From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8F44736A36C; Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:16:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781633761; cv=none; b=ewBKJqJdgwbLvsYj8lIgDjR3IBskOmTRGVebHamEBGuOoPN4acc/cPBXKSb8BOOH65o596k/H9BSLuylbBW9PmcLDnYksivstdo3ZtB2098dv09tQbtpaOoP0cSsCQnDFW84MoFgy67+7Wew0XeLrMSCrcS8j7hJ6mKla2HZwNo= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1781633761; c=relaxed/simple; bh=BpfMyVFQY09jln+nYmycJbPl/bXaHH/V2SWQ9Cd2wqQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=aQE61WuO1H5WGuU7tuvnheU14KyvGxdVGxOrmBWlwHtDMwH/C8ViTRgqpP/WjwztLm1dZCEfYhhzmX4LgeqRWzG1+3sSEw99MndmxztAxVCUeiVt9vMfzym5vc7/l2pHKobK4KGyMstJqXiRplqW9i4l2ZcmK+clnVUNfh8VrcQ= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=u8ejGSpj; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="u8ejGSpj" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 6CE771F000E9; Tue, 16 Jun 2026 18:15:59 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1781633760; bh=Y+8TefiocJZ3a/qqxHB3lG70n0Zgkt3jjbE9KtvK+nQ=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=u8ejGSpjlfxO/w+LLd/ac8RrjsKDLTx3+BfIqDc2OZaecd93XVXAOiAkKFD93Aaky t+6lRJkHxZz9ia6Na/DCFwscYA+IDOpL0otPO6NirFm1O71hdv5sgZn+fYnX1iZuK4 fJk1ycU74rygq/rEkvnMbgPKc6VU9/LVr2C7qmjI= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, stable , Michael Bommarito Subject: [PATCH 5.15 123/411] usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:26:01 +0530 Message-ID: <20260616145106.863168280@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.54.0 In-Reply-To: <20260616145100.376842714@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260616145100.376842714@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michael Bommarito commit 4e036c10e7f4df5d951c69cc3697bc8e209c6d02 upstream. ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of how many bytes were actually received: data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL); ... ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) ret = -EFAULT; __ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer -- uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS daemon. Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs: * dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT (short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path). * aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket. * renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the request. * dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT. A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer. The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon (adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a 1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer. Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to userspace. Fixes: ddf8abd25994 ("USB: f_fs: the FunctionFS driver") Cc: stable Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7 Signed-off-by: Michael Bommarito Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260419160359.1577270-1-michael.bommarito@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_fs.c @@ -592,7 +592,7 @@ static ssize_t ffs_ep0_read(struct file /* unlocks spinlock */ ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len); - if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len))) + if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, ret))) ret = -EFAULT; goto done_mutex;