From: Greg KH <greg@kroah.com>
To: Taylor Hewetson <taylor@exponent.digital>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
Benjamin Tissoires <bentiss@kernel.org>,
linux-usb@vger.kernel.org, linux-input@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] HID: usbhid: sanitize hid->uniq against non-printable bytes
Date: Sat, 18 Apr 2026 09:14:08 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <2026041845-approve-pelvis-9845@gregkh> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260418025823.21767-1-taylor@exponent.digital>
On Sat, Apr 18, 2026 at 02:58:23PM +1200, Taylor Hewetson wrote:
> Some USB HID devices (observed on ASUS ROG Azoth via its 2.4GHz
> dongle, USB ID 0b05:1a85) report an iSerialNumber string whose
> USB string descriptor declares a longer length than the actual
> serial, leaving uninitialized firmware memory - including control
> characters such as 0x18 - appended to the returned string.
>
> These non-printable bytes propagate into hid->uniq, which in turn
> populates /sys/class/input/inputN/uniq. Downstream userspace
> components (systemd sd-device property_is_valid(), and by extension
> mutter input enumeration on GNOME Wayland sessions) reject devices
> with control characters in their uniq, rendering otherwise-
> functional input devices unusable in graphical sessions despite
> the kernel input layer correctly translating keypresses.
>
> Truncate hid->uniq at the first byte outside the printable ASCII
> range (0x20..0x7e) after the serial is read.
Why aren't we doing this in the USB core instead of forcing all users of
this to do it instead?
thanks,
greg k-h
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-18 7:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-18 2:58 [PATCH] HID: usbhid: sanitize hid->uniq against non-printable bytes Taylor Hewetson
2026-04-18 7:14 ` Greg KH [this message]
2026-04-23 5:55 ` Eric Naim
2026-04-23 9:29 ` Greg KH
2026-04-23 9:36 ` Eric Naim
2026-04-23 9:49 ` Oliver Neukum
2026-04-23 14:03 ` Alan Stern
2026-04-18 19:08 ` USB: core: sanitize string descriptors against C0 control characters Taylor Hewetson
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