From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev,
Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>,
Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>,
Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>,
Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>,
Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>,
John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Subject: [PATCH 6.18 03/13] apparmor: validate DFA start states are in bounds in unpack_pdb
Date: Thu, 12 Mar 2026 21:03:44 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260312200326.373092108@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260312200326.246396673@linuxfoundation.org>
6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
commit 9063d7e2615f4a7ab321de6b520e23d370e58816 upstream.
Start states are read from untrusted data and used as indexes into the
DFA state tables. The aa_dfa_next() function call in unpack_pdb() will
access dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE][start], and if the start state exceeds
the number of states in the DFA, this results in an out-of-bound read.
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in aa_dfa_next+0x2a1/0x360
Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811956fb90 by task su/1097
...
Reject policies with out-of-bounds start states during unpacking
to prevent the issue.
Fixes: ad5ff3db53c6 ("AppArmor: Add ability to load extended policy")
Reported-by: Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>
Tested-by: Salvatore Bonaccorso <carnil@debian.org>
Reviewed-by: Georgia Garcia <georgia.garcia@canonical.com>
Reviewed-by: Cengiz Can <cengiz.can@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Massimiliano Pellizzer <massimiliano.pellizzer@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c | 12 +++++++++++-
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
--- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
+++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c
@@ -770,7 +770,17 @@ static int unpack_pdb(struct aa_ext *e,
if (!aa_unpack_u32(e, &pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE], "dfa_start")) {
/* default start state for xmatch and file dfa */
pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] = DFA_START;
- } /* setup class index */
+ }
+
+ size_t state_count = pdb->dfa->tables[YYTD_ID_BASE]->td_lolen;
+
+ if (pdb->start[0] >= state_count ||
+ pdb->start[AA_CLASS_FILE] >= state_count) {
+ *info = "invalid dfa start state";
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* setup class index */
for (i = AA_CLASS_FILE + 1; i <= AA_CLASS_LAST; i++) {
pdb->start[i] = aa_dfa_next(pdb->dfa, pdb->start[0],
i);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-03-12 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-03-12 20:03 [PATCH 6.18 00/13] 6.18.18-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 01/13] net/sched: act_gate: snapshot parameters with RCU on replace Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 02/13] net/sched: Only allow act_ct to bind to clsact/ingress qdiscs and shared blocks Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 04/13] apparmor: fix memory leak in verify_header Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 05/13] apparmor: replace recursive profile removal with iterative approach Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 06/13] apparmor: fix: limit the number of levels of policy namespaces Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 07/13] apparmor: fix side-effect bug in match_char() macro usage Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 08/13] apparmor: fix missing bounds check on DEFAULT table in verify_dfa() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 09/13] apparmor: Fix double free of ns_name in aa_replace_profiles() Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 10/13] apparmor: fix unprivileged local user can do privileged policy management Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 11/13] apparmor: fix differential encoding verification Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 12/13] apparmor: fix race on rawdata dereference Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:03 ` [PATCH 6.18 13/13] apparmor: fix race between freeing data and fs accessing it Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-03-12 20:41 ` [PATCH 6.18 00/13] 6.18.18-rc1 review Brett A C Sheffield
2026-03-13 3:23 ` Shuah Khan
2026-03-13 5:24 ` Ron Economos
2026-03-13 10:56 ` Barry K. Nathan
2026-03-13 16:16 ` Jon Hunter
2026-03-13 16:40 ` Mark Brown
2026-03-13 18:03 ` Florian Fainelli
2026-03-13 21:15 ` Miguel Ojeda
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