From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Bobby Eshleman" <bobbyeshleman@gmail.com>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 1/4] net: devmem: allow rx-buf-size > PAGE_SIZE per dmabuf binding
Date: Sat, 13 Jun 2026 16:28:19 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260613162820.2CE481F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260612-tcpdm-large-niovs-v3-1-a3b693e76fcb@meta.com>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 2 potential issue(s) to consider:
New issues:
- [Critical] Integer overflow and signedness bug leading to a negative array index and out-of-bounds memory corruption on 32-bit architectures.
Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Sleeping in atomic context due to kvfree() inside an RCU read-side critical section.
--
commit b8e27f9eee44549dc6869beb99adddc8150160f6
Author: Bobby Eshleman <bobbyeshleman@meta.com>
net: devmem: allow rx-buf-size > PAGE_SIZE per dmabuf binding
Every devmem dmabuf binding today hands the page_pool PAGE_SIZE niovs.
This caps a single RX descriptor at PAGE_SIZE, burning CPU on buffer
churn for large flows.
Add a bind-time netlink attribute, NETDEV_A_DMABUF_RX_BUF_SIZE, that
lets userspace request a larger niov size. The value must be a power of
two >= PAGE_SIZE.
[ ... ]
> diff --git a/net/core/devmem.c b/net/core/devmem.c
> index 957d6b96216b3..3ce3cc14bec07 100644
> --- a/net/core/devmem.c
> +++ b/net/core/devmem.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -93,13 +93,14 @@ net_devmem_alloc_dmabuf(struct net_devmem_dmabuf_binding *binding)
> ssize_t offset;
> ssize_t index;
>
> - dma_addr = gen_pool_alloc_owner(binding->chunk_pool, PAGE_SIZE,
> + dma_addr = gen_pool_alloc_owner(binding->chunk_pool,
> + 1UL << binding->niov_shift,
> (void **)&owner);
> if (!dma_addr)
> return NULL;
>
> offset = dma_addr - owner->base_dma_addr;
> - index = offset / PAGE_SIZE;
> + index = offset >> binding->niov_shift;
[Severity: Critical]
Does this bitwise shift cause a negative array index on 32-bit architectures?
Since a dma-buf scatterlist entry size (len) can be up to 4GB-1, the offset
within a chunk can be >= 2GB. On 32-bit architectures, ssize_t is a 32-bit
signed integer, so an offset >= 2GB overflows and becomes negative.
In the original code, the division promoted offset to an unsigned long
because PAGE_SIZE is unsigned, resulting in a correct positive index:
index = offset / PAGE_SIZE;
However, the type of a bitwise shift result is determined solely by the
promoted left operand. By changing this to a bitwise right shift:
index = offset >> binding->niov_shift;
the result remains signed. An arithmetic right shift of a negative number
produces a negative index, which can lead to an out-of-bounds write on
owner->area.niovs[index] later in the function.
> niov = &owner->area.niovs[index];
>
> niov->desc.pp_magic = 0;
[ ... ]
> @@ -273,9 +277,12 @@ net_devmem_bind_dmabuf(struct net_device *dev, void *vdev,
> size_t len = sg_dma_len(sg);
> struct net_iov *niov;
>
> - if (!IS_ALIGNED(len, PAGE_SIZE)) {
> + if (!IS_ALIGNED(dma_addr, niov_size) ||
> + !IS_ALIGNED(len, niov_size)) {
> err = -EINVAL;
> - NL_SET_ERR_MSG(extack, "dma-buf SG length must be PAGE_SIZE aligned");
> + NL_SET_ERR_MSG_FMT(extack,
> + "dmabuf sg entry (addr=%pad, len=%zu) not aligned to niov size %zu",
> + &dma_addr, len, niov_size);
> goto err_free_chunks;
[Severity: High]
This is a pre-existing issue, but can this error path lead to a panic by
sleeping in atomic context?
When goto err_free_chunks is taken, the error path handles cleanup using
gen_pool_for_each_chunk(), which iterates over chunks with rcu_read_lock()
held:
lib/genalloc.c:gen_pool_for_each_chunk() {
rcu_read_lock();
list_for_each_entry_rcu(chunk, &(pool)->chunks, next_chunk)
func(pool, chunk, data);
rcu_read_unlock();
}
The callback net_devmem_dmabuf_free_chunk_owner() then frees the memory:
net/core/devmem.c:net_devmem_dmabuf_free_chunk_owner() {
...
kvfree(owner->area.niovs);
...
}
If the allocated array is large enough to use the vmalloc fallback, kvfree()
internally invokes vfree(). Since vfree() is not allowed in atomic context
and calls might_sleep(), won't this trigger a 'scheduling while atomic' bug
when the RCU read-side critical section is held?
> }
>
[ ... ]
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260612-tcpdm-large-niovs-v3-0-a3b693e76fcb@meta.com?part=1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-13 16:28 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-12 16:25 [PATCH net-next v3 0/4] net: devmem: allow rx-buf-size > PAGE_SIZE per binding Bobby Eshleman
2026-06-12 16:25 ` [PATCH net-next v3 1/4] net: devmem: allow rx-buf-size > PAGE_SIZE per dmabuf binding Bobby Eshleman
2026-06-13 16:28 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-06-12 16:25 ` [PATCH net-next v3 2/4] udmabuf: emit one sg entry per pinned folio Bobby Eshleman
2026-06-13 16:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 16:25 ` [PATCH net-next v3 3/4] selftests/net: ncdevmem: add -b option to set rx-buf-size on bind Bobby Eshleman
2026-06-13 2:03 ` Stanislav Fomichev
2026-06-13 16:28 ` sashiko-bot
2026-06-12 16:26 ` [PATCH net-next v3 4/4] selftests/net: devmem.py: add check_rx_large_niov Bobby Eshleman
2026-06-13 2:03 ` Stanislav Fomichev
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