From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Christian Brauner" <brauner@kernel.org>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>,
"Steven Rostedt" <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"Jann Horn" <jannh@google.com>, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Justin Suess" <utilityemal77@gmail.com>,
"Kees Cook" <kees@kernel.org>,
"Masami Hiramatsu" <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
"Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
"Matthieu Buffet" <matthieu@buffet.re>,
"Mikhail Ivanov" <ivanov.mikhail1@huawei-partners.com>,
"Tingmao Wang" <m@maowtm.org>,
kernel-team@cloudflare.com, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v2 07/17] landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints
Date: Mon, 6 Apr 2026 16:37:05 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260406143717.1815792-8-mic@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260406143717.1815792-1-mic@digikod.net>
Add tracepoints for Landlock rule addition: landlock_add_rule_fs for
filesystem rules and landlock_add_rule_net for network rules. These
enable eBPF programs and ftrace consumers to correlate filesystem
objects and network ports with their rulesets.
Both tracepoints include lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock) in
TP_fast_assign to enforce that the ruleset lock is held during emission.
This guarantees that eBPF programs reading the ruleset via BTF see a
consistent version and the rule just inserted.
Add a version field to struct landlock_ruleset, incremented under the
ruleset lock on each rule insertion. The version fills the existing
4-byte hole between usage and id (no struct size increase). Add a
static assertion to ensure the version type can hold
LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES.
For filesystem rules, resolve the absolute path via
resolve_path_for_trace() which uses d_absolute_path(). Unlike d_path()
(used by audit), d_absolute_path() produces namespace-independent paths
that do not depend on the tracer's chroot state. This makes trace
output deterministic regardless of mount namespace configuration.
Differentiate error cases: "<too_long>" for -ENAMETOOLONG and
"<unreachable>" for anonymous files or detached mounts.
Add DEFINE_FREE(__putname) to include/linux/fs.h alongside the
__getname()/__putname() definitions.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
---
Changes since v1:
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250523165741.693976-5-mic@digikod.net
- Added landlock_add_rule_net tracepoint for network rules.
- Dropped key=inode:0x%lx from add_rule_fs printk, using dev/ino
instead.
- Used ruleset Landlock ID instead of kernel pointer in printk.
- Differentiated d_absolute_path() error cases (suggested by
Tingmao Wang).
- Moved DEFINE_FREE(__putname) to include/linux/fs.h (noticed by
Tingmao Wang).
- Added version field to struct landlock_ruleset.
- Added version to add_rule trace events (format:
ruleset=<id>.<version>).
- Added d_absolute_path() vs d_path() rationale to commit message.
---
include/linux/fs.h | 1 +
include/trace/events/landlock.h | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
security/landlock/fs.c | 19 +++++++
security/landlock/fs.h | 30 +++++++++++
security/landlock/net.c | 12 +++++
security/landlock/ruleset.c | 21 +++++++-
security/landlock/ruleset.h | 6 +++
7 files changed, 172 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
index 8b3dd145b25e..3849382fad4a 100644
--- a/include/linux/fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/fs.h
@@ -2562,6 +2562,7 @@ extern void __init vfs_caches_init(void);
#define __getname() kmalloc(PATH_MAX, GFP_KERNEL)
#define __putname(name) kfree(name)
+DEFINE_FREE(__putname, char *, if (_T) __putname(_T))
void emergency_thaw_all(void);
extern int sync_filesystem(struct super_block *);
diff --git a/include/trace/events/landlock.h b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
index 5e847844fbf7..f1e96c447b97 100644
--- a/include/trace/events/landlock.h
+++ b/include/trace/events/landlock.h
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <linux/tracepoint.h>
struct landlock_ruleset;
+struct path;
/**
* DOC: Landlock trace events
@@ -41,6 +42,10 @@ struct landlock_ruleset;
* information about all sandboxed processes on the system. See
* Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst for security considerations
* and privilege requirements.
+ *
+ * Network port fields use __u64 in host endianness, matching the
+ * landlock_net_port_attr.port UAPI convention. Callers convert from
+ * network byte order before emitting the event.
