From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6CCCE303A37; Mon, 23 Mar 2026 19:02:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774292524; cv=none; b=luGIUBIDzfIrDKeP8jCUflSGLDPQ7CvdDgF1/oXWvd1ChFFP/w9onGkK8EAp2EceAz+1VD70xFaYMoCxzyJNfLr7cp7NwE5DkiR8Ip3q1uKB3cSei9hqVHP3vjgwrIxoL4Fh3UgzJ19qO4ltpbxjmfz+J/zzf3mZAfPibByvyLw= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774292524; c=relaxed/simple; bh=IwrSWtGi2v1DkqFTlr7GsesaD5m96uCr8RsRD7i9kXM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: Mime-Version:Content-Type; b=OYawsVF0GRyxs9DD1Mio2/FPAK6eTzInP3kRls+8aHExW8qe5WywZP6tq8EoZne9k9zYsYv+VZskA+YcjvGFtU3hC9rJf4JceHV1hmab4+0fAzmipB46n+qZ9nBdEhdfP++j0g8+LrO4sj1DT1/BfGlf5ecHEben8UmIwLo3oys= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b=qDjXNoSP; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux-foundation.org header.i=@linux-foundation.org header.b="qDjXNoSP" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 4A9B2C4CEF7; Mon, 23 Mar 2026 19:02:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linux-foundation.org; s=korg; t=1774292524; bh=IwrSWtGi2v1DkqFTlr7GsesaD5m96uCr8RsRD7i9kXM=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=qDjXNoSPFa9vqQcYPFHo5QBuN9qbSdcVciNaX5z7tIjoerpVOhqIG3qOBnXy0wElU bFM7RJYtwa3xrc7YS0cM1NsIpADp5QVBTEfLRJGD+WzfKyesme5R6ohwdjWZ4NtUi9 rCYk1cyu5LxVFxKfCWipoxIqXZqsNS59mNmeDwiU= Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2026 12:02:02 -0700 From: Andrew Morton To: Pingfan Liu Cc: "David S. Miller" , Alexei Starovoitov , Daniel Borkmann , John Fastabend , Andrii Nakryiko , Martin KaFai Lau , Eduard Zingerman , Song Liu , Yonghong Song , Jeremy Linton , Catalin Marinas , Will Deacon , Ard Biesheuvel , Simon Horman , Gerd Hoffmann , Vitaly Kuznetsov , Philipp Rudo , Viktor Malik , Jan Hendrik Farr , Baoquan He , Dave Young , kexec@lists.infradead.org, bpf@vger.kernel.org, systemd-devel@lists.freedesktop.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: Re: [PATCHv7 00/13] kexec: Use BPF lskel to enable kexec to load PE format boot image Message-Id: <20260323120202.e662110de3ca696086f9e1f9@linux-foundation.org> In-Reply-To: <20260322014402.8815-1-piliu@redhat.com> References: <20260322014402.8815-1-piliu@redhat.com> X-Mailer: Sylpheed 3.8.0beta1 (GTK+ 2.24.33; x86_64-pc-linux-gnu) Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Sun, 22 Mar 2026 09:43:49 +0800 Pingfan Liu wrote: > Nowadays, UEFI PE bootable images are becoming increasingly popular > among distributions. Currently, we have several kinds of image format > parsers in user space (kexec-tools). However, this approach breaks the > integrity protection of the images. To address this integrity protection > concern, several approaches have been proposed to resolve this issue, > but none of them have been accepted upstream yet. > > The summary of those approaches: > -1. UEFI service emulator for UEFI stub > -2. PE format parser in kernel > -3. Signing the arm64/boot/Image > > > For the first approach, I tried a purgatory-style emulator [1], but it > encounters hardware scaling issues. For the second approach, both > zboot-format [2] and UKI-format [3] parsers were rejected due to > concerns that variant format parsers would bloat the kernel code. > Additionally, for example in arm64, both UKI and zboot format parsers > would need to be introduced and chained together to handle image > loading. For the third approach, I attempted [4], but since zboot or UKI > images already have signatures, upstream maintainers dislike the > additional signature on the Image. Moreover, for secure boot UKI, this > method cannot use signatures to protect the initramfs. > > > *** The approach in this series *** > > This series introduces an approach that allows image formats to be > parsed by BPF programs. AI review has a ton of questions: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260322014402.8815-1-piliu@redhat.com Coverage is partial because some patches didn't apply. Probably some of these questions are legitimate, others will be false positives - we're still figuring this out.