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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Pankaj Gupta" <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>
Cc: imx@lists.linux.dev, Frank.Li@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH -next] firmware: imx: secure-enclave: drop invalid overflow check in iobuf setup
Date: Thu, 14 May 2026 17:26:07 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260514172607.DB36EC2BCB3@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260514090321.2186877-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] Removing the `io.length > SIZE_MAX - 7` check introduces an integer overflow in `round_up()` on 32-bit architectures, leading to a massive out-of-bounds write.
--

commit f1f29a6c58c5d6e658a6207ce15040a2bef1f1c1
Author: Pankaj Gupta <pankaj.gupta@nxp.com>

firmware: imx: secure-enclave: drop invalid overflow check in iobuf setup

This commit removes a check comparing io.length against SIZE_MAX - 7, as it
always evaluates to false on 64-bit systems. It instead relies on size_t-based
alignment and existing shared memory bounds validation.

Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202605081441.lIHK75ug-lkp@intel.com/

> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> index f88e581fc147e..1683b259864f1 100644
> --- a/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> +++ b/drivers/firmware/imx/se_ctrl.c
> @@ -670,11 +670,6 @@ static int se_ioctl_setup_iobuf_handler(struct se_if_device_ctx *dev_ctx,
>  		goto copy;
>  	}
>  
> -	if (io.length > SIZE_MAX - 7) {
> -		dev_err(dev_ctx->priv->dev, "%s: Invalid buffer length.",
> -			dev_ctx->devname);
> -		return -EINVAL;
> -	}
>  	aligned_len = round_up((size_t)io.length, 8);

On 32-bit platforms where size_t is 32 bits, can this round_up() overflow if
io.length is near U32_MAX?

If io.length is between 0xFFFFFFF9 and 0xFFFFFFFF, round_up() will wrap
around to 0.

If aligned_len wraps to 0, does it bypass the subsequent shared memory bounds
validation?

	if (shared_mem->size < shared_mem->pos ||
	    aligned_len > (shared_mem->size - shared_mem->pos)) {

This appears to cause a regression where the following memset() can perform an
out-of-bounds write using the original un-rounded io.length value:

	memset(shared_mem->ptr + pos, 0, io.length);

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260514090321.2186877-1-pankaj.gupta@nxp.com?part=1

  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-14 17:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-14  9:03 [PATCH -next] firmware: imx: secure-enclave: drop invalid overflow check in iobuf setup Pankaj Gupta
2026-05-14 17:26 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-01 16:21 ` Frank.Li

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