From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: netdev@vger.kernel.org
Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>,
Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>,
linux-afs@lists.infradead.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc@gmail.com>, Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>,
Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>,
Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>, Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>,
Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>, Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>,
Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>,
stable@kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH net v4 12/15] rxrpc: reject undecryptable rxkad response tickets
Date: Wed, 1 Apr 2026 11:56:05 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260401105614.1696001-13-dhowells@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260401105614.1696001-1-dhowells@redhat.com>
From: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc@gmail.com>
rxkad_decrypt_ticket() decrypts the RXKAD response ticket and then
parses the buffer as plaintext without checking whether
crypto_skcipher_decrypt() succeeded.
A malformed RESPONSE can therefore use a non-block-aligned ticket
length, make the decrypt operation fail, and still drive the ticket
parser with attacker-controlled bytes.
Check the decrypt result and abort the connection with RXKADBADTICKET
when ticket decryption fails.
Fixes: 17926a79320a ("[AF_RXRPC]: Provide secure RxRPC sockets for use by userspace and kernel both")
Reported-by: Yifan Wu <yifanwucs@gmail.com>
Reported-by: Juefei Pu <tomapufckgml@gmail.com>
Co-developed-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuan Tan <yuantan098@gmail.com>
Suggested-by: Xin Liu <bird@lzu.edu.cn>
Tested-by: Ren Wei <enjou1224z@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Yuqi Xu <xuyuqiabc@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Ren Wei <n05ec@lzu.edu.cn>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
cc: Marc Dionne <marc.dionne@auristor.com>
cc: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
cc: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
cc: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
cc: Simon Horman <horms@kernel.org>
cc: linux-afs@lists.infradead.org
cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org
cc: stable@kernel.org
---
net/rxrpc/rxkad.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
index e923d6829008..0f79d694cb08 100644
--- a/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
+++ b/net/rxrpc/rxkad.c
@@ -958,6 +958,7 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
struct in_addr addr;
unsigned int life;
time64_t issue, now;
+ int ret;
bool little_endian;
u8 *p, *q, *name, *end;
@@ -977,8 +978,11 @@ static int rxkad_decrypt_ticket(struct rxrpc_connection *conn,
sg_init_one(&sg[0], ticket, ticket_len);
skcipher_request_set_callback(req, 0, NULL, NULL);
skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, sg, sg, ticket_len, iv.x);
- crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
+ ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req);
skcipher_request_free(req);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return rxrpc_abort_conn(conn, skb, RXKADBADTICKET, -EPROTO,
+ rxkad_abort_resp_tkt_short);
p = ticket;
end = p + ticket_len;
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-01 10:57 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-01 10:55 [PATCH net v4 00/15] rxrpc: Miscellaneous fixes David Howells
2026-04-01 10:55 ` [PATCH net v4 01/15] rxrpc: Fix key quota calculation for multitoken keys David Howells
2026-04-01 10:55 ` [PATCH net v4 02/15] rxrpc: Fix key parsing memleak David Howells
2026-04-01 10:55 ` [PATCH net v4 03/15] rxrpc: Fix anonymous key handling David Howells
2026-04-01 10:55 ` [PATCH net v4 04/15] rxrpc: Fix call removal to use RCU safe deletion David Howells
2026-04-01 12:42 ` David Howells
2026-04-01 10:55 ` [PATCH net v4 05/15] rxrpc: Fix RxGK token loading to check bounds David Howells
2026-04-01 10:55 ` [PATCH net v4 06/15] rxrpc: Fix use of wrong skb when comparing queued RESP challenge serial David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 07/15] rxrpc: Fix rack timer warning to report unexpected mode David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 08/15] rxrpc: Fix keyring reference count leak in rxrpc_setsockopt() David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 09/15] rxrpc: Fix key reference count leak from call->key David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 10/15] rxrpc: Fix to request an ack if window is limited David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 11/15] rxrpc: Only put the call ref if one was acquired David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` David Howells [this message]
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 13/15] rxrpc: fix RESPONSE authenticator parser OOB read David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 14/15] rxrpc: fix oversized RESPONSE authenticator length check David Howells
2026-04-01 10:56 ` [PATCH net v4 15/15] rxrpc: fix reference count leak in rxrpc_server_keyring() David Howells
2026-04-01 16:14 ` Anderson Nascimento
2026-04-01 19:32 ` David Howells
2026-04-02 2:22 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-04-08 10:49 ` David Howells
2026-04-08 17:52 ` Jakub Kicinski
2026-04-08 10:50 ` David Howells
2026-04-08 10:53 ` David Howells
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