*/
/**
@@ -56,19 +61,20 @@ TRACE_EVENT(
TP_ARGS(ruleset),
- TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id) __field(access_mask_t,
- handled_fs)
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id) __field(
+ __u32, ruleset_version) __field(access_mask_t, handled_fs)
__field(access_mask_t, handled_net)
__field(access_mask_t, scoped)),
TP_fast_assign(__entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;
+ __entry->ruleset_version = ruleset->version;
__entry->handled_fs = ruleset->layer.fs;
__entry->handled_net = ruleset->layer.net;
__entry->scoped = ruleset->layer.scope;),
- TP_printk("ruleset=%llx handled_fs=0x%x handled_net=0x%x scoped=0x%x",
- __entry->ruleset_id, __entry->handled_fs,
- __entry->handled_net, __entry->scoped));
+ TP_printk("ruleset=%llx.%u handled_fs=0x%x handled_net=0x%x scoped=0x%x",
+ __entry->ruleset_id, __entry->ruleset_version,
+ __entry->handled_fs, __entry->handled_net, __entry->scoped));
/**
* landlock_free_ruleset - Ruleset freed
@@ -82,12 +88,83 @@ TRACE_EVENT(landlock_free_ruleset,
TP_ARGS(ruleset),
- TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id)),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id)
+ __field(__u32, ruleset_version)),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(__entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;
+ __entry->ruleset_version = ruleset->version;),
+
+ TP_printk("ruleset=%llx.%u", __entry->ruleset_id,
+ __entry->ruleset_version));
+
+/**
+ * landlock_add_rule_fs - filesystem rule added to a ruleset
+ * @ruleset: Source ruleset (never NULL)
+ * @access_rights: Allowed access mask for this rule
+ * @path: Filesystem path for the rule (never NULL)
+ * @pathname: Resolved absolute path string (never NULL; error placeholder
+ * on resolution failure)
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(
+ landlock_add_rule_fs,
+
+ TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset,
+ access_mask_t access_rights, const struct path *path,
+ const char *pathname),
+
+ TP_ARGS(ruleset, access_rights, path, pathname),
+
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id) __field(__u32,
+ ruleset_version)
+ __field(access_mask_t, access_rights)
+ __field(dev_t, dev) __field(ino_t, ino)
+ __string(pathname, pathname)),
+
+ TP_fast_assign(lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock);
+ __entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;
+ __entry->ruleset_version = ruleset->version;
+ __entry->access_rights = access_rights;
+ __entry->dev = path->dentry->d_sb->s_dev;
+ /*
+ * The inode number may not be the user-visible one,
+ * but it will be the same used by audit.
+ */
+ __entry->ino = d_backing_inode(path->dentry)->i_ino;
+ __assign_str(pathname);),
+
+ TP_printk("ruleset=%llx.%u access_rights=0x%x dev=%u:%u ino=%lu path=%s",
+ __entry->ruleset_id, __entry->ruleset_version,
+ __entry->access_rights, MAJOR(__entry->dev),
+ MINOR(__entry->dev), __entry->ino,
+ __print_untrusted_str(pathname)));
+
+/**
+ * landlock_add_rule_net - network port rule added to a ruleset
+ * @ruleset: Source ruleset (never NULL)
+ * @port: Network port number in host endianness
+ * @access_rights: Allowed access mask for this rule
+ */
+TRACE_EVENT(landlock_add_rule_net,
+
+ TP_PROTO(const struct landlock_ruleset *ruleset, __u64 port,
+ access_mask_t access_rights),
+
+ TP_ARGS(ruleset, port, access_rights),
- TP_fast_assign(__entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;),
+ TP_STRUCT__entry(__field(__u64, ruleset_id) __field(__u32,
+ ruleset_version)
+ __field(access_mask_t, access_rights)
+ __field(__u64, port)),
- TP_printk("ruleset=%llx", __entry->ruleset_id));
+ TP_fast_assign(lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock);
+ __entry->ruleset_id = ruleset->id;
+ __entry->ruleset_version = ruleset->version;
+ __entry->access_rights = access_rights;
+ __entry->port = port;),
+ TP_printk("ruleset=%llx.%u access_rights=0x%x port=%llu",
+ __entry->ruleset_id, __entry->ruleset_version,
+ __entry->access_rights, __entry->port));
#endif /* _TRACE_LANDLOCK_H */
/* This part must be outside protection */
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index a0b4d0dd261f..f627ecc537a5 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@
#include "ruleset.h"
#include "setup.h"
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+
/* Underlying object management */
static void release_inode(struct landlock_object *const object)
@@ -345,7 +347,24 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
return PTR_ERR(id.key.object);
mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
+
+ /*
+ * Emit after the rule insertion succeeds, so every event corresponds
+ * to a rule that is actually in the ruleset. The ruleset lock is
+ * still held for BTF consistency (enforced by lockdep_assert_held
+ * in TP_fast_assign).
+ */
+ if (!err && trace_landlock_add_rule_fs_enabled()) {
+ char *buffer __free(__putname) = __getname();
+ const char *pathname =
+ buffer ? resolve_path_for_trace(path, buffer) :
+ "<no_mem>";
+
+ trace_landlock_add_rule_fs(ruleset, access_rights, path,
+ pathname);
+ }
mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
+
/*
* No need to check for an error because landlock_insert_rule()
* increments the refcount for the new object if needed.
