From: sashiko-bot@kernel.org
Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 4/8] selinux: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks
Date: Tue, 07 Jul 2026 00:01:26 +0000 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260707000126.AB5AE1F000E9@smtp.kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260706235053.4104951-5-song@kernel.org>
Thank you for your contribution! Sashiko AI review found 1 potential issue(s) to consider:
- [Critical] The patch series unregisters the `sb_mount` and `move_mount` LSM hooks in SELinux and AppArmor, replacing them with new granular hooks (`mount_bind`, `mount_new`, etc.). However, it completely fails to update the VFS layer (`fs/namespace.c`) to actually call these new `security_mount_*` wrappers. Because the VFS still calls the legacy `security_sb_mount()` and `security_move_mount()` functions, and the LSMs no longer provide handlers for them, the LSM framework silently defaults to returning 0 (success). This causes a total bypass of all mount permission checks for both SELinux and AppArmor.
--
--- Patch [4]: [PATCH v6 4/8] selinux: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks ---
commit 55260dac718bdd3a6181cc49259e13a6867345fb
Author: Song Liu <song@kernel.org>
selinux: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks
This commit replaces the monolithic selinux_mount hook with granular
mount hooks such as mount_bind, mount_new, and mount_remount. It removes
the legacy sb_mount and move_mount hooks from the selinux_hooks array.
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 0f704380a8c81..85c168c204364 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
[ ... ]
> @@ -7558,13 +7577,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, selinux_sb_kern_mount),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_show_options, selinux_sb_show_options),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, selinux_sb_statfs),
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, selinux_mount),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mount_bind, selinux_mount_bind),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mount_new, selinux_mount_new),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mount_remount, selinux_mount_remount),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mount_reconfigure, selinux_mount_reconfigure),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mount_change_type, selinux_mount_change_type),
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(mount_move, selinux_move_mount),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, selinux_umount),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, selinux_set_mnt_opts),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_clone_mnt_opts, selinux_sb_clone_mnt_opts),
>
> - LSM_HOOK_INIT(move_mount, selinux_move_mount),
> -
[Severity: Critical]
Are there accompanying changes to the VFS layer in fs/namespace.c to actually
call these new security_mount_* wrappers?
If sb_mount and move_mount are unregistered here, but the VFS still calls the
legacy security_sb_mount() and security_move_mount(), will the LSM framework
silently default to returning 0 (success) because the handlers are gone?
Could this result in a complete bypass of all mount permission checks for
SELinux?
--
Sashiko AI review · https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260706235053.4104951-1-song@kernel.org?part=4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-07-07 0:01 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-07-06 23:50 [PATCH v6 0/8] lsm: Replace security_sb_mount with granular mount hooks Song Liu
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 1/8] lsm: Add " Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:00 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 2/8] apparmor: Remove redundant MS_MGC_MSK stripping in apparmor_sb_mount Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:04 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 3/8] apparmor: Convert from sb_mount to granular mount hooks Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:05 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 4/8] selinux: " Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:01 ` sashiko-bot [this message]
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 5/8] landlock: " Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:04 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 6/8] tomoyo: " Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:04 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 7/8] vfs: Replace security_sb_mount/security_move_mount with granular hooks Song Liu
2026-07-07 0:06 ` sashiko-bot
2026-07-06 23:50 ` [PATCH v6 8/8] lsm: Remove security_sb_mount and security_move_mount Song Liu
2026-07-07 2:08 ` sashiko-bot
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