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From: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
To: corbet@lwn.net, song@kernel.org, kpsingh@kernel.org,
	mattbobrowski@google.com, ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net,
	andrii@kernel.org, eddyz87@gmail.com, memxor@gmail.com,
	rostedt@goodmis.org, mhiramat@kernel.org
Cc: skhan@linuxfoundation.org, jolsa@kernel.org,
	martin.lau@linux.dev, yonghong.song@linux.dev,
	mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com, atomlin@atomlin.com,
	neelx@suse.com, sean@ashe.io, chjohnst@gmail.com, steve@abita.co,
	mproche@gmail.com, nick.lange@gmail.com,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-trace-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH] bpf: introduce TAINT_UNSAFE_BPF for mutating helpers
Date: Sat,  2 May 2026 23:52:20 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260503035220.520479-1-atomlin@atomlin.com> (raw)

The primary remit of the eBPF verifier is to ensure that eBPF programs
can neither crash the kernel nor corrupt memory. Nevertheless,
administrative utilities such as "bpftrace --unsafe" permit the loading
of programs that employ destructive or mutating helpers, most notably
bpf_probe_write_user() and bpf_override_return().

Since commit b28573ebfabe ("bpf: Remove bpf_probe_write_user() warning
message"), the kernel no longer issues a warning when an attempt is made to
invoke such destructive helpers.

Consequently, this patch introduces a novel kernel taint flag,
TAINT_UNSAFE_BPF ("V"). Tainting the kernel establishes a permanent and
readily auditable indicator (i.e., /proc/sys/kernel/tainted) to alert
maintainers and that the kernel's execution flow or user memory may have
been compromised by an eBPF program.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Tomlin <atomlin@atomlin.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst | 54 ++++++++++---------
 include/linux/panic.h                         |  3 +-
 kernel/panic.c                                |  1 +
 kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c                      |  3 ++
 4 files changed, 36 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst
index 9ead927a37c0..630f24996e7b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/tainted-kernels.rst
@@ -79,30 +79,31 @@ which bits are set::
 Table for decoding tainted state
 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
-===  ===  ======  ========================================================
-Bit  Log  Number  Reason that got the kernel tainted
-===  ===  ======  ========================================================
-  0  G/P       1  proprietary module was loaded
-  1  _/F       2  module was force loaded
-  2  _/S       4  kernel running on an out of specification system
-  3  _/R       8  module was force unloaded
-  4  _/M      16  processor reported a Machine Check Exception (MCE)
-  5  _/B      32  bad page referenced or some unexpected page flags
-  6  _/U      64  taint requested by userspace application
-  7  _/D     128  kernel died recently, i.e. there was an OOPS or BUG
-  8  _/A     256  ACPI table overridden by user
-  9  _/W     512  kernel issued warning
- 10  _/C    1024  staging driver was loaded
- 11  _/I    2048  workaround for bug in platform firmware applied
- 12  _/O    4096  externally-built ("out-of-tree") module was loaded
- 13  _/E    8192  unsigned module was loaded
- 14  _/L   16384  soft lockup occurred
- 15  _/K   32768  kernel has been live patched
- 16  _/X   65536  auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros
- 17  _/T  131072  kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin
- 18  _/N  262144  an in-kernel test has been run
- 19  _/J  524288  userspace used a mutating debug operation in fwctl
-===  ===  ======  ========================================================
+===  ===   ======  ========================================================
+Bit  Log   Number  Reason that got the kernel tainted
+===  ===   ======  ========================================================
+  0  G/P        1  proprietary module was loaded
+  1  _/F        2  module was force loaded
+  2  _/S        4  kernel running on an out of specification system
+  3  _/R        8  module was force unloaded
+  4  _/M       16  processor reported a Machine Check Exception (MCE)
+  5  _/B       32  bad page referenced or some unexpected page flags
+  6  _/U       64  taint requested by userspace application
+  7  _/D      128  kernel died recently, i.e. there was an OOPS or BUG
+  8  _/A      256  ACPI table overridden by user
+  9  _/W      512  kernel issued warning
+ 10  _/C     1024  staging driver was loaded
+ 11  _/I     2048  workaround for bug in platform firmware applied
+ 12  _/O     4096  externally-built ("out-of-tree") module was loaded
+ 13  _/E     8192  unsigned module was loaded
+ 14  _/L    16384  soft lockup occurred
+ 15  _/K    32768  kernel has been live patched
+ 16  _/X    65536  auxiliary taint, defined for and used by distros
+ 17  _/T   131072  kernel was built with the struct randomization plugin
+ 18  _/N   262144  an in-kernel test has been run
+ 19  _/J   524288  userspace used a mutating debug operation in fwctl
+ 20  _/V  1048576  an unsafe eBPF program (mutating helper) was loaded
+===  ===  =======  ========================================================
 
 Note: The character ``_`` is representing a blank in this table to make reading
 easier.
@@ -189,3 +190,8 @@ More detailed explanation for tainting
  19) ``J`` if userspace opened /dev/fwctl/* and performed a FWTCL_RPC_DEBUG_WRITE
      to use the devices debugging features. Device debugging features could
      cause the device to malfunction in undefined ways.
+
+ 20) ``V`` if an eBPF program utilising unsafe, mutating helpers (such as
+     bpf_probe_write_user() or bpf_override_return()) was loaded. These helpers
+     bypass standard eBPF safety guarantees and can alter execution flow or
+     corrupt memory.
diff --git a/include/linux/panic.h b/include/linux/panic.h
index f1dd417e54b2..8622c02c2c24 100644
--- a/include/linux/panic.h
+++ b/include/linux/panic.h
@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ static inline void set_arch_panic_timeout(int timeout, int arch_default_timeout)
 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT		17
 #define TAINT_TEST			18
 #define TAINT_FWCTL			19
-#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		20
+#define TAINT_UNSAFE_BPF		20
+#define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT		21
 #define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX			((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1)
 
 struct taint_flag {
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 20feada5319d..1ae19bd8fc1d 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -825,6 +825,7 @@ const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
 	TAINT_FLAG(RANDSTRUCT,			'T', ' '),
 	TAINT_FLAG(TEST,			'N', ' '),
 	TAINT_FLAG(FWCTL,			'J', ' '),
+	TAINT_FLAG(UNSAFE_BPF,			'V', ' '),
 };
 
 #undef TAINT_FLAG
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index af7079aa0f36..4e7e5bf76dcb 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ unsigned int trace_call_bpf(struct trace_event_call *call, void *ctx)
 #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_KPROBE_OVERRIDE
 BPF_CALL_2(bpf_override_return, struct pt_regs *, regs, unsigned long, rc)
 {
+	add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_BPF, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
 	regs_set_return_value(regs, rc);
 	override_function_with_return(regs);
 	return 0;
@@ -344,6 +345,8 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void __user *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
 	if (unlikely(!nmi_uaccess_okay()))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	add_taint(TAINT_UNSAFE_BPF, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
+
 	return copy_to_user_nofault(unsafe_ptr, src, size);
 }
 
-- 
2.51.0


             reply	other threads:[~2026-05-03  3:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-03  3:52 Aaron Tomlin [this message]
2026-05-03  4:00 ` [RFC PATCH] bpf: introduce TAINT_UNSAFE_BPF for mutating helpers sashiko-bot
2026-05-03  4:29 ` Randy Dunlap
2026-05-03 15:23   ` Aaron Tomlin
2026-05-03  4:44 ` bot+bpf-ci
2026-05-03 15:21   ` Aaron Tomlin

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