From: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
To: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linuxfoundation.org>,
Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>
Cc: "David Hildenbrand (Arm)" <david@kernel.org>,
Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
Qualys Security Advisory <qsa@qualys.com>,
Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>, Minchan Kim <minchan@kernel.org>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, Suren Baghdasaryan <surenb@google.com>,
Lorenzo Stoakes <ljs@kernel.org>,
"Liam R. Howlett" <liam@infradead.org>,
Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@kernel.org>,
Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>, Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
"Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH RFC v2 1/5] sched/coredump: introduce enum task_dumpable
Date: Wed, 20 May 2026 16:42:54 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260520-work-task_exec_state-v2-1-9ea88ceb09e6@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260520-work-task_exec_state-v2-0-9ea88ceb09e6@kernel.org>
Replace the SUID_DUMP_DISABLE/USER/ROOT preprocessor constants with
enum task_dumpable. Numeric values are preserved (kernel.suid_dumpable
sysctl and prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE) ABI), so this is a pure rename with
no behavioral change.
Subsequent commits relocate dumpability onto a per-task structure
where the enum type will allow stronger type-checking on the new API.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c | 2 +-
fs/coredump.c | 4 ++--
fs/exec.c | 8 ++++----
fs/pidfs.c | 6 +++---
fs/proc/base.c | 2 +-
include/linux/mm_types.h | 2 +-
include/linux/sched/coredump.h | 15 +++++++++++----
kernel/exit.c | 2 +-
kernel/ptrace.c | 4 ++--
kernel/sys.c | 2 +-
10 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
index 6874b16d0657..904ac41f93bc 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/mte.c
@@ -538,7 +538,7 @@ static int access_remote_tags(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
return -EPERM;
if (!tsk->ptrace || (current != tsk->parent) ||
- ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ ((get_dumpable(mm) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) &&
!ptracer_capable(tsk, mm->user_ns))) {
mmput(mm);
return -EPERM;
diff --git a/fs/coredump.c b/fs/coredump.c
index bb6fdb1f458e..f5348d5bc441 100644
--- a/fs/coredump.c
+++ b/fs/coredump.c
@@ -873,7 +873,7 @@ static inline bool coredump_socket(struct core_name *cn, struct coredump_params
static inline bool coredump_force_suid_safe(const struct coredump_params *cprm)
{
/* Require nonrelative corefile path and be extra careful. */
- return __get_dumpable(cprm->mm_flags) == SUID_DUMP_ROOT;
+ return __get_dumpable(cprm->mm_flags) == TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT;
}
static bool coredump_file(struct core_name *cn, struct coredump_params *cprm,
@@ -1419,7 +1419,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(dump_align);
void validate_coredump_safety(void)
{
- if (suid_dumpable == SUID_DUMP_ROOT &&
+ if (suid_dumpable == TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT &&
core_pattern[0] != '/' && core_pattern[0] != '|' && core_pattern[0] != '@') {
coredump_report_failure("Unsafe core_pattern used with fs.suid_dumpable=2: "
diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c
index ba12b4c466f6..f5663bb607d3 100644
--- a/fs/exec.c
+++ b/fs/exec.c
@@ -1212,7 +1212,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
gid_eq(current_egid(), current_gid())))
set_dumpable(current->mm, suid_dumpable);
else
- set_dumpable(current->mm, SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ set_dumpable(current->mm, TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER);
perf_event_exec();
@@ -1261,7 +1261,7 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm)
* wait until new credentials are committed
* by commit_creds() above
*/
- if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ if (get_dumpable(me->mm) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER)
perf_event_exit_task(me);
/*
* cred_guard_mutex must be held at least to this point to prevent
@@ -1906,11 +1906,11 @@ void set_binfmt(struct linux_binfmt *new)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_binfmt);
/*
- * set_dumpable stores three-value SUID_DUMP_* into mm->flags.
+ * set_dumpable stores three-value TASK_DUMPABLE_* into mm->flags.
