From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
Cc: Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>,
Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>,
Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>,
kraxel@redhat.com, qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 11/34] hw/i386: refactor x86_bios_rom_init for reuse in confidential guest reset
Date: Fri, 20 Feb 2026 10:01:26 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260220100116-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260218114233.266178-12-anisinha@redhat.com>
On Wed, Feb 18, 2026 at 05:12:04PM +0530, Ani Sinha wrote:
> For confidential guests, bios image must be reinitialized upon reset. This
> is because bios memory is encrypted and hence once the old confidential
> kvm context is destroyed, it cannot be decrypted. It needs to be reinitilized.
> In order to do that, this change refactors x86_bios_rom_init() code so that
> parts of it can be called during confidential guest reset.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
just a refactor:
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
> ---
> hw/i386/x86-common.c | 50 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
> 1 file changed, 37 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/i386/x86-common.c b/hw/i386/x86-common.c
> index de4cd7650a..c98abaf368 100644
> --- a/hw/i386/x86-common.c
> +++ b/hw/i386/x86-common.c
> @@ -1020,17 +1020,11 @@ void x86_isa_bios_init(MemoryRegion *isa_bios, MemoryRegion *isa_memory,
> memory_region_set_readonly(isa_bios, read_only);
> }
>
> -void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, const char *default_firmware,
> - MemoryRegion *rom_memory, bool isapc_ram_fw)
> +static int get_bios_size(X86MachineState *x86ms,
> + const char *bios_name, char *filename)
> {
> - const char *bios_name;
> - char *filename;
> int bios_size;
> - ssize_t ret;
>
> - /* BIOS load */
> - bios_name = MACHINE(x86ms)->firmware ?: default_firmware;
> - filename = qemu_find_file(QEMU_FILE_TYPE_BIOS, bios_name);
> if (filename) {
> bios_size = get_image_size(filename, NULL);
> } else {
> @@ -1040,6 +1034,21 @@ void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, const char *default_firmware,
> (bios_size % 65536) != 0) {
> goto bios_error;
> }
> +
> + return bios_size;
> +
> + bios_error:
> + fprintf(stderr, "qemu: could not load PC BIOS '%s'\n", bios_name);
> + exit(1);
> +}
> +
> +static void load_bios_from_file(X86MachineState *x86ms, const char *bios_name,
> + char *filename, int bios_size,
> + bool isapc_ram_fw)
> +{
> + ssize_t ret;
> +
> + /* BIOS load */
> if (machine_require_guest_memfd(MACHINE(x86ms))) {
> memory_region_init_ram_guest_memfd(&x86ms->bios, NULL, "pc.bios",
> bios_size, &error_fatal);
> @@ -1068,7 +1077,26 @@ void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, const char *default_firmware,
> goto bios_error;
> }
> }
> - g_free(filename);
> +
> + return;
> +
> + bios_error:
> + fprintf(stderr, "qemu: could not load PC BIOS '%s'\n", bios_name);
> + exit(1);
> +}
> +
> +void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, const char *default_firmware,
> + MemoryRegion *rom_memory, bool isapc_ram_fw)
> +{
> + int bios_size;
> + const char *bios_name;
> + g_autofree char *filename;
> +
> + bios_name = MACHINE(x86ms)->firmware ?: default_firmware;
> + filename = qemu_find_file(QEMU_FILE_TYPE_BIOS, bios_name);
> +
> + bios_size = get_bios_size(x86ms, bios_name, filename);
> + load_bios_from_file(x86ms, bios_name, filename, bios_size, isapc_ram_fw);
>
> if (!machine_require_guest_memfd(MACHINE(x86ms))) {
> /* map the last 128KB of the BIOS in ISA space */
> @@ -1081,8 +1109,4 @@ void x86_bios_rom_init(X86MachineState *x86ms, const char *default_firmware,
> (uint32_t)(-bios_size),
> &x86ms->bios);
> return;
> -
> -bios_error:
> - fprintf(stderr, "qemu: could not load PC BIOS '%s'\n", bios_name);
> - exit(1);
> }
> --
> 2.42.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-02-20 15:02 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-02-18 11:41 [PATCH v5 00/34] Introduce support for confidential guest reset (x86) Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:41 ` [PATCH v5 01/34] i386/kvm: avoid installing duplicate msr entries in msr_handlers Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:41 ` [PATCH v5 02/34] accel/kvm: add confidential class member to indicate guest rebuild capability Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:41 ` [PATCH v5 03/34] hw/accel: add a per-accelerator callback to change VM accelerator handle Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:41 ` [PATCH v5 04/34] system/physmem: add helper to reattach existing memory after KVM VM fd change Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:41 ` [PATCH v5 05/34] accel/kvm: add changes required to support KVM VM file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:41 ` [PATCH v5 06/34] accel/kvm: add a notifier to indicate KVM VM file descriptor has changed Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 07/34] accel/kvm: notify when KVM VM file fd is about to be changed Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 08/34] i386/kvm: unregister smram listeners prior to vm file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 09/34] kvm/i386: implement architecture support for kvm " Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 10/34] i386/kvm: refactor xen init into a new function Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 11/34] hw/i386: refactor x86_bios_rom_init for reuse in confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-20 15:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 12/34] hw/i386: export a new function x86_bios_rom_reload Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 13/34] kvm/i386: reload firmware for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 14/34] accel/kvm: rebind current VCPUs to the new KVM VM file descriptor upon reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 15/34] i386/tdx: refactor TDX firmware memory initialization code into a new function Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 16/34] i386/tdx: finalize TDX guest state upon reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 17/34] i386/tdx: add a pre-vmfd change notifier to reset tdx state Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 18/34] i386/sev: add migration blockers only once Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 19/34] i386/sev: add notifiers " Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 20/34] i386/sev: free existing launch update data and kernel hashes data on init Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 21/34] i386/sev: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 22/34] hw/vfio: generate new file fd for pseudo device and rebind existing descriptors Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 14:07 ` Cédric Le Goater
2026-02-18 15:07 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 15:30 ` Cédric Le Goater
2026-02-18 16:06 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 16:09 ` Cédric Le Goater
2026-02-18 17:33 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 17:39 ` Cédric Le Goater
2026-02-19 5:30 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 8:01 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 8:14 ` Cédric Le Goater
2026-02-19 9:06 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-23 11:56 ` Gerd Hoffmann
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 23/34] kvm/i8254: refactor pit initialization into a helper Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 24/34] kvm/i8254: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 25/34] kvm/hyperv: add synic feature to CPU only if its not enabled Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 26/34] hw/hyperv/vmbus: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 18:34 ` Maciej S. Szmigiero
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 27/34] kvm/xen-emu: re-initialize capabilities during " Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 9:39 ` Paul Durrant
2026-02-19 10:31 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 10:45 ` Paul Durrant
2026-02-19 11:19 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 11:40 ` Paul Durrant
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 28/34] ppc/openpic: create a new openpic device and reattach mem region on coco reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 29/34] kvm/vcpu: add notifiers to inform vcpu file descriptor change Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 30/34] kvm/clock: add support for confidential guest reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 31/34] hw/machine: introduce machine specific option 'x-change-vmfd-on-reset' Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 32/34] tests/functional/x86_64: add functional test to exercise vm fd change on reset Ani Sinha
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 33/34] qom: add 'confidential-guest-reset' property for x86 confidential vms Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 8:55 ` Markus Armbruster
2026-02-19 9:12 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 9:27 ` Markus Armbruster
2026-02-19 9:29 ` Ani Sinha
2026-02-19 10:19 ` Markus Armbruster
2026-02-23 10:08 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2026-02-18 11:42 ` [PATCH v5 34/34] migration: return EEXIST when trying to add the same migration blocker Ani Sinha
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