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From: Borislav Petkov <bp@kernel.org>
To: X86 ML <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>,
	stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] x86/cpu: Enable FSGSBASE early in cpu_init_exception_handling()
Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2026 12:54:14 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260320115417.4156-2-bp@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260320115417.4156-1-bp@kernel.org>

From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>

Move FSGSBASE enablement from identify_cpu() to cpu_init_exception_handling()
to ensure it is enabled before any exceptions can occur on both boot and
secondary CPUs.

== Background ==

Exception entry code (paranoid_entry()) uses ALTERNATIVE patching based on
X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE to decide whether to use RDGSBASE/WRGSBASE instructions
or the slower RDMSR/SWAPGS sequence for saving/restoring GSBASE.

On boot CPU, ALTERNATIVE patching happens after enabling FSGSBASE in CR4.
When the feature is available, the code is permanently patched to use
RDGSBASE/WRGSBASE, which require CR4.FSGSBASE=1 to execute without triggering

== Boot Sequence ==

Boot CPU (with CR pinning enabled):
  trap_init()
    cpu_init()                   <- Uses unpatched code (RDMSR/SWAPGS)
      x2apic_setup()
  ...
  arch_cpu_finalize_init()
    identify_boot_cpu()
      identify_cpu()
        cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE)  # Enables the feature
	# This becomes part of cr4_pinned_bits
    ...
    alternative_instructions()   <- Patches code to use RDGSBASE/WRGSBASE

Secondary CPUs (with CR pinning enabled):
  start_secondary()
    cr4_init()                   <- Code already patched, CR4.FSGSBASE=1
                                    set implicitly via cr4_pinned_bits

    cpu_init()                   <- exceptions work because FSGSBASE is
                                    already enabled

Secondary CPU (with CR pinning disabled):
  start_secondary()
    cr4_init()                   <- Code already patched, CR4.FSGSBASE=0
    cpu_init()
      x2apic_setup()
        rdmsrq(MSR_IA32_APICBASE)  <- Triggers #VC in SNP guests
          exc_vmm_communication()
            paranoid_entry()       <- Uses RDGSBASE with CR4.FSGSBASE=0
                                      (patched code)
    ...
    ap_starting()
      identify_secondary_cpu()
        identify_cpu()
	  cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE)  <- Enables the feature, which is
                                             too late

== CR Pinning ==

Currently, for secondary CPUs, CR4.FSGSBASE is set implicitly through
CR-pinning: the boot CPU sets it during identify_cpu(), it becomes part of
cr4_pinned_bits, and cr4_init() applies those pinned bits to secondary CPUs.
This works but creates an undocumented dependency between cr4_init() and the
pinning mechanism.

== Problem ==

Secondary CPUs boot after alternatives have been applied globally. They
execute already-patched paranoid_entry() code that uses RDGSBASE/WRGSBASE
instructions, which require CR4.FSGSBASE=1. Upcoming changes to CR pinning
behavior will break the implicit dependency, causing secondary CPUs to
generate #UD.

This issue manifests itself on AMD SEV-SNP guests, where the rdmsrq() in
x2apic_setup() triggers a #VC exception early during cpu_init(). The #VC
handler (exc_vmm_communication()) executes the patched paranoid_entry() path.
Without CR4.FSGSBASE enabled, RDGSBASE instructions trigger #UD.

== Fix ==

Enable FSGSBASE explicitly in cpu_init_exception_handling() before loading
exception handlers. This makes the dependency explicit and ensures both
boot and secondary CPUs have FSGSBASE enabled before paranoid_entry()
executes.

Fixes: c82965f9e530 ("x86/entry/64: Handle FSGSBASE enabled paranoid entry/exit")
Reported-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Suggested-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Reviewed-by: Sohil Mehta <sohil.mehta@intel.com>
Cc: <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260318075654.1792916-2-nikunj@amd.com
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 18 ++++++++++++------
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index a8ff4376c286..7840b224d6a7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -2050,12 +2050,6 @@ static void identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	setup_umip(c);
 	setup_lass(c);
 
-	/* Enable FSGSBASE instructions if available. */
-	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
-		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
-		elf_hwcap2 |= HWCAP2_FSGSBASE;
-	}
-
 	/*
 	 * The vendor-specific functions might have changed features.
 	 * Now we do "generic changes."
@@ -2416,6 +2410,18 @@ void cpu_init_exception_handling(bool boot_cpu)
 	/* GHCB needs to be setup to handle #VC. */
 	setup_ghcb();
 
+	/*
+	 * On CPUs with FSGSBASE support, paranoid_entry() uses
+	 * ALTERNATIVE-patched RDGSBASE/WRGSBASE instructions. Secondary CPUs
+	 * boot after alternatives are patched globally, so early exceptions
+	 * execute patched code that depends on FSGSBASE. Enable the feature
+	 * before any exceptions occur.
+	 */
+	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FSGSBASE)) {
+		cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_FSGSBASE);
+		elf_hwcap2 |= HWCAP2_FSGSBASE;
+	}
+
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FRED)) {
 		/* The boot CPU has enabled FRED during early boot */
 		if (!boot_cpu)
-- 
2.51.0


  reply	other threads:[~2026-03-20 11:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-03-20 11:54 [PATCH 0/4] x86/CPU: Fix CR4 pinning and FRED in CoCo guests Borislav Petkov
2026-03-20 11:54 ` Borislav Petkov [this message]
2026-03-20 11:54 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/cpu: Remove X86_CR4_FRED from the CR4 pinned bits mask Borislav Petkov
2026-03-20 17:49   ` Sohil Mehta
2026-03-20 11:54 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/fred: Fix early boot failures on SEV-ES/SNP guests Borislav Petkov
2026-03-20 11:54 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/cpu: Add comment clarifying CRn pinning Borislav Petkov

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