From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
patches@lists.linux.dev, Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>,
Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>,
"Christian Brauner (Amutable)" <brauner@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 7.1 1/8] fs/fcntl: fix SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order in fasync signaling
Date: Tue, 16 Jun 2026 20:28:46 +0530 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260616145523.379523542@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260616145523.335696673@linuxfoundation.org>
7.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know.
------------------
From: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
commit 00633c4683828acd5256fa8d5163f440d74bbe71 upstream.
A SOFTIRQ-safe to SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order deadlock can occur in
send_sigio() and send_sigurg() when a process group receives a signal.
When FASYNC is configured for a process group (PIDTYPE_PGID), both
functions use read_lock(&tasklist_lock) to traverse the task list.
However, they are frequently called from softirq context:
- send_sigio() via input_inject_event -> kill_fasync
- send_sigurg() via tcp_check_urg -> sk_send_sigurg (NET_RX_SOFTIRQ)
The deadlock is caused by the rwlock writer fairness mechanism:
1. CPU 0 (process context) holds read_lock(&tasklist_lock) in do_wait().
2. CPU 1 (process context) attempts write_lock(&tasklist_lock) in
fork() or exit() and spins, which blocks all new readers.
3. CPU 0 is interrupted by a softirq (e.g., TCP URG packet reception).
4. The softirq calls send_sigurg() and attempts to acquire
read_lock(&tasklist_lock), deadlocking because CPU 1 is waiting.
Since PID hashing and do_each_pid_task() traversals are already
RCU-protected, the read_lock on tasklist_lock is no longer strictly
required for safe traversal. Fix this by replacing tasklist_lock with
rcu_read_lock(), aligning the process group signaling path with the
single-PID path. This also mitigates a potential remote denial of
service vector via TCP URG packets.
Lockdep splat:
=====================================================
WARNING: SOFTIRQ-safe -> SOFTIRQ-unsafe lock order detected
[...]
Chain exists of:
&dev->event_lock --> &f_owner->lock --> tasklist_lock
Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
lock(tasklist_lock);
local_irq_disable();
lock(&dev->event_lock);
lock(&f_owner->lock);
<Interrupt>
lock(&dev->event_lock);
*** DEADLOCK ***
Reviewed-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Mingyu Wang <25181214217@stu.xidian.edu.cn>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260523135210.590928-1-w15303746062@163.com
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) <brauner@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
---
fs/fcntl.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
--- a/fs/fcntl.c
+++ b/fs/fcntl.c
@@ -929,11 +929,11 @@ void send_sigio(struct fown_struct *fown
send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band, type);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ rcu_read_lock();
do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {
send_sigio_to_task(p, fown, fd, band, type);
} while_each_pid_task(pid, type, p);
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
out_unlock_fown:
read_unlock_irqrestore(&fown->lock, flags);
@@ -975,11 +975,11 @@ int send_sigurg(struct file *file)
send_sigurg_to_task(p, fown, type);
rcu_read_unlock();
} else {
- read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+ rcu_read_lock();
do_each_pid_task(pid, type, p) {
send_sigurg_to_task(p, fown, type);
} while_each_pid_task(pid, type, p);
- read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
}
out_unlock_fown:
read_unlock_irqrestore(&fown->lock, flags);
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-16 15:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-16 14:58 [PATCH 7.1 0/8] 7.1.1-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 2/8] driver core: faux: fix root device registration Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 3/8] driver core: reject devices with unregistered buses Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 4/8] arm64: cputype: Add C1-Ultra definitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 5/8] arm64: cputype: Add C1-Premium definitions Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 6/8] arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on various Arm CPUs Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 7/8] arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on NVIDIA Olympus CPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 14:58 ` [PATCH 7.1 8/8] arm64: errata: Mitigate TLBI errata on Microsoft Azure Cobalt 100 CPU Greg Kroah-Hartman
2026-06-16 16:56 ` [PATCH 7.1 0/8] 7.1.1-rc1 review Brett A C Sheffield
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