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From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
To: "Yousef Alhouseen" <alhouseenyousef@gmail.com>
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] vfio/type1: validate dirty bitmap page size before use
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 2026 19:25:55 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260624192556.669BB1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260624191204.3774-1-alhouseenyousef@gmail.com>

Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:

Pre-existing issues:
- [High] Calling `__ffs()` and `__fls()` with an argument of 0 results in undefined behavior when userspace passes `dirty.flags = 0`.
--

commit 38ca5c3a7cef062b9bd643fc4332459f28940553
Author: Yousef Alhouseen <alhouseenyousef@gmail.com>

vfio/type1: validate dirty bitmap page size before use

The dirty bitmap ioctl paths derive a shift with __ffs() from the userspace
supplied bitmap page size before comparing it with the IOMMU page size. A zero
page size has undefined behavior, and a non-power-of-2 value makes the bitmap
size check use a different granularity than the page size later accepted by
the ioctl.

> diff --git a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
> index c8151ba54de33..9499381d06a20 100644
> --- a/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c
> +++ b/drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c

[ ... ]

> @@ -3039,6 +3043,9 @@ static int vfio_iommu_type1_dirty_pages(struct vfio_iommu *iommu,

[Severity: High]
This isn't a bug introduced by this patch, but does calling __ffs() and
__fls() with an argument of 0 result in undefined behavior when userspace
passes dirty.flags set to 0?

In vfio_iommu_type1_dirty_pages():

	if (dirty.argsz < minsz || dirty.flags & ~mask)
		return -EINVAL;

	/* only one flag should be set at a time */
	if (__ffs(dirty.flags) != __fls(dirty.flags))
		return -EINVAL;

If dirty.flags is 0, the mask check evaluates to 0 and passes, allowing
__ffs(0) and __fls(0) to execute. Since these macros map to __builtin_ctzl
and __builtin_clzl, this results in undefined behavior.

Could this be triggered by userspace to cause a denial of service?

>  			       range.bitmap.size))
>  			return -EINVAL;
>  
> +		if (!is_power_of_2(range.bitmap.pgsize))
> +			return -EINVAL;
> +
>  		pgshift = __ffs(range.bitmap.pgsize);
>  		ret = verify_bitmap_size(size >> pgshift,
>  					 range.bitmap.size);

-- 
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260624191204.3774-1-alhouseenyousef@gmail.com?part=1

      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-24 19:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 3+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-24 19:12 [PATCH] vfio/type1: validate dirty bitmap page size before use Yousef Alhouseen
2026-06-24 19:22 ` Alex Williamson
2026-06-24 19:25 ` sashiko-bot [this message]

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