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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: tabba@google.com
Cc: kvmarm@lists.linux.dev, "Oliver Upton" <oupton@kernel.org>,
	"Marc Zyngier" <maz@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v1 08/11] KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives
Date: Fri, 12 Jun 2026 07:08:18 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260612070819.64FE01F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260612065925.755562-9-tabba@google.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] flush_hyp_vcpu() incorrectly copies MDCR_EL2 from the untrusted host context for protected VMs, violating EL2 security guidelines.
--

commit 11498ed516d4ebc65b4ad00086974239ee0e2eb4
Author: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives

This commit introduces primitives to translate a host vCPU into the
hypervisor's address space. It refactors handle___kvm_vcpu_run() to use
these new lookup primitives.

> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -214,23 +245,16 @@ static void handle___kvm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt)
>  			goto out;
>  		}
>  
> -		if (!hyp_vcpu) {
> -			ret = -EINVAL;
> -			goto out;
> -		}
> -
>  		flush_hyp_vcpu(hyp_vcpu);

[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but does flush_hyp_vcpu() incorrectly copy
mdcr_el2 from the untrusted host context for protected VMs?

Looking at flush_hyp_vcpu() in arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/hyp-main.c:

static void flush_hyp_vcpu(struct pkvm_hyp_vcpu *hyp_vcpu)
{
        struct kvm_vcpu *host_vcpu = hyp_vcpu->host_vcpu;
        [ ... ]
        hyp_vcpu->vcpu.arch.mdcr_el2 = host_vcpu->arch.mdcr_el2;
        [ ... ]
}

According to the pKVM EL2 Security and Trust Boundary guidelines, trap
configuration registers like mdcr_el2 must be initialized in an EL2-private
context for protected VMs. They must not rely on values written by the host.

Because host_vcpu resides in untrusted host memory, this unconditional
assignment could allow a compromised host to overwrite the mdcr_el2
configuration of a protected VM. This could potentially allow the host to
manipulate guest debug exceptions and break guest confidentiality or
hypervisor isolation.

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260612065925.755562-1-tabba@google.com?part=8

  reply	other threads:[~2026-06-12  7:08 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-12  6:59 [PATCH v1 00/11] KVM: arm64: Rework pKVM vCPU state synchronisation tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 01/11] KVM: arm64: Add scoped resource management (guard) for hyp_spinlock tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 02/11] KVM: arm64: Use guard(hyp_spinlock) in pKVM hypervisor code tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 03/11] KVM: arm64: Use guard()/scoped_guard() in arm64 KVM EL1 code tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 04/11] KVM: arm64: Extract MPIDR computation into a shared header tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 05/11] KVM: arm64: Make vcpu_{read,write}_sys_reg available to HYP code tabba
2026-06-12  7:17   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12  7:53     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 06/11] KVM: arm64: Factor out reusable vCPU reset helpers tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 07/11] KVM: arm64: Move PSCI helper functions to a shared header tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 08/11] KVM: arm64: Add host and hypervisor vCPU lookup primitives tabba
2026-06-12  7:08   ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-12  7:15     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 09/11] KVM: arm64: Minimise EL2's exposure of host VGIC state during world switch tabba
2026-06-12  7:24   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12  8:05     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12  8:09       ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 10/11] KVM: arm64: Add primitives to flush/sync the VGIC state at EL2 tabba
2026-06-12  7:23   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12  8:14     ` Fuad Tabba
2026-06-12  6:59 ` [PATCH v1 11/11] KVM: arm64: Implement lazy vCPU state sync for non-protected guests tabba
2026-06-12  7:19   ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12  9:51     ` Fuad Tabba

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