Re: [PATCH] LoongArch: add spectre boundry for syscall dispatch table

[Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>]

On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 09:53:09AM +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> On Wed, Mar 25, 2026 at 11:26:29AM +0800, Xi Ruoyao wrote:
> > On Tue, 2026-03-24 at 17:30 +0100, Greg Kroah-Hartman wrote:
> > > The LoongArch syscall number is directly controlled by userspace, but
> > > does not have a array_index_nospec() boundry to prevent access past
> > > the
> > > syscall function pointer tables.
> > > 
> > > Cc: Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>
> > > Cc: WANG Xuerui <kernel@xen0n.name>
> > > Assisted-by: gkh_clanker_2000
> > > Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
> > > Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
> > > ---
> > > My scripts caught this as I think LoongArch is vulnerable to the
> > 
> > There's no evidence.  The kernel currently report all LoongArch
> > processors invulnerable to spectre V1 via cpuinfo.
> 
> Where is that?  In the sysfs files, or in the actual silicon testing?
> 
> > So NAK unless there's a reproducer of spectre V1 on LoongArch.  If so
> > we'd also need to adjust the cpuinfo output.
> 
> I really thought this cpu was vulnerable to this, but if the companies
> say it isn't, then great, but reports like this:
> 	https://cc-sw.com/chinese-loongarch-architecture-evaluation-part-3-of-3/
> say that the silicon is vulnerable.  So, which is it?

Any thoughts about this?

thanks,

greg k-h