From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D89CF3EB0F5; Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:59:47 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781636388; cv=none; b=dyJ3JdBJNMFeRySZRPjNIGVb3RwqgNXDDJGDKKY1JVjF9zYXtgKayFmF4skoHwO2gb9OXMsqM7CYisBuwQyulnDly4WuV7YYart2OSOt9QnFbxMsZJ6EtMhnmGfobFlzOP7RKdSPRV9mONW/kmxZvz0ePXxM8bNM0Xvcxj7pQgk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781636388; c=relaxed/simple; bh=fpUqcsWcSuPwurLOKxMK3/5ELq/5o8AM+etUVGgnJ2c=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=PCbsrbNcyryZJkOHoXa/6gON98+oHB/qq+8HTdCQRH4SiZN5VuV45nNJZ70ErD3fS7Kv80YJPZsoKDuY49nVAeyC0Lqb7nLdhdQthA8UF9qOcKbbxlEdlcn6AkiMgNEn/9XahEkUsKZomu0xFgJwzjJD4QDzhpMxKOkYaxBmc2c= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=h+QMx+ZV; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="h+QMx+ZV" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id C20C81F000E9; Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:59:46 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1781636387; bh=anpk9jAuhVIaBXtTgi+Ko9Nx0rq4c3+Twz9p3EnZq6g=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=h+QMx+ZV26nK+faf8LfLZJOOjvWakdsiC6LZ3WqUR3kemN9y9ICW8hbB39XS1pg4l 3732WWq1+LD4M367JbyAMX98gp1qfymdsQCAG9TdFtu9gEZ8ehHuYPkY1jyIm7X9zp Pg5+3Sdj9uUt1LOgkqlGVO7QB/qEVJLVDwusMD7Y= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Yuhao Jiang , Junrui Luo , Gao Xiang , Chao Yu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10 230/342] erofs: fix the out-of-bounds nameoff handling for trailing dirents Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:28:46 +0530 Message-ID: <20260616145058.915038002@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260616145048.348037099@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260616145048.348037099@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Gao Xiang [ Upstream commit d18a3b5d337fa412a38e776e6b4b857a58836575 ] Currently we already have boundary-checks for nameoffs, but the trailing dirents are special since the namelens are calculated with strnlen() with unchecked nameoffs. If a crafted EROFS has a trailing dirent with nameoff >= maxsize, maxsize - nameoff can underflow, causing strnlen() to read past the directory block. nameoff0 should also be verified to be a multiple of `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` as well [1]. [1] https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260416063511.3173774-1-hsiangkao%40linux.alibaba.com Fixes: 3aa8ec716e52 ("staging: erofs: add directory operations") Fixes: 33bac912840f ("staging: erofs: keep corrupted fs from crashing kernel in erofs_readdir()") Reported-by: Yuhao Jiang Reported-by: Junrui Luo Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/A0FD7E0F-7558-49B0-8BC8-EB1ECDB2479A@outlook.com Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Gao Xiang Reviewed-by: Chao Yu [ replaced upstream `bsz` with `PAGE_SIZE` and `sizeof(*de)` with `sizeof(struct erofs_dirent)` ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/erofs/dir.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++-------------- 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) --- a/fs/erofs/dir.c +++ b/fs/erofs/dir.c @@ -38,20 +38,18 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff); de_name = (char *)dentry_blk + nameoff; - /* the last dirent in the block? */ - if (de + 1 >= end) - de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - else + /* non-trailing dirent in the directory block? */ + if (de + 1 < end) de_namelen = le16_to_cpu(de[1].nameoff) - nameoff; + else if (maxsize <= nameoff) + goto err_bogus; + else + de_namelen = strnlen(de_name, maxsize - nameoff); - /* a corrupted entry is found */ - if (nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize || - de_namelen > EROFS_NAME_LEN) { - erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", - EROFS_I(dir)->nid); - DBG_BUGON(1); - return -EFSCORRUPTED; - } + /* a corrupted entry is found (including negative namelen) */ + if (!in_range32(de_namelen, 1, EROFS_NAME_LEN) || + nameoff + de_namelen > maxsize) + goto err_bogus; debug_one_dentry(d_type, de_name, de_namelen); if (!dir_emit(ctx, de_name, de_namelen, @@ -63,6 +61,10 @@ static int erofs_fill_dentries(struct in } *ofs = maxsize; return 0; +err_bogus: + erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "bogus dirent @ nid %llu", EROFS_I(dir)->nid); + DBG_BUGON(1); + return -EFSCORRUPTED; } static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, struct dir_context *ctx) @@ -96,8 +98,8 @@ static int erofs_readdir(struct file *f, nameoff = le16_to_cpu(de->nameoff); - if (nameoff < sizeof(struct erofs_dirent) || - nameoff >= PAGE_SIZE) { + if (!nameoff || nameoff >= PAGE_SIZE || + (nameoff % sizeof(struct erofs_dirent))) { erofs_err(dir->i_sb, "invalid de[0].nameoff %u @ nid %llu", nameoff, EROFS_I(dir)->nid);