From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 04FD932D42B; Sat, 30 May 2026 17:01:33 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1780160495; cv=none; b=TWfWp0j1Gz23mZuwxK12CsxJ8EIbmJBUZYQ28dP+2xYeqFyTvP8Kd1PTEi9vBs0mGLO7e00QIiYSx2vXKLGbPERoCChYQmK+/ktnJ7gRR/dCBmk0JZ/PuOynpCJ79hMMM32f/QFwnAs2HHC4Cyo24+4WqEf29gSfjPB9qTc8X1M= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1780160495; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Dqh/IL8UF/LqIOwG+HqOYsgPgCnO6H/e4sAx2afH9bc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=KDcWBay98UpsqqqhJDrZAYhMb6J/nlFDTyNFNY9cerIj1jUVMExZqRiQmHSLg2351VV+VZF6CFBGmWpPQ2TCCm9zSB47wT6OqCN4bckKO4U078xbSV0lVL+njHDVUQDhaUFIuspNkTKwqRA4ZJENJOg3ma9Zzbx6WHodCeRz5D0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=TeM4q+l/; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="TeM4q+l/" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D00C01F00893; Sat, 30 May 2026 17:01:32 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1780160493; bh=PrvCNAcMwtt7LZ6auAaCrQbWv+qtilu3ta44D2Cz9H0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=TeM4q+l/fEKPpBHsNDq76XeF/pgMQ4hNv0k4QE2xxgSZOVC1liYcrXsY0wTfeTGlm /SPoMwRP1JZYr5jXP4DNGJ9E/wGk8fVx+AQoV6NTYGNfvhFTi2xIPgUFKOWJmlKyEh jEDwyAmRXWAoXau3ZQwBdYuVhdvGKnBwJbcSMiJA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Michael Bommarito , Jan Kara Subject: [PATCH 6.1 354/969] isofs: validate Rock Ridge CE continuation extent against volume size Date: Sat, 30 May 2026 17:57:58 +0200 Message-ID: <20260530160310.122327583@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <20260530160300.485627683@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260530160300.485627683@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michael Bommarito commit a36d990f591320e9dd379ab30063ebfe91d47e1f upstream. rock_continue() reads rs->cont_extent verbatim from the Rock Ridge CE record and passes it to sb_bread() without checking that the block number is within the mounted ISO 9660 volume. commit e595447e177b ("[PATCH] rock.c: handle corrupted directories") added cont_offset and cont_size rejection for the CE continuation but did not validate the extent block number itself. commit f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries") later capped the CE chain length at RR_MAX_CE_ENTRIES = 32 but again left the block number unchecked. With a crafted ISO mounted via udisks2 (desktop optical auto-mount) or via CAP_SYS_ADMIN mount, rs->cont_extent can therefore point at an out-of-range block or at blocks belonging to an adjacent filesystem on the same block device. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the block layer EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent- filesystem data, the CE buffer is parsed as Rock Ridge records and only the text of SL sub-records reaches userspace through readlink(), which makes the info-leak channel narrow and difficult to exploit; still, rejecting the malformed CE outright matches the rejection shape already present in the same function for cont_offset and cont_size. Add an ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones bounds check to rock_continue() next to the existing offset/size rejection, printing the same corrupted-directory-entry notice. Fixes: f54e18f1b831 ("isofs: Fix infinite looping over CE entries") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419212155.2169382-2-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jan Kara Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/isofs/rock.c | 9 +++++++++ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+) --- a/fs/isofs/rock.c +++ b/fs/isofs/rock.c @@ -101,6 +101,15 @@ static int rock_continue(struct rock_sta goto out; } + if ((unsigned)rs->cont_extent >= ISOFS_SB(rs->inode->i_sb)->s_nzones) { + printk(KERN_NOTICE "rock: corrupted directory entry. " + "extent=%u out of volume (nzones=%lu)\n", + (unsigned)rs->cont_extent, + ISOFS_SB(rs->inode->i_sb)->s_nzones); + ret = -EIO; + goto out; + } + if (rs->cont_extent) { struct buffer_head *bh;