From: Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Cc: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
linux-bluetooth@vger.kernel.org, iwd@lists.linux.dev,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org, Milan Broz <gmazyland@gmail.com>,
Demi Marie Obenour <demiobenour@gmail.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Add af_alg_restrict sysctl, defaulting to 1
Date: Tue, 23 Jun 2026 19:27:15 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260623192715.GE1850517@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrXPj0u=FZ=aFcZAHk3fFZa7rCuPEjx6cOMXmT3sdkC7SA@mail.gmail.com>
On Tue, Jun 23, 2026 at 12:12:24PM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote:
> On Mon, Jun 22, 2026 at 4:49 PM Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> wrote:
> >
> > AF_ALG is a frequent source of vulnerabilities and a maintenance
> > nightmare. It exposes far more functionality to userspace than ever
> > should have been exposed, especially to unprivileged processes. Recent
> > exploits have targeted kernel internal implementation details like
> > "authencesn" that have zero use case for userspace access.
> >
> > Fortunately, AF_ALG is rarely used in practice, as userspace crypto
> > libraries exist. And when it is used, only some functionality is known
> > to be used, and many users are known to hold capabilities already.
> > iwd for example requires CAP_NET_ADMIN and has a known algorithm list
> > (https://lore.kernel.org/linux-crypto/bcbbef00-5881-421b-8892-7be6c04b832d@gmail.com/).
> >
> > Thus, let's restrict the set of allowed algorithms by default, depending
> > on the capabilities held.
> >
> > Add a sysctl /proc/sys/crypto/af_alg_restrict with meaning:
> >
> > 0: unrestricted
> > 1: limited functionality
> > 2: completely disabled
> >
> > Set the default value to 1, which enables an algorithm allowlist for
> > unprivileged processes and a slightly longer allowlist for privileged
> > processes.
>
> In our brave new world of containers, this is a bit awkward. The
> admin is sort of asking two separate questions:
>
> 1. Is the actual running distro and its privileged components capable
> of working without AF_ALG or with only the parts marked as being
> unprivileged?
>
> 2. Is the system running contains that need the unprivileged parts?
> (Which is maybe just sha1 for ip? I really don't know.)
>
> Should there maybe be two separate options so that all options are
> available? Or maybe something between 2 and 3 that means "limited
> functionality and privileged modes are completely disabled"?
If we want to offer more settings we could. I could see this getting
quite complex pretty quickly once everyone weighs in, though. There's
quite a bit of value in keeping things simple, even if the offered
settings won't be optimal for every case.
- Eric
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-23 19:27 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-22 23:48 [PATCH] crypto: af_alg - Add af_alg_restrict sysctl, defaulting to 1 Eric Biggers
2026-06-22 23:53 ` bluez.test.bot
2026-06-23 8:42 ` [PATCH] " Bastien Nocera
2026-06-23 16:54 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 15:04 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2026-06-23 16:52 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 17:29 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-06-23 17:45 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 18:05 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 18:51 ` Luiz Augusto von Dentz
2026-06-23 17:24 ` Demi Marie Obenour
2026-06-23 17:58 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 19:12 ` Andy Lutomirski
2026-06-23 19:27 ` Eric Biggers [this message]
2026-06-23 19:24 ` Kees Cook
2026-06-23 19:49 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 21:28 ` Rosen Penev
2026-06-23 21:47 ` Eric Biggers
2026-06-23 22:06 ` Rosen Penev
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