Re: [PATCH] libnvdimm/labels: Prevent integer overflow in __nd_label_validate()

[David Laight <david.laight.linux@gmail.com>]

On Sat, 20 Jun 2026 15:54:39 -0500
Bryam Vargas via B4 Relay <devnull+hexlabsecurity.proton.me@kernel.org> wrote:

> From: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
> 
> The on-media namespace index field nslot is a u32 read from the DIMM
> label storage area.  __nd_label_validate() bounds it against the config
> area size, but sizeof_namespace_label() returns unsigned, so the product
> nslot * label_size is evaluated in 32-bit and wraps modulo 2^32 before
> the comparison.  A crafted nslot passes the bound and is then used as the
> loop trip count in nd_label_data_init(), whose memset() walks off the end
> of the config_size buffer: an out-of-bounds write.
> 
> The field is not trusted -- it comes from the medium, or from userspace
> via ND_CMD_SET_CONFIG_DATA.  Evaluate the product in 64-bit so the bound
> check is exact; conforming labels are unaffected.

Is this enough and/or a sane way to stop the overflow.
AFAICT label_size is either 128 or 258.
But I can't see where nsarea.config_size is set.
If it comes from a user ioctl there should be some associated sanity limits.
The same could be done for nslot - any value above 64k is pretty much
guaranteed to be garbage - I'd bet valid values are actually very small
integers.

	David

> 
> Fixes: 564e871aa66f ("libnvdimm, label: add v1.2 nvdimm label definitions")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Bryam Vargas <hexlabsecurity@proton.me>
> ---
> The check was safe when introduced: 4a826c83db4e ("libnvdimm: namespace
> indices: read and validate") multiplied by sizeof(struct
> nd_namespace_label), a size_t, so the product was 64-bit.  564e871aa66f
> replaced that with sizeof_namespace_label(), which returns unsigned, when
> the label size became a runtime value -- narrowing the product to 32 bits.
> 
> The sibling multiply in sizeof_namespace_index() uses an nslot derived
> from config_size (nvdimm_num_label_slots()), not the on-media field, so it
> cannot overflow and is left unchanged.
> 
> Reproduced with an out-of-tree module that mirrors nd_label_data_init() --
> kvzalloc(config_size), the __nd_label_validate() bound check, and the
> memset loop -- since the defect is the wrapped arithmetic into the memset,
> not the DIMM-probe plumbing:
> 
> Build A (without this patch), nslot = 0x02000000, 128-byte labels:
>     the u32 product wraps to 0, the index is accepted, and the loop's
>     memset() writes past the kvzalloc'd buffer ->
>       right of the config_size region -> panic.
>   Build B (with this patch): the 64-bit product exceeds config_size, the
>     index is rejected, the loop never runs -> clean.
>   Control (legitimate small nslot): writes stay in bounds -> clean.
> 
> BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds, Write of size 128, 0 bytes to the
> ---
>  drivers/nvdimm/label.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/drivers/nvdimm/label.c b/drivers/nvdimm/label.c
> index 4218e3ac4a2a..ec12ce72cfe2 100644
> --- a/drivers/nvdimm/label.c
> +++ b/drivers/nvdimm/label.c
> @@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static int __nd_label_validate(struct nvdimm_drvdata *ndd)
>  		}
>  
>  		nslot = __le32_to_cpu(nsindex[i]->nslot);
> -		if (nslot * sizeof_namespace_label(ndd)
> +		if ((u64)nslot * sizeof_namespace_label(ndd)
>  				+ 2 * sizeof_namespace_index(ndd)
>  				> ndd->nsarea.config_size) {  
>  			dev_dbg(dev, "nsindex%d nslot: %u invalid, config_size: %#x\n",
> 
> ---
> base-commit: 8e65320d91cdc3b241d4b94855c88459b91abf66
> change-id: 20260620-b4-disp-7f43b155-92b84c904c08
> 
> Best regards,