From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2EA8639A7F2; Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:53:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774428813; cv=none; b=ezUQBaLXcN56GRskI6K9zmG0dR0yq7rE/eo+jwGFMyaHlpOeDgLCmrXG8PJnDdxmEhdzhnayHImqazy7CI8o/h9nO+Pn8ocA4k+eXoEceEcHHm4RQt7rb9/JoA7LhaBdkQeA86otTWduBeanlt+KsOp7LeqsNNTgHO2a14BZvME= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1774428813; c=relaxed/simple; bh=jjBuEWFC0C5Y7B+a0sd2j8L/RIjE1T+l+8+9jmEglRQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Content-Disposition:In-Reply-To; b=sddl6B/p9+hhAN3sdgcEwB0sTPQndk/Wqzl93CCQeKJQltW/iUHzihJAyu2nebI6EMi+Epw/AOOueQYxi/KQu+hjeiAbpD5hdAJM0pCNstcwsK40ZQSQaZwZGqUyOeXDN1+iZ4LrkiMkJq2nISn47ZCdN0ZHBCwhAELJQW/Tvws= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=VgIKSPZy; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="VgIKSPZy" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 65FC7C4CEF7; Wed, 25 Mar 2026 08:53:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1774428812; bh=jjBuEWFC0C5Y7B+a0sd2j8L/RIjE1T+l+8+9jmEglRQ=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:From; b=VgIKSPZyw4u8+NRiAkCJ/Y7OlderFlBgEzKZVUSw3dz80/YbNzNKdy4R//uYfTCtk OEh5/QVUZcAGEZE7UPPA7BI1XH63deuFW6+5Vde5VhOFn+ROCCuBwcscbYA2sENZ9C eX7JxzMW1HpkfDJhRCBfeZT9EM9J0OjvbNNbpiWM= Date: Wed, 25 Mar 2026 09:53:09 +0100 From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: Xi Ruoyao Cc: loongarch@lists.linux.dev, arnd@arndb.de, jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Huacai Chen , WANG Xuerui , stable Subject: Re: [PATCH] LoongArch: add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table Message-ID: <2026032541-rental-sizably-48bd@gregkh> References: <2026032456-crinkle-washable-96ea@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: loongarch@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline In-Reply-To: On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 11:26:29AM +0800, Xi Ruoyao wrote: > On Tue, 2026-03-24 at 17:30 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote: > > The LoongArch syscall number is directly controlled by userspace, but > > does not have a array_index_nospec() boundry to prevent access past > > the > > syscall function pointer tables. > > > > Cc: Huacai Chen > > Cc: WANG Xuerui > > Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000 > > Cc: stable > > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman > > --- > > My scripts caught this as I think LoongArch is vulnerable to the > > There's no evidence. The kernel currently report all LoongArch > processors invulnerable to spectre V1 via cpuinfo. Where is that? In the sysfs files, or in the actual silicon testing? > So NAK unless there's a reproducer of spectre V1 on LoongArch. If so > we'd also need to adjust the cpuinfo output. I really thought this cpu was vulnerable to this, but if the companies say it isn't, then great, but reports like this: https://cc-sw.com/chinese-loongarch-architecture-evaluation-part-3-of-3/ say that the silicon is vulnerable. So, which is it? confused, greg k-h