*/
void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value)
{
- if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > SUID_DUMP_ROOT))
+ if (WARN_ON((unsigned)value > TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT))
return;
__mm_flags_set_mask_dumpable(mm, value);
diff --git a/fs/pidfs.c b/fs/pidfs.c
index 1cce4f34a051..9cd12f2f004c 100644
--- a/fs/pidfs.c
+++ b/fs/pidfs.c
@@ -341,11 +341,11 @@ static inline bool pid_in_current_pidns(const struct pid *pid)
static __u32 pidfs_coredump_mask(unsigned long mm_flags)
{
switch (__get_dumpable(mm_flags)) {
- case SUID_DUMP_USER:
+ case TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER:
return PIDFD_COREDUMP_USER;
- case SUID_DUMP_ROOT:
+ case TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT:
return PIDFD_COREDUMP_ROOT;
- case SUID_DUMP_DISABLE:
+ case TASK_DUMPABLE_OFF:
return PIDFD_COREDUMP_SKIP;
default:
WARN_ON_ONCE(true);
diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index d9acfa89c894..da0b316befb8 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -1909,7 +1909,7 @@ void task_dump_owner(struct task_struct *task, umode_t mode,
mm = task->mm;
/* Make non-dumpable tasks owned by some root */
if (mm) {
- if (get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
+ if (get_dumpable(mm) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) {
struct user_namespace *user_ns = mm->user_ns;
uid = make_kuid(user_ns, 0);
diff --git a/include/linux/mm_types.h b/include/linux/mm_types.h
index a308e2c23b82..51ea37b2a0aa 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm_types.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm_types.h
@@ -1908,7 +1908,7 @@ enum {
/*
* The first two bits represent core dump modes for set-user-ID,
- * the modes are SUID_DUMP_* defined in linux/sched/coredump.h
+ * the modes are TASK_DUMPABLE_* defined in linux/sched/coredump.h
*/
#define MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS 2
#define MMF_DUMPABLE_MASK (BIT(MMF_DUMPABLE_BITS) - 1)
diff --git a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
index 624fda17a785..ed6547692b61 100644
--- a/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
+++ b/include/linux/sched/coredump.h
@@ -4,9 +4,16 @@
#include <linux/mm_types.h>
-#define SUID_DUMP_DISABLE 0 /* No setuid dumping */
-#define SUID_DUMP_USER 1 /* Dump as user of process */
-#define SUID_DUMP_ROOT 2 /* Dump as root */
+/*
+ * Task dumpability mode. Gates core dump production and ptrace_attach()
+ * authorization. The numeric values are stable ABI (suid_dumpable
+ * sysctl, prctl(PR_SET_DUMPABLE)); do not renumber.
+ */
+enum task_dumpable {
+ TASK_DUMPABLE_OFF = 0, /* no dump; ptrace needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
+ TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER = 1, /* default; dump and ptrace by uid match */
+ TASK_DUMPABLE_ROOT = 2, /* dump as root; ptrace needs CAP_SYS_PTRACE */
+};
static inline unsigned long __mm_flags_get_dumpable(const struct mm_struct *mm)
{
@@ -26,7 +33,7 @@ extern void set_dumpable(struct mm_struct *mm, int value);
/*
* This returns the actual value of the suid_dumpable flag. For things
* that are using this for checking for privilege transitions, it must
- * test against SUID_DUMP_USER rather than treating it as a boolean
+ * test against TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER rather than treating it as a boolean
* value.
*/
static inline int __get_dumpable(unsigned long mm_flags)
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index f50d73c272d6..507eda655e8d 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static void exit_mm(void)
*/
smp_mb__after_spinlock();
local_irq_disable();
- current->user_dumpable = (get_dumpable(mm) == SUID_DUMP_USER);
+ current->user_dumpable = (get_dumpable(mm) == TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER);
current->mm = NULL;
membarrier_update_current_mm(NULL);
enter_lazy_tlb(mm, current);
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index 130043bfc209..07398c9c8fe3 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ int ptrace_access_vm(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long addr,
if (!tsk->ptrace ||
(current != tsk->parent) ||
- ((get_dumpable(mm) != SUID_DUMP_USER) &&
+ ((get_dumpable(mm) != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) &&
!ptracer_capable(tsk, mm->user_ns))) {
mmput(mm);
return 0;
@@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ static bool task_still_dumpable(struct task_struct *task, unsigned int mode)
{
struct mm_struct *mm = task->mm;
if (mm) {
- if (get_dumpable(mm) == SUID_DUMP_USER)
+ if (get_dumpable(mm) == TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER)
return true;
return ptrace_has_cap(mm->user_ns, mode);
}
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 62e842055cc9..f1189f719db5 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2568,7 +2568,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, arg2, unsigned long, arg3,
error = get_dumpable(me->mm);
break;
case PR_SET_DUMPABLE:
- if (arg2 != SUID_DUMP_DISABLE && arg2 != SUID_DUMP_USER) {
+ if (arg2 != TASK_DUMPABLE_OFF && arg2 != TASK_DUMPABLE_OWNER) {
error = -EINVAL;
break;
}
--
2.47.3
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-20 14:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-20 14:42 [PATCH RFC v2 0/5] ptrace: keep mm metadata accessible past exit_mm() Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 14:42 ` Christian Brauner [this message]
2026-05-20 16:27 ` [PATCH RFC v2 1/5] sched/coredump: introduce enum task_dumpable Jann Horn
2026-05-20 14:42 ` [PATCH RFC v2 2/5] exec: introduce struct task_exec_state and relocate dumpable Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 15:14 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-05-20 15:24 ` Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 16:27 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 19:47 ` Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 14:42 ` [PATCH RFC v2 3/5] ptrace: add ptracer_access_allowed() Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 16:28 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 14:42 ` [PATCH RFC v2 4/5] exec_state: relocate dumpable information Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 19:21 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 19:47 ` Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 14:42 ` [PATCH RFC v2 5/5] cred: switch dumpability lowering to task_exec_state Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 18:44 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 15:08 ` [PATCH RFC v2 0/5] ptrace: keep mm metadata accessible past exit_mm() Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 16:27 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 16:52 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-05-20 16:55 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-05-20 18:09 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 18:12 ` Linus Torvalds
2026-05-20 19:46 ` Christian Brauner
2026-05-20 17:29 ` Jann Horn
2026-05-20 18:11 ` Linus Torvalds
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