From: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
To: sched-ext@lists.linux.dev, Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
David Vernet <void@manifault.com>,
Andrea Righi <arighi@nvidia.com>,
Changwoo Min <changwoo@igalia.com>
Cc: Ching-Chun Huang <jserv@ccns.ncku.edu.tw>,
Chia-Ping Tsai <chia7712@gmail.com>,
yphbchou0911@gmail.com
Subject: [PATCH v2 1/2] sched_ext: Deny SCX kfuncs to non-SCX struct_ops programs
Date: Mon, 20 Apr 2026 17:28:47 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260420092913.440989-2-yphbchou0911@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260420092913.440989-1-yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
scx_kfunc_context_filter() currently allows non-SCX struct_ops programs
(e.g. tcp_congestion_ops) to call SCX unlocked kfuncs. This is wrong
for two reasons:
- It is semantically incorrect: a TCP congestion control program has no
business calling SCX kfuncs such as scx_bpf_kick_cpu().
- With CONFIG_EXT_SUB_SCHED=y, kfuncs like scx_bpf_kick_cpu() call
scx_prog_sched(aux), which invokes bpf_prog_get_assoc_struct_ops(aux)
and casts the result to struct sched_ext_ops * before reading ops->priv.
For a non-SCX struct_ops program the returned pointer is the kdata of
that struct_ops type, which is far smaller than sched_ext_ops, making
the read an out-of-bounds access (confirmed with KASAN).
Extend the filter to cover scx_kfunc_set_any and scx_kfunc_set_idle as
well, and deny all SCX kfuncs for any struct_ops program that is not the
SCX struct_ops. This addresses both issues: the semantic contract is
enforced at the verifier level, and the runtime out-of-bounds access
becomes unreachable.
Fixes: d1d3c1c6ae36 ("sched_ext: Add verifier-time kfunc context filter")
Suggested-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Cheng-Yang Chou <yphbchou0911@gmail.com>
---
kernel/sched/ext.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
kernel/sched/ext_idle.c | 1 +
kernel/sched/ext_idle.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext.c b/kernel/sched/ext.c
index b34f1e5df1c5..0a53a0dd64bf 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/ext.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/ext.c
@@ -9625,6 +9625,7 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_END(scx_kfunc_ids_any)
static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set scx_kfunc_set_any = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.set = &scx_kfunc_ids_any,
+ .filter = scx_kfunc_context_filter,
};
/*
@@ -9672,13 +9673,12 @@ static const u32 scx_kf_allow_flags[] = {
};
/*
- * Verifier-time filter for context-sensitive SCX kfuncs. Registered via the
- * .filter field on each per-group btf_kfunc_id_set. The BPF core invokes this
- * for every kfunc call in the registered hook (BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS or
+ * Verifier-time filter for SCX kfuncs. Registered via the .filter field on
+ * each per-group btf_kfunc_id_set. The BPF core invokes this for every kfunc
+ * call in the registered hook (BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS or
* BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL), regardless of which set originally introduced the
- * kfunc - so the filter must short-circuit on kfuncs it doesn't govern (e.g.
- * scx_kfunc_ids_any) by falling through to "allow" when none of the
- * context-sensitive sets contain the kfunc.
+ * kfunc - so the filter must short-circuit on kfuncs it doesn't govern by
+ * falling through to "allow" when none of the SCX sets contain the kfunc.
*/
int scx_kfunc_context_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
{
@@ -9687,18 +9687,21 @@ int scx_kfunc_context_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
bool in_enqueue = btf_id_set8_contains(&scx_kfunc_ids_enqueue_dispatch, kfunc_id);
bool in_dispatch = btf_id_set8_contains(&scx_kfunc_ids_dispatch, kfunc_id);
bool in_cpu_release = btf_id_set8_contains(&scx_kfunc_ids_cpu_release, kfunc_id);
+ bool in_idle = btf_id_set8_contains(&scx_kfunc_ids_idle, kfunc_id);
+ bool in_any = btf_id_set8_contains(&scx_kfunc_ids_any, kfunc_id);
u32 moff, flags;
- /* Not a context-sensitive kfunc (e.g. from scx_kfunc_ids_any) - allow. */
- if (!(in_unlocked || in_select_cpu || in_enqueue || in_dispatch || in_cpu_release))
+ /* Not an SCX kfunc - allow. */
+ if (!(in_unlocked || in_select_cpu || in_enqueue || in_dispatch ||
+ in_cpu_release || in_idle || in_any))
return 0;
/* SYSCALL progs (e.g. BPF test_run()) may call unlocked and select_cpu kfuncs. */
if (prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL)
- return (in_unlocked || in_select_cpu) ? 0 : -EACCES;
+ return (in_unlocked || in_select_cpu || in_idle || in_any) ? 0 : -EACCES;
if (prog->type != BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS)
- return -EACCES;
+ return (in_any || in_idle) ? 0 : -EACCES;
/*
* add_subprog_and_kfunc() collects all kfunc calls, including dead code
@@ -9711,14 +9714,15 @@ int scx_kfunc_context_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
return 0;
/*
- * Non-SCX struct_ops: only unlocked kfuncs are safe. The other
- * context-sensitive kfuncs assume the rq lock is held by the SCX
- * dispatch path, which doesn't apply to other struct_ops users.
+ * Non-SCX struct_ops: SCX kfuncs are not permitted.
*/
if (prog->aux->st_ops != &bpf_sched_ext_ops)
- return in_unlocked ? 0 : -EACCES;
+ return -EACCES;
/* SCX struct_ops: check the per-op allow list. */
+ if (in_any || in_idle)
+ return 0;
+
moff = prog->aux->attach_st_ops_member_off;
flags = scx_kf_allow_flags[SCX_MOFF_IDX(moff)];
diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c b/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c
index 443d12a3df67..c43d62d90e40 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/ext_idle.c
@@ -1467,6 +1467,7 @@ BTF_KFUNCS_END(scx_kfunc_ids_idle)
static const struct btf_kfunc_id_set scx_kfunc_set_idle = {
.owner = THIS_MODULE,
.set = &scx_kfunc_ids_idle,
+ .filter = scx_kfunc_context_filter,
};
/*
diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext_idle.h b/kernel/sched/ext_idle.h
index dc35f850481e..8d169d3bbdf9 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/ext_idle.h
+++ b/kernel/sched/ext_idle.h
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
struct sched_ext_ops;
+extern struct btf_id_set8 scx_kfunc_ids_idle;
extern struct btf_id_set8 scx_kfunc_ids_select_cpu;
void scx_idle_update_selcpu_topology(struct sched_ext_ops *ops);
--
2.48.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-04-20 9:29 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-04-20 9:28 [PATCH v2 sched_ext/for-7.1-fixes 0/2] sched_ext: Deny SCX kfuncs to non-SCX struct_ops programs Cheng-Yang Chou
2026-04-20 9:28 ` Cheng-Yang Chou [this message]
2026-04-20 9:28 ` [PATCH v2 2/2] selftests/sched_ext: Add non_scx_kfunc_deny test Cheng-Yang Chou
2026-04-20 18:02 ` [PATCH v2 sched_ext/for-7.1-fixes 0/2] sched_ext: Deny SCX kfuncs to non-SCX struct_ops programs Tejun Heo
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