All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>,
	syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com,
	Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>, Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>,
	Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>,
	Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>, Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>,
	Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y 3/3] ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline
Date: Mon, 13 Apr 2026 12:26:11 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260413162611.3289109-3-sashal@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260413162611.3289109-1-sashal@kernel.org>

From: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>

[ Upstream commit 7bc5da4842bed3252d26e742213741a4d0ac1b14 ]

KASAN reports a use-after-free write of 4086 bytes in
ocfs2_write_end_inline, called from ocfs2_write_end_nolock during a
copy_file_range splice fallback on a corrupted ocfs2 filesystem mounted on
a loop device.  The actual bug is an out-of-bounds write past the inode
block buffer, not a true use-after-free.  The write overflows into an
adjacent freed page, which KASAN reports as UAF.

The root cause is that ocfs2_try_to_write_inline_data trusts the on-disk
id_count field to determine whether a write fits in inline data.  On a
corrupted filesystem, id_count can exceed the physical maximum inline data
capacity, causing writes to overflow the inode block buffer.

Call trace (crash path):

   vfs_copy_file_range (fs/read_write.c:1634)
     do_splice_direct
       splice_direct_to_actor
         iter_file_splice_write
           ocfs2_file_write_iter
             generic_perform_write
               ocfs2_write_end
                 ocfs2_write_end_nolock (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1949)
                   ocfs2_write_end_inline (fs/ocfs2/aops.c:1915)
                     memcpy_from_folio     <-- KASAN: write OOB

So add id_count upper bound check in ocfs2_validate_inode_block() to
alongside the existing i_size check to fix it.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20260403063830.3662739-1-joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com
Signed-off-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=62c1793956716ea8b28a
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ocfs2/inode.c | 10 ++++++++++
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
index a673d877291c7..bf5100e7f9e08 100644
--- a/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
+++ b/fs/ocfs2/inode.c
@@ -1429,6 +1429,16 @@ int ocfs2_validate_inode_block(struct super_block *sb,
 			goto bail;
 		}
 
+		if (le16_to_cpu(data->id_count) >
+		    ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di)) {
+			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
+					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data id_count %u exceeds max %d\n",
+					 (unsigned long long)bh->b_blocknr,
+					 le16_to_cpu(data->id_count),
+					 ocfs2_max_inline_data_with_xattr(sb, di));
+			goto bail;
+		}
+
 		if (le64_to_cpu(di->i_size) > le16_to_cpu(data->id_count)) {
 			rc = ocfs2_error(sb,
 					 "Invalid dinode #%llu: inline data i_size %llu exceeds id_count %u\n",
-- 
2.53.0


      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-04-13 16:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-04-13 12:13 FAILED: patch "[PATCH] ocfs2: fix out-of-bounds write in ocfs2_write_end_inline" failed to apply to 5.10-stable tree gregkh
2026-04-13 16:26 ` [PATCH 5.10.y 1/3] ocfs2: add inline inode consistency check to ocfs2_validate_inode_block() Sasha Levin
2026-04-13 16:26   ` [PATCH 5.10.y 2/3] ocfs2: validate inline data i_size during inode read Sasha Levin
2026-04-13 16:26   ` Sasha Levin [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20260413162611.3289109-3-sashal@kernel.org \
    --to=sashal@kernel.org \
    --cc=akpm@linux-foundation.org \
    --cc=gechangwei@live.cn \
    --cc=heming.zhao@suse.com \
    --cc=jlbec@evilplan.org \
    --cc=joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com \
    --cc=junxiao.bi@oracle.com \
    --cc=mark@fasheh.com \
    --cc=piaojun@huawei.com \
    --cc=stable@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=syzbot+62c1793956716ea8b28a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.