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index bf9948941f2f..cc54133ae33d 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H
#include <linux/build_bug.h>
+#include <linux/cleanup.h>
#include <linux/fs.h>
#include <linux/init.h>
#include <linux/rcupdate.h>
@@ -128,4 +129,33 @@ int landlock_append_fs_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
const struct path *const path,
access_mask_t access_hierarchy);
+/**
+ * resolve_path_for_trace - Resolve a path for tracepoint display
+ *
+ * @path: The path to resolve.
+ * @buf: A buffer of at least PATH_MAX bytes for the resolved path.
+ *
+ * Uses d_absolute_path() to produce a namespace-independent absolute path,
+ * unlike d_path() which resolves relative to the process's chroot. This
+ * ensures trace output is deterministic regardless of the tracer's mount
+ * namespace.
+ *
+ * Return: A pointer into @buf with the resolved path, or an error string
+ * ("<too_long>", "<unreachable>").
+ */
+static inline const char *resolve_path_for_trace(const struct path *path,
+ char *buf)
+{
+ const char *p;
+
+ p = d_absolute_path(path, buf, PATH_MAX);
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(p))
+ return p;
+
+ if (PTR_ERR(p) == -ENAMETOOLONG)
+ return "<too_long>";
+
+ return "<unreachable>";
+}
+
#endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_FS_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/net.c b/security/landlock/net.c
index 63f1fe0ec876..1e893123e787 100644
--- a/security/landlock/net.c
+++ b/security/landlock/net.c
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@
#include "net.h"
#include "ruleset.h"
+#include <trace/events/landlock.h>
+
int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
const u16 port, access_mask_t access_rights)
{
@@ -36,6 +38,16 @@ int landlock_append_net_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
mutex_lock(&ruleset->lock);
err = landlock_insert_rule(ruleset, id, access_rights);
+
+ /*
+ * Emit after the rule insertion succeeds, so every event corresponds
+ * to a rule that is actually in the ruleset. The ruleset lock is
+ * still held for BTF consistency (enforced by lockdep_assert_held
+ * in TP_fast_assign).
+ */
+ if (!err)
+ trace_landlock_add_rule_net(ruleset, port, access_rights);
+
mutex_unlock(&ruleset->lock);
return err;
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 0d1e3dadb318..4bd997b58058 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
*
* Copyright © 2016-2020 Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
* Copyright © 2018-2020 ANSSI
+ * Copyright © 2026 Cloudflare
*/
#include <linux/bits.h>
@@ -159,8 +160,16 @@ static void build_check_ruleset(void)
const struct landlock_rules rules = {
.num_rules = ~0,
};
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
+ const struct landlock_ruleset ruleset = {
+ .version = ~0,
+ };
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
BUILD_BUG_ON(rules.num_rules < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ruleset.version < LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_RULES);
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
}
/**
@@ -293,11 +302,19 @@ int landlock_insert_rule(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset,
/* When @level is zero, landlock_rule_insert() extends @ruleset. */
.level = 0,
} };
+ int err;
build_check_layer();
lockdep_assert_held(&ruleset->lock);
- return landlock_rule_insert(&ruleset->rules, id, &layers,
- ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
+ err = landlock_rule_insert(&ruleset->rules, id, &layers,
+ ARRAY_SIZE(layers));
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
+ if (!err)
+ ruleset->version++;
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG */
+
+ return err;
}
void landlock_free_rules(struct landlock_rules *const rules)
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.h b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
index 0d60e7fb8ff2..aa489ca9d450 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.h
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.h
@@ -156,6 +156,12 @@ struct landlock_ruleset {
refcount_t usage;
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LANDLOCK_LOG
+ /**
+ * @version: Monotonic counter incremented on each rule insertion. Used
+ * by tracepoints to correlate a domain with the exact ruleset state it
+ * was created from. Protected by @lock.
+ */
+ u32 version;
/**
* @id: Unique identifier for this ruleset, used for tracing.
*/
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-06 14:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-06 14:36 [PATCH v2 00/17] Landlock tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:36 ` [PATCH v2 01/17] landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-12 16:29 ` Tingmao Wang
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 02/17] landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 03/17] landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-12 16:27 ` Tingmao Wang
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 04/17] landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 05/17] tracing: Add __print_untrusted_str() Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 06/17] landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 08/17] landlock: Add restrict_self and free_domain tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 09/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 10/17] landlock: Set audit_net.sk for socket access checks Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 11/17] landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 12/17] landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 15:01 ` Steven Rostedt
2026-04-07 13:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 13/17] selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 14/17] selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 15/17] selftests/landlock: Add network " Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 16/17] selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace " Mickaël Salaün
2026-04-06 14:37 ` [PATCH v2 17/17] landlock: Document tracepoints Mickaël Salaün
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