10:40           ` Marc Zyngier
2026-02-12  9:02 ` Fuad Tabba [this message]
2026-02-13 11:03   ` [PATCH v1 2/3] KVM: arm64: Fix ID register initialization for non-protected pKVM guests Marc Zyngier
2026-02-13 11:07     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-02-12  9:02 ` [PATCH v1 3/3] KVM: arm64: Remove redundant kern_hyp_va() in unpin_host_sve_state() Fuad Tabba

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